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I. INTRODUCTION
For roughly a century and a half in United States legal history, territo-
rial theory supplied largely uncontroversial solutions to problems in choice-
of-law. For torts, it was the law of the place of injury; for contracts, the law
of the place where a contract was made or was to be performed. Disputes
involving real property were uniformly referred to the law of the state in
which the property was situated, and those involving personalty to the law of
the state where the owner was domiciled.
So sovereign-seeming were the states of the United States during this
period that these handful of simple rules had about them the aura of ineluc-
tability. Each state had its own distinct legal system, absolute within its
territorial boundaries. These systems had much in common, but there were
differences, often significant ones, and when these differences came to focus
in the occasional conflict-of-laws case, it seemed natural to resolve them by
reference to the law of.the state where legally significant events occurred.!
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; J.D., University of Wisconsin
1966; B.S., United States Military Academy, 1956.
1. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland & Jerry J. Waxman, Florida's Approach to Choice-of-
Law Problems in Tort, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. RFv. 447,453-55 (1984).
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The only debatable question-usually more of theoretical than practical
importance-was why, exactly, a court with complete power to decide a case
would use another state's law rather than its own. To Joseph Story, who
spoke for the nineteenth century, the answer lay in comity-the deference
and respect that one sovereign state owed to the law making power of
another.2 To Joseph Beale, who tried to cement territorial theory for all time
in the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the answer was one of obliga-
tion. One state applied the laws of another because it had to. Legal rights
and liabilities came into existence in the first instance only by virtue of the
law of some place; once created under that law, they were fixed and could
thereafter be enforced in some other place only in the form of their creation.3
Real dissatisfaction with territorial principles began to manifest itself in
the first third of this century.4 " Against a backdrop of monumental change in
the larger society, territoriality and the results it dictated grew increasingly
unpalatable to judges striving to do justice in individual cases and no longer
overawed by notions of sovereignty.5 The result was the well known and
still on-going choice-of-law revolution-a pattern of decision making in
which territorial rules were first avoided and then gradually, starting in the
1960s, rejected outright in a growing number of states for one or another of
2. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 23-25, 32-38 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1st ed. 1834).
3. See 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71, app. at 1964-65
(1935); see also ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OFLAWS 8 (3d ed. 1981):
Mr. Justice Story's "comity" theory held that the forum was free to do as it
wished; the forum, for reasons of practical convenience or moral obligation,
might often permit foreign law to operate.... To Professor Beale and other
vested-rights theorists, "comity" was a fighting word. The term itself implied
that the court possessed an undesirable degree of discretion concerning the appli-
cable law, and the principle violated their view of the territorial premise. Thus
the vested-rights approach stressed a legal obligation to recognize rights based on
foreign law: "A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition
of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot
be called in question anywhere."
Id (quoting BEALE, supra at 1969).
4. See, e.g., Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
Yale L.J. 457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of
Laws, 43 Yale L.J. 736 (1924); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of
Laws, 37 Yale L.J. 468 (1928).
5. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, A Screaming Comes Across the Sky--Tort Choice-of-




Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
1997] Southerland 779
the so-called modem approaches. 6 So much has been made of this revolu-
tion and the new learning it embodies that it is possible to lose sight of an
important point. Most of the pressure for change was felt in just two areas-
in torts primarily and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in contracts. 7
In all this, the Florida experience has been typical. Territorial theory
fell as naturally to hand here as elsewhere, rationalized repeatedly in over a
century's worth of opinions in the language of comity-a beneficial exercise
in that deference and respect that one sovereign state owes the law-making
power of another.8 In 1967, in a wrongful death case arising out of the crash
of a commercial airliner,9 the Supreme Court of Florida moved to align itself
with the modem approach for tort cases then being pioneered by the New
York Court of Appeals, 10 but on rehearing, it reconsidered and reversed
itself.1" Thirteen years later, in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,12 the
court took this step. It discarded lex loci delicti, the inflexible place-of-
injury rule, and replaced it with the most significant relationship approach of
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. After Bishop, it seemed
probable that the venerable lex loci contractus doctrine for contracts cases
would be the next to go, discarded and replaced with a modem approach, the
obvious candidate being the Second Restatement. But when the opportunity
squarely presented itself in 1988 in Sturiano v. Brooks, 3 the court declined
to make the change.
Sturiano involved an automobile insurance contract. The Sturianos,
husband and wife, were lifelong residents of New York and had insured their
6. See, e.g., Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 772, 802-20 (1983).
7. See, e.g., id. at 775-76.
8. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d 12, 16 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 1977); Gillen v. United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1974); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 746
(Fla. 1967); Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 1953);
Markham v. Nisbet, 60 So. 2d 393, 394 (Fla. 1952); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton,
199 So. 50, 54 (Fla. 1940); Beckwith v. Bailey, 161 So. 576, 581 (Fla. 1935); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. City of Thomasville, 130 So. 7, 8 (Fla. 1930); Mott v. First Nat'l
Bank, 124 So. 36, 37 (Fla. 1929); Herron v. Passailaigue, 110 So. 539, 542 (Fla. 1926);
Warren v. Warren, 75 So. 35, 44-45 (Fla. 1917); Walters & Walker v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86, 96
(1860); Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555, 559 (Fla. 1856).
9. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
10. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see also Southerland & Wax-
man, supra note 1, at 536-42.
11. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 749.
12. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
13. 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988).
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car there. At some point after the policy was issued and without notice to
their insurer, they began to spend the winter months each year in Florida.
While in Florida Mr. Sturiano negligently caused an automobile accident in
which he was killed and his wife injured. She brought suit in Florida against
her husband's estate to recover under the policy. Under New York law, her
claim was barred because the Sturianos had not elected coverage for claims
between spouses as required by New York statute. Florida law had no
corresponding provision. 14 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
jury verdict in Mrs. Sturiano's favor, holding that New York law controlled
because the contract of insurance had been made there.' 5 The court then
certified the question whether lex loci contractus should continue to be the
conflicts rule in Florida, precluding consideration of "OTHER RELEVANT
FACTORS, SUCH AS THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FLORIDA AND THE PARTIES AND/OR THE TRANSACTION?
' 16
In a majority opinion by Justice Kogan, the supreme court answered the
certified question affirmatively, though expressly limiting itself to automo-
bile insurance contracts.1 7 The court recognized that lex loci contractus was
"inflexible" and that it had been replaced in other states by modem ap-
proaches.' 8 But it was just this inflexibility that ensured "stability in
contract arrangements;"'
' 9
Although lex loci contractus is old, it is not yet out-
dated.... Parties have a right to know what the agreement they
have executed provides. To allow one party to modify the contract
simply by moving to another state would substantially restrict the
power to enter into valid, binding, and stable contracts. There can
be no doubt that the parties to insurance contracts bargained and
paid for the provisions in the agreement, including those provisions
that apply the statutory law of that state.
... In the case of an insurance contract, the parties enter into
that contract with the acknowledgment that the laws of that juris-
diction control their actions. In essence, that jurisdiction's laws are
incorporated by implication into the agreement. The parties to this
14. Id. at 1127, 1129. See MCKINNEY, N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 3420(g) (McKinney ed.,
1985).
15. Brooks v. Sturiano, 497 So. 2d 976, 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 523 So.
2d 1126 (Fla. 1988).
16. Id. at 979.
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contract did not bargain for Florida or any other state's laws to
control. We must presume that the parties did bargain for, or at
least expected, New York law to apply.20
In the course of the opinion Justice Kogan quoted in its entirety section 188
of the Second Restatement, conceding that its view was "seemingly the trend
of courts around the nation., 2' But it failed, he said, "to adequately provide
security to the parties to a contract.,
22
Justice Grimes concurred in a separate opinion, joined by Justice
Overton, in which he argued for adoption of the Second Restatement
approach. '"The emerging consensus, [he said], even in cases involving
questions of contract validity, is to apply the most significant relationship
test of section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971)."23 He continued:
Because contractual disputes arise in such a great variety of set-
tings, rules of broad application cannot do justice to the various
interests and expectations involved. While the application of the
significant relationship test may be less certain, it reflects a more
realistic standard by which a choice of laws may be made. Fur-
thermore, I believe the majority's concern for predictability and the
parties' right to know what the agreement provides is adequately
taken into account by factors (d) (the protection of justified expec-
tations) and (f) (certainty, predictability and uniformity of result) of
section 6 of the Second Restatement which is made applicable to
section 188.24
Notwithstanding his preference for the Second Restatement, he concurred in
the majority's opinion because he believed that the result would be the same
under either approach.2
The question certified in Sturiano is unlikely to go away. It has in fact
arisen since-though not pressed by the parties to the supreme court level-
and almost surely will arise again.26 Given the division within the court
reflected in the Sturiano opinions, it seems appropriate to consider what the
20. Id. at 1129-30. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1129.
22. Sturiano, 523 So. 2d at 1129.
23. Id. at 1130 (Grimes, J., concurring).
24. Id at 1130-31.
25. Id. at 1131.
26. See In re Santos, 648 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1997]
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court should do when it again confronts the issue. Should it take the same
approach for contracts as it did for torts and abandon lex loci contractus for
the approach of the Second Restatement? Certainly a good case can be made
for the change. Writing in 1987 on the eve of Sturiano, Professor Michael
Finch and his co-author, Lora Smeltzly, exhaustively surveyed the Florida
cases and concluded that the Second Restatement would bring "to Florida
conflicts law a structure and approach that impose some order on a seem-
ingly disparate body of precedent and that can guide the courts as conflicts
practice continues to evolve." 27 This is a defensible point of view, and in the
end I think the court will make the change-in part because change is in the
nature of things, in part because it will be difficult to resist the blandish-
ments of the district courts of appeal, who I suspect would prefer what they
perceive to be the greater freedom and flexibility offered by the Restatement
approach.
Yet the prospect leaves me with distinctly uneasy feelings. For one
thing, the doctrine of lex loci contractus, properly understood, has always
been a far more malleable one than its torts counterpart, lex loci delicti.
Despite the disparate contexts in which contracts cases can arise, I have no
sense from the decisions that Florida's courts have been unduly hampered in
arriving at sensible and just results with a fair degree of simplicity and
efficiency; nor am I persuaded that the actual results in cases would be that
much different or necessarily more defensible under the Second Restatement
approach than under the present one. For another, the Second Restatement
approach is complex and alive with protean possibilities, combining as it
does invitations to open-ended policy analysis with attempts to state specific
rules for a variety of commonly occurring kinds of cases. It has found favor
as a replacement for territorial methods with a number of courts around the
country,2 but in actual use it has been much criticized.29 In its complexity, it
has the potential to confuse and complicate decision making rather than
27. See Michael S. Finch & Lora Smeltzly, The Restatement Second and Conflict of
Laws: Extending the Bishop Approach to Problems in Contract, 16 STETSON L. REV. 261, 292
(1987).
28. See, e.g., ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWs 132 (5th ed. 1993); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357,
362-64 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466, 486-89 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
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simplifying it. This observation is borne out by the uneven and disappoint-
ing experience in Florida thus far with the torts provisions of the Second
Restatement, particularly at the supreme court level.30
In short, I am not convinced that it would be productive for the court to
adopt the Second Restatement approach for cases in contract. I see little
advantage and potentially much grief flowing from it. There is not much
doubt that Florida can continue to survive with its traditional territorial
approach. Whether that would be a good thing or not is more debatable; like
almost any other method, lex loci contractus has shortcomings, but at least in
Florida these problems would not be eliminated by substituting the approach
of the Second Restatement. That is the thesis I shall try to develop in what
follows. The time is ripe, for there is no more pressing issue on the court's
rather meager conflict-of-laws agenda than this one.
II. FROM TERRITORIAL TO PoLIcY ANALYSIS: THE ROAD TO THE
SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
A range of considerations bear on the question of whether lex loci
contractus should be replaced in Florida with the approach of the Second
Restatement. To raise these considerations and put some perspective on
them, I want to discuss two cases, both staples in the literature of conflict-of-
laws. They are Milliken v. Pratt,31 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in 1878, and Lilienthal v. Kaufman,32 a 1964 decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court. These cases stand at opposite ends of the spectrum
of developments that have occurred in choice-of-law in the United States
from the nineteenth century to the present. Either directly or by implication
they have much to say about the traditional territorial approach and why it
has lost favor in many quarters. In this way, it will be possible to covey a
sense of what brought the Second Restatement into being so quickly on the
heels of the First Restatement and thus provide a framework for evaluating
its approach and how well or ill it deals with issues of contract and choice-
of-law.
30. See generally Southerland, supra note 5. For a somewhat more temperate appraisal,
see Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the
Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REv. 653 (1995). For an account of the Florida courts'
traditional approach to conflicts cases involving property, see Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-
law and Property, 26 STrESON L. REV. 257 (1996).
31. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
32. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
1997]
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A. Milliken v. Pratt
Daniel Pratt and his wife Sarah were life-long residents of Massachu-
setts. In 1870, Daniel, a businessman, applied to the Portland, Maine, firm
of Deering, Milliken & Co. for a line of credit. The firm agreed on the
condition that Sarah guarantee payment of the account up to the amount of
five hundred dollars. She executed a separate agreement to this effect at her
home and gave it to her husband, who mailed it to the firm in Portland.
During the following year, Daniel bought goods on credit from time to time
and paid for them promptly. Then in October 1871 he defaulted, leaving an
unpaid balance of $560.12. In January 1872, Deering-Milliken demanded
payment from Sarah under the guaranty. She refused. In 1875, the firm
brought suit against her in Massachusetts to recover $500 of the unpaid
balance.33
Sarah Pratt's refusal to honor her agreement, as well as her defense to
the lawsuit, was grounded in the male-dominated society of nineteenth-
century America and its attitude towards women. At the time she executed
the agreement in 1870, portions of the common law rule that. disabled
married women from entering into contracts in their own name were still in
force in Massachusetts. 34 At common law, marriage was considered a true
merger of two souls-one which only the husband survived as a legal
entity.35 This fiction no doubt made a great deal of sense to the men whose
business it was to lay down legal rules: wives, being women, were known to
be inexperienced in the ways of the world and thus in need of protection.
What better way to protect them than to insure that in any matter of impor-
tance-that is, one involving money or property-they could act only
through and in the name of their husbands?
It seems patent that it was husbands whom this convenient fiction
protected, but nevertheless that was the law in Massachusetts in 1870 when
Sarah executed the guaranty. As far as Massachusetts was concerned, she
had no capacity to enter into this kind of a contract in her own name, and her
guaranty was unenforceable. In Maine, on the other hand, it was perfectly
33. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 374-75.
34. Id. at 376-77.
35. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 184-85 (1973). See
generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
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enforceable; Maine had emancipated married women by statute in 1866,
giving them the same power to contract that men and single women en-
joyed. 6 Massachusetts would likewise change its rule, but not until 1874,
well after the execution of the guaranty and the subsequent events that gave
rise to the lawsuit.37 The trial court held for Sarah, and Deering-Milliken
appealed.
The opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, written by Chief Justice
Gray, began with a statement of the general rule:
[T]he validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the
state in which it is made; if it is valid there, it is deemed valid eve-
rywhere, and will sustain an action in the courts of a state whose
laws do not permit such a contract.38
The agreement executed by Sarah at her home in Massachusetts, the court
said, was an offer which ripened into a contract only when Deering-Milliken
received the guaranty in Portland and acted on it there by selling goods on
credit to Daniel. The contract therefore had to be treated as one made and to
be performed in Maine. 39 The case fell within the general rule, and the only
question was whether Sarah's incapacity under Massachusetts law made a
difference.
On this point, the authorities were divided. On the continent, where the
civil law largely prevailed, the view was that the capacity to enter into a
contract was at all times governed by the law of a person's domicile,
regardless of where the contract was made.4° The weight of authority in
England and the United States went the other way, holding that capacity was
a function of the law of the place of contracting.41 Was it possible that
Sarah's contractual incapacity had traveled with her, so to speak, when she
went to Maine and made the contract? Such a rule, the court said, would
hardly be suitable for a nation like the United States:
[I]t is only by the comity of other states that laws can operate be-
yond the limit of the state that makes them. In the great majority of
cases, especially in this country, where it is so common to travel, or
36. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 376.
37. Id. at 377.
38. Id. at 375 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 381, 382.
41. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 378-81.
1997]
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to transact business through agents, or to correspond by letter, from
one state to another, it is more just, as well as more convenient, to
have regard to the law of the place of the contract, as a uniform
rule operating on all contracts of the same kind, and which the
contracting parties may be presumed to have in contemplation
when making their contracts, than to require them at their peril to
know the domicil of those with whom they deal, and to ascertain
the law of that domicil, however remote, which in many cases
could not be done without such delay as would greatly cripple the
power of contracting abroad at all.42
The place-of-making rule was clearly the preferable one. The court took
note of the possibility that Sarah's incapacity might be considered "so fixed
by the settled policy of... [this] state, for the protection of its own citi-
zens ..... ,43 as to justify a refusal to give effect to the otherwise applicable
law of Maine. That condition plainly did not obtain in Massachusetts
even at the time of the making of the contract in question, a mar-
ried woman was vested by statute with a very extensive power to
carry on business by herself, and to bind herself by contracts with
regard to her own property, business and earnings, and, before the
bringing of the present action, the power had been extended so as
to include the making of all kinds of contracts, with any person but
her husband, as if she were unmarried. There is therefore no rea-
son of public policy which should prevent the maintenance of this
action.44
The court accordingly applied the law of Maine, upheld the validity of the
contract, and enforced it against Sarah.
The most striking thing about the case is the result: the contract was
enforced, notwithstanding that under Massachusetts law Sarah Pratt's pen
was bereft of ink when she signed the agreement. The reasoning of the
opinion was beguilingly syllogistic. The question was whether the contract
was valid. The court's choice-of-law rule told it to make this determination
by applying the law of the state where the contract was made. That state was
Maine, and the contract was valid there. The outcome seems so unexcep-
tional that it is easy to miss its implications.
42. Id. at 382-83.
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There was a problem in the first place because the laws of Maine and
Massachusetts differed as to matters of contractual capacity. The Massachu-
setts Legislature was in the process of changing the law to emancipate
married women as Maine had done, but at the time this case arose it still
retained so much of the older doctrine as disabled a married woman from
agreeing to guarantee her husband's debts. What was it about this situation
that warranted such focused attention? The prevailing climate of opinion
held that married women were subservient to their husbands and were
supposed to obey them in all things. It was therefore believed that they
could easily be influenced, even coerced, and hence were unlikely to act in
such a matter of their own free will or with full awareness of the conse-
quences. The relationship of marriage created a potential for abuse-of
wives most obviously, but also of creditors, who might otherwise rely on a
signature that was really no better than the debtor's own. There was a need
for special protection, or so the Massachusetts Legislature might reasonably
have believed.
Sarah Pratt was a Massachusetts married woman. No matter what the
court thought of the law and the wisdom of its underlying policy, it would
have had no choice but to invalidate the agreement if the case had arisen
entirely within Massachusetts-that is, if it had involved no out-of-state
elements. But here there was a choice, and it was one that the court exer-
cised with a will. Obviously it thought it was better to subordinate Sarah's
claim to the protection of Massachusetts law in order to uphold the contract
and enforce it in favor of a Maine creditor. The interesting question is why.
Much of the answer lies in the idea of contract and its importance to a
society constituted not along lines of status-caste, class, accidents of
birth-but on the radical proposition that "[t]he ideal way to organize social
relations was through free voluntary agreement, by persons pursuing their
own ends." 45 The movement from status to contract had its origins in
England, but nowhere did it reach fuller fruition than in the United States,
which almost from the beginning was a business and market-oriented, profit-
motivated society of individuals free to exercise their will and ambition in
order to prosper and improve their condition in life. A society like this
required the idea of contract, and the texture of this nation as it has evolved
and exists today-the myriad of commercial, economic, and social interrela-
45. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 464.
19971
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tionships that undergird and define the United States can hardly be imagined
without it.46
Because it lay ready to hand, the legal system was given the important
role of maintaining an environment in which this kind of structured activity
could go on-an environment which not only encouraged the making of
agreements but also gave assurance that where necessary they would be
enforced. It was a role that courts took seriously, all the more so because the
law of contract itself did not shape the contours of social and economic
relationships so much as give tangible expression to deeply held beliefs
about what society valued in life and what the ground rules ought to be in
getting it.47 At the turn of the century, freedom of contract was considered
an essential part of the concept of ordered liberty enshrined in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.48 If less than that today, it has
nevertheless numbered among this nation's articles of faith. The quasi-
religious overtones in that phrase are hardly misplaced.
It is easy to see the court's opinion as a reflection and affirmation of
these values. The justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
were a group of men stamped in the mold of a state that was among the
original centers of shipping, trade, commerce, business, and manufacturing
in the United States-a state built, almost literally, on the ability of men to
deal with one another at arm's length with the assurance that their bargains
would be kept. To these men, the importance of business and commercial
transactions was obvious; equally obvious was the need to encourage and
facilitate these transactions when they crossed state lines. The states were
sovereign, but not in the same way as the nation-states of Europe. Free and
unfettered commercial intercourse was the norm. "Especially in this
country," the court said, it would be unjust as well as inconvenient to allow
quirks of local law to interfere with the security of transactions.49 It would
46. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER & MALCOLM P. SHARP, CONTRACTS 2-9 (1st ed. 1953);
JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES 5-29 (1956) [hereinafter CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM]; JAMES W. HURST, LAW
AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 10-50 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical
Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917, 936-52 (1974).
47. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 244-47, 464-68; CONDITIONS OF FREEDEOM, supra
note 46, at 11-12; see generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965).
48. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
49. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 382.
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"greatly cripple the power of contracting abroad at all."50 Far better to refer
these cases uniformly to the law of the place of contracting, which was the
law that parties presumably had in mind when they made agreements.
51
This typically hard-headed and practical assessment was leavened with
an element of cold-blooded calculation. It was not lost on the court that its
preferred set of values could be implemented only at the sacrifice of local
policy and the fortunes of a local resident. Massachusetts law presumed that
a married woman signed an agreement of this sort not of her own free will
and with full awareness of the consequences, but only in obedience to her
husband. It had to be presumed, therefore, that Sarah had not signed in the
belief that she could never be held to her agreement: there was no bad faith
or intention to deceive. She had never left her home in Massachusetts, much
less the shelter of its protective laws. She was the quintessential innocent
victim contemplated by the law. As to this aspect of the case, the opinion
was silent, the court's views appearing only by necessary implication in the
result. The fair inference is that a little injustice at the local level was a
small price to pay for furthering the orderly transaction of business.
This result was by no means inevitable. With a different order of values
the court might have put another interpretation on the course of the parties'
dealings with one another. It might, for example, have construed the writing
in question as a counteroffer by Deering-Milliken to sell goods to Daniel on
credit in exchange for Sarah's promise to guarantee payment.5 2 This offer
would have ripened into a contract when Sarah signed the agreement at her
home in Massachusetts and caused it to be placed in the mail there. The
instrument in fact recited the payment of one dollar as consideration
(although this sum was never paid).,3 The result would then have been a
separate contract between Deering-Milliken and Sarah, bilateral and execu-
tory in nature, but made in Massachusetts.
Another possibility for avoiding the application of Maine law lay in the
aspect of public policy touched upon briefly at the end of the opinion.
Territorial theory, in the version expounded by Joseph Story in his highly
influential nineteenth-century treatise, recognized the right of a state to
refuse to give effect to a law that would violate its own public policy. In
Story's view the territorial rules had their theoretical basis in the principle of
50. Id. at 382-83.
51. Id. at 382.
52. See RUSSEL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 364-65 (3d ed.
1986).
53. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 376.
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comity. Enforcing another state's laws was therefore always a voluntary act,
and no state could be required "to yield up its own fundamental policy" to
that of another. 54 This was the root of the so-called public policy exception,
perhaps the most important of the judicially developed techniques for
avoiding the operation of territorial rules without rejecting them outright.55
The court was heavily influenced by Story's views and was therefore
well aware that it had the power to deny enforcement to the law of Maine.56
It had only to characterize Massachusetts' policy of protecting married
women as "fundamental," or, in its own words, as sufficiently "fixed by the
settled policy of the state ... Rationalizing this conclusion might have
been tricky in light of the demise of the policy in 1874; but as we shall see,
the contours of the public policy exception and the conditions necessary to
its invocation have never been precise.58 It could have been done if the court
54. STORY, supra note 2, § 25. "Much less," he continued, "can any nation be required
to sacrifice its own interests in favor of another; or to enforce doctrines, which, in a moral, or
political view, are incompatible with its own safety, or happiness, or conscientious regard to
justice and duty." Id.
55. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 141-45; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I.
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
56. Justice Story's treatise is approvingly cited at several points in the opinion, Milliken,
125 Mass. at 377, 378, 381, and the court plainly subscribed to the theory of comity as the
basis for the enforcement of extraterritorial rights:
As the law of another state can neither operate nor be executed in this state
by its own force, but only by the comity of this state, its operation and enforce-
ment here may be restricted by positive prohibition of statute. A state may al-
ways by express enactment protect itself from being obliged to enforce in its
courts contracts made abroad by its citizens, which are not authorized by its own
laws....
It is possible also that in a state where the common law prevailed in full
force, by which a married woman was deemed incapable of binding herself by
any contract whatever, it might be inferred that such an utter incapacity, lasting
throughout the joint lives of husband and wife, must be considered as so fixed by
the settled policy of the state, for the protection of its own citizens, that it could
not be held by the courts of that state to yield to the law of another state in which
she might undertake to contract.
Id. at 383.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, at 14
(4th ed. 1964):
Proponents of [the public policy] exception hold that the ordinarily applicable
conflict of laws doctrine will not be followed when to do so would violate the
strong public policy of the forum. As so used the term "public policy" is so
vague and general as to defy definition. The strength of the policy necessary to
call the exception into operation is unclear and varies with the facts.
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had wanted to protect Sarah Pratt, and it would have been neither the first
nor the last time that the name "fundamental" was put to a policy reflected in
some minor wrinkle of a state's law.59 In the end, protecting the bargain was
simply more important.
Milliken appears in many conflict-of-laws casebooks as a classic
illustration of the lex loci contractus rule, but its deeper significance lies in
the fact that it is utterly typical of the way in which American courts have
tended to deal with matters of contract and choice-of-law. They take as a
given that the institution of contract itself represents a value of fundamental
importance to society. Those who enter into agreements do so with goals
and purposes in mind; provided that an agreement is neither illegal nor
contrary to public policy, the intentions of the parties and the expectations
arising therefrom assume paramount importance. Courts perceive their
function to be the essentially legitimating one of effectuating the intentions
of the parties and thereby protecting their expectations.
60
With traditional methods, this disposition shows up in the decisions in
two primary ways. The first is in the willingness of courts to give effect to
the concept of party autonomy. Party autonomy has nothing to do with
territoriality as such, but refers to the ability of the parties to contract with
reference to the law of a particular jurisdiction. Sometimes their intent is
implicit in their agreement, 61 sometimes explicit in the form of a choice-of-
law clause.62 The idea originated in the eighteenth century in England in an
opinion by Lord Mansfield and quickly took hold in the United States.63 Its
popularity here is an obvious reflection of the importance attached to party
intentions, at least as long as the law chosen bears some sort of reasonable
relation to the parties or their transaction.
64
The second has to do with the territorial doctrine of lex loci contractus
and the way in which courts have used it in actual practice. The court's
Id.; see also CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 141-45; Paulsen & Sovem, supra note 55;
Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 463-69.
59. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (refusing to
give effect on public policy grounds to an "other insurance" clause contained in an insurance
policy issued in New Hampshire).
60. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR Er AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 420-23 (4th ed.
1986); EUGENEF. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CoN1tuCroFLAwS 657 (2d ed. 1992).
61. See, e.g., LEFLAR ETAL., supra note 60, at 413-14.
62. See, e.g., id. at 413-19.
63. See 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON Ti CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 332.5, at 1092-
1100. The case was Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1 W. Bi. 234 (1760). See generally
ALBERTA. EHRENZWEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 173-175 (1962).
64. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 669-673.
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statement of the rule in Milliken is accurate as far as it goes, but misleading
to the extent that it suggests that the law of the place of contracting governs
in every case. The Latinism "lex loci contractus" literally means the law of
the place of contracting, but the term is also loosely used to refer to the
territorial approach in contracts cases generally, and in this sense means
something more. In Scudder v. Union National Bank,65 for example, the case
relied upon by Chief Justice Gray, the Supreme Court set out the rule in
these terms:
Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where
the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Mat-
ters respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissi-
bility of evidence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
66
It is apparent from this statement that lex loci contractus is not one rule,
but three. It therefore comes with a built-in flexibility that courts have not
hesitated to exploit in order to effectuate party intentions. Since this can
rarely be done by choosing a law that invalidates a contract, the over-
whelming observable tendency has been one of selective use of the three
rules to produce a choice of validating law. 67 The opinions frequently fail to
make the distinction between issues of validity and issues of performance.
Validity may be determined in one case by the law of the place of contract-
ing and in another by the law of the place of performance; in like fashion,
performance-related questions may, on one occasion, be determined by the
law of the place of performance and, on another, by the law of the place of
contracting. 68 And there are cases in which courts characterize the course of
65. 91 U.S. 406 (1875).
66. Id. at 412-13. In Walling v. Christian & Craft Grocery Co., 27 So. 46, 49 (Fla.
1899), the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the rule in the form adopted by the Scudder
Court, and it has been the law in Florida ever since. See, e.g., Jemco, Inc.- v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 499, 501 n.4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
67. See, e.g., LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 60, at 407 n.6, 420-23; EHRENZWEIG, supra note
63, at §§ 175-182.
68. See, e.g., BEALE, supra note 3, at 1105-09; LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 405-413.
In surveying cases in the United States Supreme Court from 1825 to 1928, Professor Beale
states:
It will thus be seen that almost every rule ever suggested for determining the
law applicable to the validity of a contract which has ever been seriously urged in
[Vol. 21:777
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Southerland
the parties' dealings with one another in such a way as to locate the place of
making in a state whose law upholds the agreement.
69
Traditional practice might seem a doctrinal mess were it not for the
striking fact that the law chosen is usually one under which the contract in
question can be upheld. The wealth of judicial practice brings to mind one
of the more profound observations about the choice-of-law process, which
was made by Professor Robert Leflar. He said that choice-of-law has never
been a purely
jurisdiction-selecting process, with courts first deciding which
state's law should govern and checking afterward to see what that
state's law [is] .... Everyone knows that this is not what courts
do, nor what they should do. Judges know from the beginning
between which rules of law, and not just which states, they are
choosing....
... The inclination of any reasonable court will be to prefer
rules of law which make good socio-economic sense for the time
when the court speaks, whether they be its own or another state's
rules.70
The fair inference from the cases is that courts think that enforcing agree-
ments makes good socio-economic sense and are not above using the choice-
of-law decision itself as a way of furthering this value judgment.
The fact that courts engage in a certain amount of result-oriented
decision making is not the shocking proposition it once was. Whether this is
what they ought to do, as Leflar also asserts, is a different question and a
much more difficult one. Every conflict-of-laws case involves two deci-
sions. A court must first decide whose law governs, and then, under that
law, what the outcome is. The catch, of course, is that the choice-of-law
decision itself is often outcome-determinative. Hence the recurrent bedev-
iling question in choice-of-law centers on what "justice" means, or ought to
a common-law court has at one time or another been adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States as the basis of its decision; that each decision has been
made apparently without realizing its inconsistency with former decisions; and
that many of the decisions are self-contradictory.
BEALE, supra note 3, at 1108-09.
69. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Ray-Hof Agencies, Inc. v. Petersen, 123 So. 2d 251 (Fla.
1960); Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega Y Arminan, 207 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968); 2 ERNST RABEL, CoNFucr OF LAwS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461-62 (2d ed. 1958).
70. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALU. L. REv. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
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mean, in such a case. Does it mean making the choice-of-law decision in a
fair and impartial way, without regard to what result one law or the other
would produce when applied to the facts of a case? Or does it mean reach-
ing an end result that itself seems just, the choice-of-law decision being just
another means to that end? The question is hardly academic. It has far-
reaching implications for the kinds of choice-of-law rules that any particular
court will prefer, as well as for the use it will make of them.
No one labored longer or harder to isolate the process of choice from its
effect than Joseph Beale, the distinguished Harvard law professor who
served as the Reporter for the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Beale
took the existing hodge-podge of traditional territorial practice and sought to
impose logic and order on it in order to create a perfectly fair and impartial
way of choosing law. To him, the content of the competing laws was
irrelevant as was the result that one law or the other might produce in a given
case. He was concerned only with how the choice-of-law decision was
made. He predicated his system on the concept of "vested rights." If acts
had legal significance, it could only be by virtue of the law of the place
where those acts occurred. Legal rights or liabilities created under that law
were said to vest at the moment of their creation and could thereafter be
enforced in some other place only in that form. It followed from this that
acts valid where done ought to be valid everywhere. Beale found the idea of
comity offensive; it implied discretion where in his view none existed. One
state applied the law of another, not out of deference and respect, but
because it was obligated to.7
For contracts, Beale dispensed summarily with the concept of party
autonomy. He argued that it was objectionable in theory because it con-
ferred upon the parties permission "to do a legislative act,' 72 and in practice
because it was too uncertain and unpredictable: no one could say what
effect a court might give to the expressed intent of the parties.73 He at-
tempted to transform the lex loci contractus doctrine into an instrument of
precision, drawing the sharpest possible line between issues of contract
validity and issues of performance.74 All questions concerning validity,
71. See generally BEALE, supra note 3.
72. See id. at 1079, 1080-83.
73. See id. at 1083-86.
74. In the comments, Professor Beale conceded that the process of separating the two
could be problematical:
[T]he nature of the obligation and the duty to render the performance for which a
party becomes bound is governed by the law of the place of contract-
ing.... [While] matters concerning performance of a contract are determined by
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including the nature of the obligation and the extent of the duty to perform it,
he decisively referred to the law of the place of contracting 75-- the place
where "the principal event necessary to make a contract" occurred. 76 This
was sound in theory, he said, because the question whether or not there was
a contract could- "on general principles be determined by no other law
the law of the place of performance .... A difficult problem is presented in de-
ciding whether a question in a dispute concerning a contract is one involving the
creation of an obligation or performance thereof. There is no distinction based
on logic alone between determining the creation of the contract and the rights
and duties thereunder on the one hand, and its performance on the
other.... Regardless of the lack of logic, however, problems arising out of dis-
putes upon contracts are settled as if certain acts pertained to the making of the
contract and other acts to its performance. The applicability of the rule that the
complete control of all questions is determined by the law of the place of con-
tracting is therefore modified upon practical considerations. One law is applied
to what is regarded as the initiation of a contract and another to what is regarded
as its final performance. The point at which initiation ceases and performance
begins is not a point which can be fixed by any rule of law of universal applica-
tion to all cases. Like all questions of degree, the solution must depend upon the
circumstances of each case and must be governed by the exercise of judgment.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 cmt. c (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Professor Beale pursued the distinction in the comments to section 358, which states the
general rule that issues of performance are governed by the law of the place of performance:
While the law of the place of performance is applicable to determine the
manner and sufficiency and conditions under which performance is to be made, it
is not applicable to the point where the substantial obligation of the parties is
materially altered. As stated in § 332, Comment c, there is no logical line which
separates questions of the obligation of the contract, which is determined by the
law of the place of contracting, from questions of performance, determined by
the law of the place of performance. There is, however, a practical line which is
drawn in every case by the particular circumstances thereof. When the applica-
tion of the law of the place of contracting would extend to the determination of
the minute details of the manner, method, time and sufficiency of performance so
that it would be an unreasonable regulation of acts in the place of performance,
the law of the place of contracting will cease to control and the law of the place
of performance will be applied. On the other hand, when the application of the
law of the place of performance would extend to a regulation of the substance of
the obligation to which the parties purported to bind themselves so that it would
unreasonably determine the effect of an agreement made in the place of con-
tracting, the law of the place of performance will give way to the law of the place
of contracting.
Id. § 358 cmt. b. It is worth noting that the comments in the First Restatement are unofficial;
that is, unlike the black-letter rules, they did not receive the endorsement of the American Law
Institute and therefore rest on the authority of the reporter alone.
75. See id. § 332.
76. Id. § 311 cmt. d.
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than... the law of the place of contracting., 77 It was practically the best
rule because there was usually no doubt where a contract was made, and it
was also the easiest for the parties to follow. 78  Details relating to the
performance of a contract, such as the manner, time, place, and sufficiency
thereof, he referred to the law of the place of performance.7 9
These rules were simple, logical, and ordinarily easy to apply. If widely
adopted and faithfully followed, they offered a number of advantages. They
would produce fair, impartial, and uniform results because courts every-
where would tend to make the choice-of-law decision in the same way. For
this reason, it would make no difference where a particular suit was brought.
The unseemly possibility of forum shopping would be eliminated altogether.
Just as important, the rules would make the choice-of-law process easy,
simple, certain, and predictable-qualities that the mass of conflicting
decisions from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seemed to
suggest were sorely needed.
Despite these virtues, the First Restatement has to be accounted a
failure. Though intended as a definitive statement of territorial theory, its
influence was never that great. Territoriality would remain the predominant
approach until the 1950s, but not necessarily in the "vested rights" version
prescribed in the Restatement; courts for the most part simply continued
doing what they had always done. 80 The clearest evidence of its rejection is
the fact that in 1953 the American Law Institute found it advisable to
commence work on a replacement. In essence the First Restatement failed
because it tried to reduce choice-of-law to a purely mechanical process. Its
rigidity left no room for maneuver; in taking the element of judgment out of
judging, it became a victim of its own drive for perfection. No one can deny
that fairness and impartiality, ease of application, simplicity, certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result are important values in choice-of-law,
or indeed, in any area of law. What the fate of the First Restatement sug-
gests is that these values count for less in the minds of courts than the
freedom to decide cases in ways that are perceived to make good socio-
economic sense.
77. BEALE, supra note 3, at 1091.
78. Id. at 1091-92.
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 358.
80. For example, the vast majority of conflicts cases in Florida have been decided with
territorial rules, but the underlying theory has always been one of comity rather than vested
rights. See cases cited, supra note 8. It is rare to find a Florida appellate opinion in which the
First Restatement is even cited, much less relied upon.
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If nothing else, the First Restatement's existence is a persistent re-
minder that choice-of-law itself involves a choice-one that pits the need for
rules and the impulse to follow them against intuitions of justice in some
larger sense. If a court's choice-of-law rule calls for Georgia law, but its
sense of justice cries out for Florida law, then it has a choice-the more
agonizing one of values rather than laws. The dilemma is apt to seem most
acute when the otherwise applicable law is one that strikes a court as silly or
unwise. What "justice" is then may seem clear. At the same time, every
court knows there is only so much tolerance for decisions that depart from an
announced set of rules or that cannot easily be squared with them. There is
"justice" there, too, in considerations of fairness, expectations and reliance,
and certainty and predictability. If a court is simply going to "think deeply
and decide justly,"8' it has no need for choice-of-law rules at all. The result
of that can be chaos and confusion. What would happen as choice-of-law
entered the modem era is ample proof of that.
B. Lilienthal v. Kaufman
Given the importance of contract in the nation's history, the result in
Milliken is not surprising. But it makes all the more interesting the decision
in Lilienthal v. Kaufman82 in which, almost a hundred years later, a similar
case presented itself to the Oregon Supreme Court and was decided the other
way.
Like Milliken, Lilienthal involved a question of contractual disability
and its effect in a multi-state transaction. 3 Leonard Kaufman had been
declared a spendthrift by the courts in the State of Oregon and he had a
guardian appointed for him. The pertinent Oregon statute provided that all
contracts he might enter into thereafter, except for necessaries, were void-
able by the guardian. Kaufman was apparently obsessed with binoculars and
the buying and selling of them. He started a joint venture for that purpose
with one Olshen, an Oregon resident, who advanced funds to underwrite the
venture. When Kaufman tried to repay the loan with a bad check, Olshen
sued. In that case, Olshen v. Kaufman,84 the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the guardian had the right to void the contract and preclude recovery.
81. Maurice Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 551, 644
(1968).
82. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
83. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the court's opinion.
84. 385 P.2d 161 (Or. 1963).
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Kaufman then went further afield, to California, where he persuaded
Philip Lilienthal, a California resident, to advance funds for a similar joint
venture, giving two promissory notes in exchange. The notes were executed
and delivered in California. Though Lilienthal made routine credit checks,
these failed to disclose that Kaufman was a spendthrift.85 When he pre-
sented the notes for payment, the guardian once again asserted Kaufman's
incapacity as a spendthrift and refused to pay. Lilienthal brought suit in
Oregon to collect on the notes. He argued that California was the place of
making since the notes were executed and delivered there, and that Oregon
was bound under its conflicts rule-lex loci contractus-to apply the law of
California. California law did not recognize the disability of a spendthrift.
The trial court held for Kaufman, and Lilienthal appealed.
The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court was written by Justice
Denecke and ended by applying Oregon law and sustaining the spendthrift
defense. 86  Two justices dissented. The case has been the object of a
considerable amount of criticism in the conflicts literature, and few agree
with the result.8 7 I find it hard to share this view. To my mind, the majority
opinion is remarkable not only for its reasoning and result, but also for the
picture it gives of a conscientious court wrestling in a thorough and forth-
right way with a particularly thorny problem.
The first half of the opinion consisted of a frank concession that almost
all of the existing conflicts theories called for the application of California
law. It is worth tracing the court's discussion in some detail because it gives
a concise picture of how far choice-of-law thinking had come in the years
since Milliken v. Pratt was decided.
85. See CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 253 (4th ed. 1987); David P. Currie, Com-
ments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595, 603-04 (1968).
86. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 549.
87. See, e.g., CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 189-92 (1965); WEINTRAUB, supra
note 52, at 384-85; ScoLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 688-90; Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative
Jurisdiction, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1587, 1597 (1978); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 938 (1975). But see Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 323 (1990); Robert A. Sedler, Interest
Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34
MERCER L. REV. 593, 602 n.50 (1983). And, as Professor Weintraub and others have noted,
the Oregon Supreme Court itself appears to have drastically reconsidered the approach it took
in the case. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 385-86 (discussing Casey v. Manson Constr.
and Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967)). He adds, however, that at least one Oregon
appellate court thinks that the Lilienthal approach is the correct one. See id. at 386 n.78
(citing Straight Grain Builders v. Track N' Trail, 760 P.2d 1350 (Or. App.)).
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Lex loci contractus of course pointed to the application of California
law. But here the court qualified its traditional reliance on that approach,
expressing doubt as to its correctness "if the only connection of the state
whose law would govern is that it was the place of making."88 The qualifi-
cation was a significant echo of the modem criticism of the jurisdiction-
selecting rules89 of the First Restatement. In the vastly different, highly
mobile society that America had become in the twentieth century, contracts
could be made anywhere. Businessmen from two different states might meet
for the weekend in New York City because they could take in a show while
they settled their deal; they might finalize contracts while traveling cross-
country by train or in a plane. These realities meant that the place where
people happened to be when a contract came into existence under the
familiar rules of the law of contracts could be wholly fortuitous, without
connection either to the parties or their transaction. The court called this the
"strongest criticism"' 90 of lex loci contractus, but the main thrust of the
rebellion against territoriality ran deeper. The jurisdiction-selecting rules of
the First Restatement took no account of the content of the competing laws
or the policies that they reflected; nor did they, in theory at least, provide
much latitude for courts in trying to achieve what they perceived to be just
results in individual cases.91
But in this case, as the court readily conceded, the place of making was
not California's only connection. Kaufman had gone to California to
persuade Lilienthal to lend him money. The loan was actually made in
California, and the promissory notes, in addition to being executed and
delivered in California, were also by their terms to be paid there. California,
in other words, was both the place of making and the place of performance.
88. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545.
89. The phrase 'jurisdiction-selecting rule" was coined by Professor David Cavers and
refers to a choice-of-law rule which uses a particular contact to select the state whose law is to
govern without consideration of the content of the law so chosen. See David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933); DAVID F.
CAVERS, ThE CHOICE-or-LAW PRocEss at 9 n.24 (1965) ('The jurisdiction-selecting rule
makes a state the object of choice; in theory it is only after the rule has selected the governing
state by reference to the 'contact' prescribed in the rule that the court ascertains the content of
the state's law.").
90. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545 (citing G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 231 (3d ed.
1963)).
91. See, e.g., CAVERS, supra note 89; Cook, supra note 4; Brainerd Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 227 (1958);




: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
The court cited various authorities, including a Tentative Draft of the Second
Restatement, for the proposition that the validity of a promissory note was
governed by the law of the place where payment was to be made.92
Still another principle calling for the application of California law was
the rule of validation-the idea that given a choice between a validating and
an invalidating law, a court should choose the law that upholds the parties'
agreement. The rule of validation, the court said,
is appealing because it is founded upon the same reasoning that is
followed in other aspects of the law of contracts. This court and all
other courts reiterate that contracts are "sacred and shall be en-
forced by the courts of justice unless some other overpowering rule
of public policy intervenes which renders such agreement illegal or
unenforceable. * * * Without such a rule the commerce of the
world would soon lapse into a chaotic state."... In the general law
of contracts we constantly strive to hold the contract valid and en-
forceable. The "rule of validation" has the same purpose in con-
flict of laws.
93
And to all of this the majority might just as well have added the dissenters'
argument that California law would also apply under the approach then
being pioneered by the New York Court of Appeals. 94 In 1954, that court
discarded the traditional rule of lex loci contractus in favor of what it called
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach.95 This approach
emphasized the law of the place "'which has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute'' 96 in order to give that place "paramount control
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing
the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned
92. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 546 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
332b(a) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1960)).
93. Id. (citations omitted). According to the court, the rule of validation held that
if the contract is valid under the law of any jurisdiction having significant con-
nection with the contract, i.e., place of making, place of performance, etc., the
law of that jurisdiction validating the contract will be applied. This would also
agree with the intentions of the parties, if they had had any intentions in this re-
gard. They must have intended their agreement to be valid.
I
94. Id. at 552 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
95. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954).
96. Id. at 102 (quoting Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 424,431 (N.Y. 1953)).
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with the outcome of [the] particular litigation."' 97 These seductive sounding
but somewhat imprecise phrases would soon find a reinforcing echo in the
Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" formulation. What-
ever "significant contacts" were, exactly, it was pretty clear that California
had them here.
It seemed that California law had to govern, yet the court avoided that
conclusion. To understand how it managed to do this on a principled basis
requires an understanding of the concept of interest analysis. Interest
analysis had emerged on the scene only a few years earlier. It was a break-
through in choice-of-law thinking at the time and has come to be recognized
since as the most important theoretical advance in the area in this century. It
was primarily the work of one man, Brainerd Currie, who proposed the idea
and elaborated it in a series of influential law review articles that appeared
between 1958 and 1963.98 As conceived by Currie, interest analysis was a
radically different way of looking at conflict-of-laws problems. It seemed to
be the catalyst that the choice-of-law revolution needed and more than
anything else was responsible for liberating choice-of-law from its territorial
constraints. Interest analysis quickly became an important conflicts method
in its own right as well as an integral component of almost all of the other
modem approaches, the Second Restatement among them.
Currie's method of analysis, in distilled form, ran along these lines. He
began with several propositions that seem almost self-evident. Law makers,
he said, ordinarily made rules of law with only the domestic situation in
mind.99 They were mainly concerned with events that happened within their
own borders and with the activities of their own residents; they rarely gave
thought to the extraterritorial consequences of those rules-that is, to how
they would want them to apply in the marginal conflict-of-laws case. 1°° All
of these rules embodied or expressed some social, economic, or administra-
tive policy01° which could be discovered through the familiar processes of
statutory interpretation or case analysis. 02 Having ascertained the policies
embodied in the conflicting laws of two states, Currie said, a court should
inquire whether the relationship of each state to the case was such that
97. Id. (quoting D. Martin Cook, Note, Choice of Law Problems in Direct Actions
Against Indemnification Insurers, 3 UTAHL. REv. 490,498-99 (1953)).
98. The major essays are collected in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
99. See id. at 81-86.
100. See id.
101. See id. 85-86, 141-46.
102. See id. 183-84.
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applying its law would further or advance its policy. 10 3 If so, the state was
said to have an "interest" in the application of its law.
1°4
It was hardly coincidental that one of the earliest and most influential of
his articles- "Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method"'°5-- dealt with Milliken. It was a case rife with policy implica-
tions, 1°6 and Currie used it to demonstrate the inanity of the traditional
territorial rules-lex loci contractus, of course, in particular. Taking as
significant variables for choice-of-law purposes the states where the parties
resided, the place where suit was brought, and the place of making of the
contract, 07 he showed that of the fourteen possible conflict-of-laws prob-
lems that could arise, ten were false problems. They were false problems in
the sense that while the laws of the two states were in conflict, the policies
underlying them were not. 08
To illustrate this point, suppose that the residence of the parties were
reversed in Milliken, with the contract made in Massachusetts at the place of
business of the merchant and the suit brought in Maine where Sarah Pratt
resided. The application of Massachusetts law called for by the place-of-
making rule would subvert Maine's policy of enforcing contracts and
upholding commercial transactions; moreover, it would do so without any
corresponding advancement of Massachusetts' policy of protecting married
women because Sarah Pratt, in this variation, would not be a Massachusetts
married woman. Massachusetts, Currie argued, had no intention of protect-
ing married women generally, but only those married women with whose
103. See generally CURRIE, supra note 98.
104. See id.
105. See generally Currie, supra note 91.
106. In order to sharpen his discussion of the conflicting legislative polices of Massachu-
setts and Maine, Currie asked his readers to assume that in 1870 the Massachusetts Legislature
duly considered but refused to enact a bill that would have removed the contractual disabilities
of married women. He appeared to think that the actual change made in 1874 brought the
policies of the two states into alignment and destroyed any real conflict of interests. See
CURRIE, supra note 98, at 80-81. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, did
not appear to view the case in that light, although its decision was undoubtedly made easier by
the change; rather, it considered the case on the basis of the laws as they existed in 1872 when
the cause of action arose. What effect should a post-occurrence change in law have on a
conflict-of-laws case? There is no definitive answer to this question. See, e.g., id. at 736-39;
CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 275-77; Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181,
236-42 (1977); Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 843 (1969).
107. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 83.
108. See id. at 107.
[Vol. 21:777
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Southerland
welfare it was concerned-namely, Massachusetts married women.1' 9 In the
terminology of interest analysis, Maine would have an interest in the
application of its law upholding the contract because that would further its
policy of security of transactions; Massachusetts would have no interest in
the application of its rule invalidating certain married women's contracts
because there was no Massachusetts married woman to protect. Maine
would therefore be the only state with an interest in the application of its
law. The place-of-making rule, blind to these kinds of considerations, would
woodenly call for the application of Massachusetts law and would thus
defeat the interests of both states. 110
The other false problems in this group of ten were similar, though not
always so perverse in defeating one state's interest without advancing the
interest of the other. They were similar in that all were cases in which only
one state was interested in the application of its law.' Currie then asked the
obvious question: if a state had no interest in the application of its law, why
apply it? That the place-of-making rule said so was hardly an answer. He
conceded that the territorial rules, at least in theory, were uniform, certain,
and predictable in operation and thus dissuasive of forum shopping, but he
thought that systematic subversion of state interests was too high a price to
pay for benefits that in practice were apt to be more illusory than real." 2 His
own solution was simple: in a case of false conflict, a court should apply the
law of the only interested state. 3
This way of looking at a conflicts case was revolutionary, and conflict-
of-laws has not been the same since Currie launched his withering attack on
the inanity of invariant use of territorial rules in cases of false conflict. He
told judges what they had instinctively known all along-that there was a
rational way to dispose of these cases and to do so forthrightly, without
resort to the subterfuge of escape devices. 14 Today, virtually every modem
approach to choice-of-law resolves false conflicts by applying the law of the
only interested state.
109. See id. at 85-86.
110. See id. at91.
111. See id. at 98.
112. CuRRiE, supra note 98, at 98-107.
113. Id. at 184.
114. Courts dissatisfied with the inexorable operation of territorial rules, especially as laid
down by Professor Beale in the First Restatement, showed considerable ingenuity in avoiding
them when the occasion demanded. Characterization, the substance-procedure distinction,
and the public policy exception were the principal techniques employed. See, e.g., Souther-
land & Waxman, supra note 1, at 458-69.
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The remaining four of the fourteen possible cases, however, were
qualitatively different. These were cases in which the conflict-of-laws was
real. In these cases, both states were interested in the application of their
laws, and it was therefore impossible to apply one state's law and advance
its policy without simultaneously suppressing the policy of the other."
5
Milliken was such a case, and, as we shall see, so was Lilienthal. In Mil-
liken, the Massachusetts court could not apply the law of Maine, thereby
advancing the policy of security of transactions, without at the same time
sacrificing its own policy of protecting Massachusetts married women such
as Sarah Pratt. One policy or the other had to yield. To Currie, true con-
flicts posed problems of uncommon difficulty. They were so difficult, in
fact, that he said there was "no conceivable choice-of-law rule that will solve
the problem, even though both states adopt it and consistently apply it.""
6
His own solution confounded a lot of people: "The sensible and clearly
constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with a true conflict of
interests, is to apply its own law. In this way it can be sure at least that it is
consistently advancing the policy of its own state.""' 7
Currie characterized his proposal for resolving true conflicts as a "give-
it-up attitude," arguing that such an attitude was the only constructive one
when the task at hand was "impossible of accomplishment with the re-
sources.., available."' 8 He probably sensed that his proposal would not sit
well with judges bred in the bold and innovative tradition of the common
law and deeply committed, like the rest of the nation, to the belief that
rational solutions exist and can be discovered for any problem, however
thorny. In the event, he was right; his own solution has for the most part
been ignored by courts and commentators in favor of approaches that either
attempt to weigh one state's interest in the application of its law against
another's or, in some other way, strike a comparative balance between the
two." 9 Yet Currie's considered judgment compels reflection, the more so as
115. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 117.
116. Id. at 119.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 121.
119. See, e.g., CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 3, at 242; Kom, supra note 6, at 816-20. In
her valuable article surveying existing choice-of-law approaches and their actual use by courts
around the country, Professor Herma Hill Kay noted that "Currie's proposal that the forum
court, as an instrument of state policy, should apply forum law to advance its own state's
interests in true conflicts cases is unacceptable even to courts otherwise committed to interest
analysis." Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 521, 551 (1983). Two states, Kentucky and Michigan, have adopted a forum law
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his objections to solutions of this kind have never, in my opinion, been
adequately answered.
Conflicts of laws exist in the first place because, within very broad
limits set by the Constitution, each state has sovereign power to determine
for itself the legal consequences of acts or events that occur within its
territory. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits different states from making
the same kinds of determinations in different ways. Oregon may choose to
treat contracts entered into by its spendthrifts as voidable if it wants to, while
California may choose to treat the financially irresponsible like everybody
else and hold them to their bargains. There is nothing startling in this. From
a sovereign standpoint, neither state is wrong in the course it has chosen.
Because both rules are equally correct, there can be no logical way to choose
between them. Like choosing between apples and oranges, it is possible to
prefer one over the other, but it makes no sense to say that one is "better."
All that can logically be said is that the two laws and the policies they reflect
are different.
Choosing law is always a legislative act, but never more profoundly so
than in cases of true conflict. In these cases, the choice-of-law decision
operates to nullify the valid legislative judgment of either one state or the
other. It is a qualitatively different choice from the ones courts routinely
make in domestic cases where there is only one "correct" rule of law. Currie
argued that "assessment of the respective vales of the competing legitimate
interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is
a political function of a very high order. This is a function that should not be
committed to courts in a democracy."'120 As a matter of separation of
powers, he did not think courts should perform this function, nor did he think
they were equipped to, isolated as they were from legislative facts and
lacking in the resources necessary to discover them.121 Though his forum-
law solution has not been widely adopted, there is still nothing approaching
general agreement about how true conflicts should be resolved. It is the
most hotly debated issue in choice-of-law today.
22
The influence of Currie's ideas is plainly evident in the second half of
the Lilienthal opinion, which began with a consideration of whether Ore-
solution for conflicts cases, but not "explicitly tied to an analysis of the policies underlying
forum law." Id. at 561. Professor Kay's survey of judicial practice is updated in A Defense of
Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COORS D'ACADEMIE DO DRorr
INT'L, 182-83 (1990).
120. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 182.
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., CRAMTONETAL., supra note 3, at 271-358.
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gon's policy of protecting spendthrifts was sufficiently strongly held to
warrant invoking the familiar public policy exception and refusing to give
effect to the otherwise applicable law of California. Within the concept of
"public policy," the court said
we must consider the economic and social interests of Oregon.
When these factors are included in a consideration of whether the
law of the forum should be applied this traditional approach is very
similar to that advocated by many legal scholars. This latter theory
is "that choice-of-law rules should rationally advance the policies
or interests of the several states (or of the nations in the world
community). '' 123
In making this radical statement, the court was talking about interest analy-
sis, as the citations to and about Currie's writings made clear.' For a
definition of public policy, the court had traditionally relied on Justice
Cardozo's classic statement that the law of another state would not be
applied if to do so "would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."'2 But the trouble with this formulation, the court con-
cluded, was that it was difficult to determine which policies were
"fundamental" and which weren't because of the "lack of any even remotely
objective standards." 126 Then came the turning point of the opinion:
[A]s previously stated, if we include in our search for the public
policy of the forum a consideration of the various interests that the
forum has in this litigation, we are guided by more definite criteria.
In addition to the interests of the forum, we should consider the
interests of the other jurisdictions which have some connection
with the transaction.
27
The court found that Oregon's spendthrift policy was aimed at protect-
ing the spendthrift's family, presumably an Oregon family, and at avoiding
123. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 547 (quoting Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the
Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 474 (1960)).
124. See id.
125. Id. (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (citations
omitted)).
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having to support the spendthrift and his family at public expense.12 It also
acknowledged Oregon's "strong policy favoring the validity and enforce-
ability of contracts,"'129 regardless of where made, as well as one of protect-
ing innocent, persons from fraudulent conduct of the sort engaged in by
Kaufman.1 30 And of course it was in Oregon's interest to encourage persons
from other states to transact business with Oregonians.13 1 Obviously these
interests cut both ways, but the "substance of these commercial considera-
tions," the court said, "is deflated by the recollection that the Oregon
Legislature has determined, despite the weight of these considerations, that a
spendthrift's contracts are voidable."' 32 California's most direct interest was
in "having its citizen creditor paid. 133 It was California's policy "that any
creditor, in California or otherwise, should be paid even though the debtor is
a spendthrift."'134 And, like Oregon, California also wanted to be a state "in
which contracts can be made and performance be promised with the certain
knowledge that such contracts will be enforced."
135
This comprehensive analysis of underlying policies and interests led the
court to the conclusion that it was dealing with a true conflict: "[w]e have,
then, two jurisdictions, each with several close connections with the transac-
tion, and each with a substantial interest, which will be served or thwarted,
depending on which law is applied. The interests of neither jurisdiction are
clearly more important than those of the other."' 36 In such a case, the court
thought, Oregon policy should prevail, and the law of Oregon should be
applied. The rationale showed just how deeply in Currie's debt this court
was:
Courts are instruments of state policy. The Oregon Legislature
has adopted a policy to avoid possible hardship to an Oregon fam-
ily of a spendthrift and to avoid possible expenditure of Oregon
public funds which might occur if the spendthrift is required to pay
his obligations. In litigation Oregon courts are the appropriate in-
strument to enforce this policy. The mechanical application of
choice-of-law rules would be the only apparent reason for an Ore-
128. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 548-49.
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gon court advancing the interests of California over the equally
valid interests of Oregon. The present principles of conflict of
laws are not favorable to such mechanical application.
137
Lilienthal was a remarkable decision in several respects. Despite the
strength of California's ties to the case, the court's method of analysis,
explicitly in terms of underlying policies and state interests, brought it to the
recognition that it was dealing with a true conflict-of-laws--one in which it
could not possibly advance the policies of one state without nullifying those
of the other. Significantly, the court treated these interests as being of equal
dignity. It made no pretense of reasoning its way out of the impasse by
delving into the content of the laws in order to assess the wisdom of the
policies that each expressed; it made no effort to assess the relative degree to
which each state was attached to its policy or the strength with which it was
held. It refused, in short, to weigh Oregon's interest in its rather special
policy aimed at protecting the occasional spendthrift against the obviously
strong interests both states shared in enforcing contracts and upholding
commercial transactions. It recognized that the Oregon Legislature had
already made that judgment and refused to substitute its own. In the end,
this was not a case in which Oregon's spendthrift policy was characterized
as "strongly held" and that familiar exception invoked as a ground for
refusing to apply the otherwise applicable law of another state. It was a
decision cast altogether in the entirely new mold of interest analysis.
The decision also gives a good indication of just how far choice-of-law
had come in the slightly-less-than one hundred years since Milliken was
decided in 1878. The choice-of-law revolution began to brew in earnest in
the 1930s. 138 It was characterized by the increasingly scathing attacks of
commentators on the rigid mechanization of conflicts rules that Beale's
theories and his First Restatement imposed, and by a corresponding willing-
ness on the part of distinguished courts to avoid those rules by invoking
escape devices. It took Brainerd Currie and his synthesis of interest analysis,
however, to catalyze smoldering discontent into full-blown revolution.
What Currie did, most decisively, was to restore prominence to a fact
that territorial theory obscured: all laws reflect some policy and are intended
to serve some purpose. He showed how destructive the traditional rules
were of policies and purposes. By defining a state's interest in the applica-
137. Id.
138. The literature of conflict-of-laws is replete with accounts of the revolution. See, e.g.,
Kom, supra note 6, at 775-77; Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 458-80.
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tion of its law in terms of furthering the policy underlying it, he provided an
intellectually satisfying way of identifying false conflicts and distinguishing
them from true conflicts. The distinction, it turned out, was one between
easy cases and hard cases. The simple and sensible disposition of the easy
cases was almost self-evident: apply the law of the only interested state. For
the hard cases, Currie had no ready answer, only the recognition that
reasoned resolution was impossible and that a court, as an instrument of state
policy, should do what it was constitutionally sworn to do, which was to
uphold the policies and laws of its own state.
Territorial theory made the choice-of-law turn on a single event and the
place where that happened. Currie demonstrated in graphic fashion just how
irrelevant such a single connector could be when measured against the
purposes and policies that laws were intended to serve. But even before his
work appeared, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the rigid jurisdic-
tion-selecting rules of territorial theory, particularly in their dogmatic 1934
Restatement by Beale. The discontent was by far most acute in the area of
torts, whose whole underlying purpose had undergone drastic rethinking in
the face of the spiraling costs of death and accident-related injury that rapid
industrialization and technological growth had brought in their wake.
Punishment and admonition gave way in the twentieth century to the
compensation imperative. And here, in case after case, the inflexible place-
of-injury rule frustrated the growing trend toward finding ways to compen-
sate accident victims for their injuries. 39 By comparison, the pressure for
change was far less intense in the area of contracts, where the dominant
values-maintaining the security of transactions, effectuating party inten-
tions, and protecting party expectations-seemed so well understood. These
values did not change from one century to the next, and in the perception of
many courts the familiar rules of territorial theory were adequate to subserve
them.
This was true only to a point. As we have seen, lex loci contractus,
loosely treated, did lend itself to value-oriented decision making more
readily than its torts counterpart. But in a strict sense, it was not designed
that way, and this was nowhere more evident than in the 1934 Restatement.
In his effort to reduce conflicts law to an exact science and achieve the
cherished virtues of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, Beale
distinguished sharply between issues of contract validity and those of
performance. He was adamant in insisting that where validity was the issue,
139. See, e.g., Southerland, supra note 5, at 786-90.
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the law of the place of making had to govern; vested rights theory and logic
required it. This was problematic for anyone who took the First Restatement
as the final and definitive statement of territorial theory it was meant to be
and who tried to follow its dictates literally. In the more closely knit,
infinitely more mobile United States of the twentieth century, the place
where a contract was made could easily be fortuitous, unrelated either to the
parties themselves or to their transaction. This concern was evident in
Lilienthal in the majority's qualification of its long-standing adherence to lex
loci contractus. In such a world it was increasingly hard to see how any
single connector could possibly be decisive.
In the First Restatement, Beale constructed the perfect machine for
achieving conflicts justice-that is, for choosing the governing law in as fair
and just a way as possible. He was indifferent to the result the law so chosen
might produce in a given case. His uncompromising attitude was useful in a
way, for it forced courts to confront the question whether perfect conflicts
justice, according to Beale, was worth the price. Increasingly at mid-century
the answer was no. Compared to end results that made good socio-economic
sense, the attainment of logical rigor and with it the promised land of simple
and easy application, certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result
seemed secondary. This was especially true in the area of contracts where
the "right" result--one that enforced contracts and protected party expecta-
tions-was usually uppermost in the minds of courts.
In the hundred years from Milliken to Lilienthal, the nation had
changed. It had grown smaller, more interrelated and interwoven. Cata-
clysmic events-the Great Depression and World War II in particular-
increased the power of the federal government at the expense of the states.
They were sovereign still, but in a much diminished way. State lines no
longer stood as high barriers to resolving cases in ways that seemed to make
good sense. Territoriality itself was no longer talismanic. What was
increasingly evident was a disposition on the part of courts to treat the
choice-of-law decision as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.' 4°
The first real break with Beale's systematics came in 1954, when the
New York Court of Appeals discarded territoriality and replaced it with the
center-of-gravity or grouping-of-contacts approach.' 4 1 In its simplicity, the
idea had to seem appealing: if a single contact such as the place of making
was no longer to be decisive, then why not consider all of the contacts that
the parties, their transaction, and the litigation had with the states con-
140. See, e.g., id. at 787-90, 811-14.
141. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
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cerned? One state's contacts were almost bound to preponderate, and that
would identify the state "most intimately concerned"' 42 with the outcome,
hence the state whose law should govern. But this approach, as Currie and
other critics would soon point out, had its own set of problems-chiefly, in
Currie's estimation, its utter incompatibility with governmental interest
analysis. 43
It was this period of turmoil, growth, and change that formed the matrix
for the American Law Institute's second effort to restate the law of conflict-
of-laws. With Columbia law professor Willis L.M. Reese as the Reporter,
work began on the project in the early 1950s and continued for almost
twenty years. The Second Restatement appeared in final form in 1971. In
its many tentative drafts, it both influenced the choice-of-law revolution and
in turn was influenced by it. A sense of the scope and magnitude of the
undertaking, as well as of the forces that drove it, can be gathered from the
comments of Herbert Wechsler, the Institute's director, in the
"Introduction." The Second Restatement, he said:
[I]s a treatment that takes full account of the enormous change in
dominant judicial thought respecting conflicts problems that has
taken place in relatively recent years. The essence of that change
has been the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules in favor of
standards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judgment to
important values that were formerly ignored. Such a transforma-
tion in the corpus of the law reduces certitude as well as certainty,
posing a special problem in the process of restatement. Its solution
lies in candid recognition that black-letter formulations often must
consist of open-ended standards, gaining further content from rea-
soned elaboration in the comments and specific instances of appli-
cation given there or in the notes of the Reporter. That technique is
not unique to Conflicts but the situation here has called for its em-
ployment quite pervasively throughout these volumes. The result
presents a striking contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma
was so thoroughly enshrined. 44
Just how striking, we shall soon see. We can profitably turn at this point to
the Second Restatement itself to see what it made of all the turmoil and
142. Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
143. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 727-36.
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change and how effectively its provisions deal with issues of contract and
choice-of-law.
III. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ITS
APPROACH TO CASES IN CONTRACT
The Second Restatement is organized on a single fundamental principle.
It is that rights and liabilities with respect to any given issue are determined
by the law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has "the most
significant relationship" to the occurrence and the parties. 145 This principle
entirely supplants the vested-rights doctrine of the First Restatement, which,
the Reporter says, "has not prevailed in the courts and is rejected" through-
out.
146
Chapter 8 deals with contracts. It is subdivided into six topics, only the
first of which-"Validity Of Contracts And Rights Created Thereby"-bears
on the present discussion. This topic has three subparts. Title A states the
"General Principles" and contains the all-important sections 187 and 188.
Title B, comprising sections 189 to 197, deals with particular types of
contracts, and Title C, sections 198 to 207, with particular issues in contract.
Extensive comments follow each section, and they are of considerable help
in understanding the black-letter rules. Particular note should be taken of the
fact that these comments are "official," which is to say that they, like the
black-letter rules themselves, have received the endorsement of the Ameri-
can Law Institute.147 This was not true of the comments in the original
Restatement.
One of the most important doctrinal changes made by the Second
Restatement is in the area of party autonomy, which refers to the practice of
allowing the parties to choose the law that will govern their agreement.
American courts, it will be recalled, were quick to recognize this power in
contracting parties and ratified it with a will in their decisions. The use of
choice-of-law clauses became increasingly common in the twentieth century,
particularly in contracts important enough to be drafted by attorneys. Beale
opposed the concept and refused to incorporate it in the original Restate-
ment, but his views on the subject were largely ignored by the courts.
Section 187 of the Second Restatement-stating one of the two
"General Principles" which dominate the chapter on contracts-takes the
145. See id. at vii-viii.
146. See id. at 557 (ch. 8, Introductory Note).
147. See id. at viii.
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eminently sensible approach and gives explicit recognition to the power of
the parties to choose the governing law as long as there is a reasonable basis
for their choice, as where the state chosen bears a "substantial relationship"
either to the parties or the transaction. 48 For many years, the Supreme Court
of Florida, following the well-known decision in Seeman v. Philadelphia
Warehouse Co.,1 49 has taken the position that the parties' choice of a
particular state's law to govern their agreement will be upheld if the agree-
ment bears a "normal and reasonable relation" to that state.150 Section 187 is
largely congruent with existing doctrine in Florida and would not be likely to
effect the trend of decisions in this area if the Restatement approach were
adopted here.'15
Section 188, which states the second of the two "General Principles," is
more problematic. This section deals with those cases that would formerly
have been decided under the lex loci contractus doctrine-those in which the
parties have made no attempt to choose their own law. 152 Section 188(1)
148. See id. § 187. This section, entitled "Law of the State Chosen by the Parties" pro-
vides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the trans-
action and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of §
188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the lo-
cal law of the state of the chosen law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 187.
149. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
150. See Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So.
2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 1981); Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d
507, 512 (Fla. 1981).
151. See Finch & Smeltzly, supra note 27, at 282-84.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188. This section, entitled "Law Gov-
erning in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties," provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
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provides that in the absence of an effective choice by the parties, their rights
and duties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local
law of the state having "the most significant relationship to the transaction
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. ' '153 Section 188(2) then
lists five contacts that a court is to consider in applying the principles of
section 6. These are the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the
place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
the geographical location of the parties-their domicile, residence, place of
incorporation, or place of business. 54
The reference to section 6 is a critical one. Section 6 is by far the most
innovative and important section in the entire Restatement 55 and is applica-
ble to choice-of-law in all areas.' 56  Section 6(1) first directs a court to
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice-of-law if there is
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
153. See id. § 188(1).
154. See id. § 188(2).
155. See id. § 6, entitled "Choice-of-Law Principles," which provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the ap-
plicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
156. See id. § 6(2) cmt. c.
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one. 157 If there is none, which is typically the case, section 6(2) lists seven
choice-influencing considerations that a court is to take into account in
making its decision.15 8  The comments say that the enumeration is not
exclusive and that the factors are unranked and unweighted15 9 The seven
factors are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.' 6
The central theory of the Second Restatement, Professor Reese has written
elsewhere, is that "the values stated in section 6 underlie the entire field of
choice of law and that all of the black letter rules stem from these values."' 61
The choice-influencing considerations of section 6, in other words, represent
an attempt to distill those values that various courts and commentators at
various times and places have thought to be of importance in the choice-of-
law process. 62 Professor Reese is quick to concede that in a given case
these values may point in different directions and that from one area of law
to another some may be of greater importance than others. 63 But "the fact
remains that these are the values that underlie choice of law and that have
guided the courts in their decisions. '' 64 He believes that the ultimate success
of the Restatement depends on the correctness of this perception. 65
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(1).
158. Id. § 6(2).
159. Id. § 6(2) cmt. c.
160. Id. § 6(2).
161. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34
MERCERL. REv. 501, 516 (1983).
162. See id. at 509.
163. See id. at 513.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 516-17.
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The seven choice-influencing considerations of section 6 fall into five
groups, each representing a distinct choice-of-law value. 166 The first of these
comes mainly from section 6(2)(a)---"the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems"-and is reminiscent of the ideas reflected in the principle of
comity. It is a fundamental caution that a state should not ruthlessly pursue
its own self-interest at the expense of another state or of the community of
states. According to the comments, choice-of-law rules should "seek to
further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial
intercourse between them.... [A] state should have regard for the needs and
policies of other states and of the community of states." 167 Rules that reflect
this sensitivity and concern for the needs of other states, it is believed, will
commend themselves for widespread adoption, and this, in turn, will pro-
mote the "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" spoken of in
section 6(2)(f).168
The second value centers on interest analysis, which has a prominent
place among the choice-influencing considerations of section 6. The
provisions are sections 6(2)(b) and (c)-"the relevant policies of the forum"
and "the relevant policies of other interested states ... ,,169 These sections,
Professor Reese has written, give "support to the views of Professor Brain-
erd Currie and of those other advocates of what is popularly referred to as
the 'governmental interest' approach to choice of law., 170 The comments
that accompany these provisions are strongly reminiscent of Currie:
Every rule of law, whether embodied in a statute or in a com-
mon law rule, was designed to achieve one or more purposes. A
court should have regard for these purposes in determining whether
to apply its own rule or the rule of another state in the decision of a
particular issue. If the purposes sought to be achieved by a local
statute or common law rule would be furthered by its application to
out-of-state facts, this is a weighty reason why such application
should be made....
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(1) cmt. b; Reese, supra note
161, at 508-13.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. d.
168. See id. § 6(2)(f).
169. Id. § 6(2)(b)-(c).
170. Reese, supra note 161, at 509.
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... [TJhe forum should give consideration not only to its own rele-
vant policies ... but also to the relevant policies of all other inter-
ested states.171
The third value is concerned with the needs of the parties and is
reflected in sections 6(2)(d), "the protection of justified expectations,' '072 and
6(2)(f), "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result."'73 This value is
obviously of pre-eminent importance in the area of contracts' 74 and in this
context gains support from the fourth value, which is stated in section
6(2)(e), "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law."' ' The
comments to section 188(1) say flatly that "[p]rotection of the justified
expectations of the parties is the basic policy underlying the field of con-
tracts." 176 The fifth value concerns the needs of judicial administration and
is reflected mainly in section 6(2)(g), "ease in the determination and appli-
cation of the law to be applied."
177
Section 188, read in conjunction with the principles and values of
section 6, obviously invites an open-ended policy analysis of the broadest
sort in determining the state whose relationship to the transaction and the
parties is "most significant." Considering that the Restatement nowhere
defines a "significant" relationship or differentiates it from one that is not
significant, the calculus called for by these two sections may strike some as
intolerably vague and uncertain. But the sections immediately following
section 188, which deal with particular types of contracts and particular
issues in contract, attempt to dispel some of the uncertainty. Though the
general principle of section 188 is "applicable to all contracts and to all
issues in contract,"' 78 the Reporter nevertheless believes it possible, "on the
basis of existing knowledge, to lay down more precise rules for determining
the state of the applicable law.... It seems clear that the best way to bring
precision into the field is by attempting to state special rules for particular
contracts and for particular issues.,, 179 Or put more bluntly, the wonderfully
open-ended, policy-oriented approach of sections 6 and 188 collapses for
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmts. e-f.
172. Id. § 6(2)(d).
173. Id. § 6(2)(f).
174. See Reese, supra note 161, at 511-12.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2)(e).
176. Id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
177. Id. § 6(2)(g).
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particular types of contracts and issues in contract into a series of presump-
tive rules as to the state of most significant relationship.
With respect to particular types of contracts, the Reporter believes it
possible from existing experience to state that a "particular contact plays an
especially important role in the determination of the state of applicable
law."'180 The rules stated in these specific sections presume, in other words,
that a state having a certain geographical connection or contact with a case
will ordinarily be the state of most significant relationship. These are of
course jurisdiction-selecting rules, and in their territorial bias they are
strikingly similar to the traditional approach under the lex loci contractus
doctrine.
Here, for particular types of contracts, are the important contacts and
resultant presumptions as to the state of most significant relationship: for
contracts involving transfers of interests in land, the state where the land is
situated; 181 for contracts for the sale of a chattel, the state where the seller is
to deliver; 182 for life insurance contracts, the state where the insured was
domiciled at the time the policy was applied for;' 83 for contracts of fire,
surety, or casualty insurance, the state where the parties understood the
principal location of the insured risk to be;184 for contracts of suretyship, the
state whose law governs the principal obligation; 85 for contracts for the
repayment of money lent, the state where the contract requires repayment;
86
for contracts for the rendition of services, the state where the services are to
be rendered;' 87 and for contracts of transportation, the state from which the
passenger departs or the goods are dispatched. 188 It is important to bear in
mind that these rules are presumptions only. Each section contains the
explicit qualification that the presumption is subject to displacement if some
other state has "a more significant relationship" to the transaction and the
parties "under the principles stated in § 6. "189
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 189 (Title B, Introductory Note).
181. Id. §§ 189, 190.
182. Id. § 191.
183. Id. § 192.
184. Id. § 193.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 194.
186. Id. § 195.
187. Id. § 196.
188. Id. § 197.
189. See, e.g., id. § 195. This section provides:
The validity of a contract for the repayment of money lent and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the par-
ties, by the local law of the state where the contract requires that repayment be
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Particular issues in contract receive considerably less categorical
treatment. Some of the rules simply state that an issue is to be determined by
the law selected by application of the general principle of section 188.
Issues in this group are those which concern the validity of a contract in
respects other than capacity and formalities; 19° the effect on a contract of
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake;' 91 the construction
of words used in a contract;' 92 the nature and extent of the rights and duties
created by a contract; 193 and the measure of recovery for a breach of con-
tract.194 Others are in two parts, the first part stating that the issue is to be
determined by application of the rule of section 188, the second then
offering a tentative suggestion as to what the result of such application
would ordinarily be. Thus, a party's contractual capacity will be upheld if
she has such capacity under the law of her domicile; 195 formalities meeting
the requirements of the place of execution "will usually be acceptable";
196
and contracts calling for performance which is illegal in the place of per-
formance "will usually be denied enforcement."'
197
Additionally, two issues are singled out for special treatment: usury and
details of performance. Section 203 provides that a contract will be upheld
against a charge of usury "if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissi-
ble in a state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not
greatly in excess of the rate permitted" by the law of the state that would
otherwise have the most significant relationship under section 188.98 And
section 206 states that "[i]ssues relating to details of performance ... are
determined by the local law of the place of performance."'
99
I think it is important to stress that the general approach of the Restate-
ment aims at identifying the state of most significant relationship under
sections 6 and 188. The presumptions and suggested answers of the specific
made, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 195.
190. Id. § 200.
191. Id. § 201.
192. Id. § 204.
193. Id. § 205.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 207.
195. I § 198(2).
196. Id. § 199(2).
197. Id. § 202(2).
198. Id. § 203.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 206.
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sections are simply the Reporter's view of the result that would usually
follow from using that approach. For particular types of contracts, all of the
presumptions are subject to displacement if some other state has a more
significant relationship to the parties and the transaction under the principles
stated in section 6, and most of the particular issues are determined by the
law selected by application of section 188. It is obviously important to
understand just how a court should go about identifying the state of most
significant relationship using sections 6 and 188.
Section 188(2) says that the five enumerated contacts are to be taken
into account in applying the principles of section 6 to determine the applica-
ble law. But exactly how do sections 6 and 188 interrelate? The comments
to section 188 offer considerable guidance on this point. The comment to
section 188(2) states that
the forum, in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the state of
most significant relationship, should give consideration to the rele-
vant policies of all potentially interested states and the relative in-
terests of those states in the decision of the particular issue. The
states which are most likely to be interested are those which have
one or more of the following [five] contacts with the transaction or
the parties. 2W
This language is an obvious reference to the interest analysis provisions of
section 6-section 6(2)(b) and (c). The comment to section 188(1) makes
this clear by saying that these two principles of section 6 focus "upon the
purposes, policies, aims and objectives of each of the competing local law
rules urged to govern and upon the concern of the potentially interested
states in having their rules applied. The factors ... are at times referred to as
'state interests' or as appertaining to an 'interested state.,, 201  The five
contacts, then, are important not in themselves, but because of the likelihood
that a state having one or more of these contacts with the parties or the
transaction will have an interest in the application of its law.
The appropriate starting point is therefore with the interest analysis
provisions of section 6. A court should first identify the relevant policy
underlying the law of each state having one or more of the five contacts with
the case. It should then ask whether that state's policy would be furthered by
application of its law. If the answer is yes, that state will be interested in the
200. Id. § 188(2) cmt. e.
201. Id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
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application of its law. The majority of cases, as Currie demonstrated, will be
false conflicts because only one state will have such an interest. 2 In that
event, the only interested state will presumably be the state of most signifi-
cant relationship. The comments to section 6 say that a state's interest in the
application of its law is a "weighty reason" favoring such application.
20 3
They do not actually state the converse proposition-that courts should not
apply the law of a state having no interest in such application-but there can
be little doubt that the basic philosophy of the Restatement, in common with
most of the other modem approaches, is to resolve false conflicts by appli-
cation of the law of the only interested state. Professor Reese has said
elsewhere that "a court should seek to avoid applying a law whose underly-
ing policy would not be served by such application." 2°4
This is certainly the easiest and most practical way to proceed. The
interest analysis provisions of section 6 may, without more, identify the state
of most significant relationship; if the conflict is false, the only interested
state will be that state. This, in turn, makes it unnecessary to consider the
other choice-influencing considerations of section 6 or to consult any of the
sections dealing with particular types of contracts and issues in contract
since the interest analysis principles of section 6 will have overridden any
contrary result that these sections might call for.
Up to this point, the method of the Restatement is clear enough.
Matters become more complex, however, if the interest analysis called for by
sections 6(2)(b) and (c) reveals that both states are interested in the applica-
tion of their laws-a true conflict, in other words. The comments to section
6 say that the state whose interests are "most deeply affected" should have
its law applied, 205 but nothing is said, there or elsewhere, about how this
determination is to be made. The Restatement leaves a court at this point
with a jumble of contacts, principles, policy-oriented provisions, and
jurisdiction-selecting rules to sort through and no guidance on how to do it.
One thing seems clear. The Restatement invites a court to do what
Brainerd Currie said neither could nor should be done, and that is to weigh
or compare the respective interests of two states in the application of their
202. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 107.
203. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. e.
204. Reese, supra note 161, at 510 (citation omitted). See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL, supra
note 3, at 245-51; ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 60, at 583-88; William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecti-
cism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 647-48 &
n.12 (1983); see generally CRAMTON uT AL., supra note 3, at 193-379 (summarizing principal
modem approaches); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 15-41.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
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laws. Currie, whose proposal it first was that conflicts cases be analyzed in
terms of governmental interests, deplored the weighing of interests as a way
of choosing between the competing laws and policies of two states. If both
states were interested, he said, no one, not even the Supreme Court, was in a
position to say which state's policies were "the more important, or the more
deserving, or the more enlightened." 2°6 Yet the Restatement's most basic
premise-that for every case there is a state of most significant relation-
ship-requires a court to make this relative judgment. Any state interested
in the application of its law will have a significant relationship to a case. If
two states have such a relationship, there appears to be no escape from
determining in some way that one state's relationship is more significant
than the other's. In effect, the Restatement assumes its own conclusion: one
state's relationship must be more significant than another's because there
must be a state of most significant relationship.
The Restatement's failure to say how a court is supposed to make this
determination opens a Pandora's box of possibilities. Courts as unimpressed
with Currie's arguments as the Reporter, apparently will undoubtedly try to
assess the degree to which the interested states are attached to the policies
embodied in their laws as a measure of whose interests are "most deeply
affected. 2 °7  Some policies will no doubt strike some courts as more
strongly held than others, but this will necessarily be an individual and
highly subjective judgment, much like that involved with traditional methods
in deciding whether to invoke the public policy exception. In practice it has
proven difficult enough for a forum court to make that judgment with respect
to its own state's public policy, 208 much less compare its degree of "strength"
with that of another state in any meaningful way.
206. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 117.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
208. In Lilienthal v. Kaufinan, 395 P.2d 543, 548 (Or. 1964), Justice Denecke made the
following, refreshingly candid observation:
The difficulty in deciding what is the fundamental law forming a cornerstone
of the forum's jurisprudence and what is not such fundamental law, thus allow-
ing it to give way to foreign law, is caused by the lack of any even remotely ob-
jective standards. Former limitations on the capacity of married women to con-
tract illustrate the difficulty. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), is used in
many case books as an example. There, the Massachusetts court held that the
Massachusetts law that a Massachusetts married woman was incapable of con-
tracting as a surety was not such a cornerstone of Massachusetts jurisprudence
and economy that Maine law to the contrary could not be applicable. However,
in Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918), Mr. Justice Holmes, writ-
ing for the court, held that a similar Texas limitation on a Texas married woman
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In this sort of calculus, policies that coincide with a court's own sense
of values are likely to appear more strongly held than those that do not, and
it will be tempting to credit a state with little attachment to a policy that
seems wrong-headed or archaic or that is plainly on its way out, as was the
case with Massachusetts's protective policy in Milliken v. Pratt.209 It will
also be difficult for a court to ignore the result that application of the one
law or the other will produce in a given case, for once the content of com-
peting laws is taken into account, weighing interests almost inevitably
shades into weighing results. Courts that think they know a good socio-
economic result when they see one will have a field day with the Restate-
ment's "most deeply affected" 210 formulation.
Another possibility is contact counting. New York's adoption of the
"grouping of contacts" approach has had a fair measure of influence with
other courts.211 This approach counts "significant contacts" in an attempt to
locate the state "having the most interest in the problem" or "most intimately
concerned with the outcome."212 Its simple arithmetic creates an aura of
objectivity that courts, unwilling to engage in the unseemly business of
interest weighing, may find appealing. Although the similarity in terminol-
ogy makes it easy to guess that the Reporter took a few leaves from New
York's book in designing the Second Restatement, the comments to section
188(2) never say that the five contacts of the section are quantitatively
important; they are important only because they are likely to be the ones that
implicate a state's interest in the application of its law under the principles
of section 6. "Interest" in this sense means that the relevant policies em-
bodied in the law would be furthered by its application. A state is either
interested or it is not-not more or less interested depending on the number
was such an integral part of Texas policy that the Illinois law to the contrary
would not be enforced in a Texas court.
Compare Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967) (holding that
the historical absence of any limitation on wrongful death damages in the Florida wrongful
death statute falls to reflect strongly held public policy), with Gillen v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (holding that the statutory prohibition of "other insurance"
clauses in automobile insurance policies issued in Florida reflects strongly held public policy).
209. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
211. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 691-93 ("[A] significant number [of
states] have adopted the more flexible center-of-gravity approach or that of the Second
Restatement"); Kay, supra note 119, at 535 ("North Dakota appears to be the only state that
has adopted New York's center of gravity approach without merging it into the 'most
significant relationship' doctrine of the Restatement Second."). See generally id. at 525-38.
212. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (citations omitted).
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of contacts it has with a case. All the same, confronted with a true conflict
of interests and stuck for a way to break the tie, some courts will turn to
contact counting in the intuitively appealing if analytically superficial belief
that the interests of the state with the most contacts must be those that are
"most deeply affected. ' 13
For courts that understand Currie's objections and take them seriously,
the inexorable demand of the Restatement to locate the state of most signifi-
cant relationship will pose a thornier dilemma. Currie's own proposal-that
the forum apply its own law in a case of true conflict-was essentially
arbitrary, intended for a problem not capable of solution with the resources
at hand, but for which a solution nevertheless had to be found. Lilienthal is
a perfect example, but few courts have followed its lead,214  apparently
regarding a forum-law solution as too self-serving to commend itself as a
settled rule of decision. Certainly the Restatement lends no support to
Currie's proposal, but it does contain other possibilities for courts that value
arbitrary solutions in preference to the "apples and oranges" comparison
involved in interest weighing.
Professor Russell Weintraub has proposed that true conflicts be re-
solved by applying the law that validates the parties' agreement. 215  "It
makes sense," he says, "to have a choice-of-law rule in accord with widely
shared and clearly discernible trends in the domestic laws whose conflicts
we are trying to resolve., 216  In this, of course, he draws on the near-
sacrosanct status that contracts have enjoyed throughout the nation's history
and the well-known predilection of courts for enforcing them wherever
possible. Ample support for this result-essentially that argued for by all
proponents of the rule of validation2 7-can be found in the principles of
section 6. Choosing the validating law protects the justified expectations of
the parties and serves their need for certainty and predictability. This in turn
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
214. See Kay, supra note 119, at 551.
215. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 386-98. His proposal is more complex than the
statement in the text suggests; it is limited to questions of contract validity and is intended to
operate as a presumption subject to rebuttal in certain cases. "[F]acilitating the planning of
interstate and international commercial transactions," he says, "is far better served by a
rebuttable presumption that the contract will be valid under the local law of any contact state
provided that the validating policies underlying that law will be advanced by application to the
interstate transaction in issue." Id. at 387.
216. Id. at 359 (referencing torts cases); see also id. at 388.
217. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 63, at 465-90; STUMBERG, supra note 90, at 237-
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furthers the basic policy underlying the field of contract law. Such an
approach is simple and easy to use and, considering that most cases have
come out this way anyhow, could hardly cause disruption in the smooth
workings of the interstate system.
The other obvious possibility is simply a default reference to the
presumptions and suggested answers of the sections that follow section 188.
These black-letter rules represent the Reporter's attempt to distill for each
kind of contract and issue in contract the one particular territorial contact
that courts themselves have tended to emphasize in their choice-of-law
determinations. Since many of the decisions from which these rules derive
were made with territorial methods, it is not surprising to find the place of
contracting and the place of performance figuring prominently as the
important contacts. The net effect, somewhat ironically, is a more highly
refined and particularized version of the lex loci contractus doctrine. The
territorial bias of these sections reflects the Reporter's own view of the
profound and continuing importance of territoriality in conflicts thinking.
He has said elsewhere that to ignore the significance of territoriality is "to
ignore the basic reason for the existence of choice of law."218 These sections
also reflect his personal preference for a rule-based approach rather than one
that is open-ended and policy-oriented.219
For some, perhaps many courts, the appeal of an approach of this sort
should not be underestimated. In saying this, I have in mind the kind of
court that might approach a case in this way.220 Suppose it has determined
through the interest analysis provisions of section 6 that both states are
legitimately interested in the application of their laws. It recognizes, with
Currie, that it is in no position to "weigh" these conflicting interests. It
cannot say that one state is more deeply committed than the other to the
policies embodied in its law, or that the policies of one are more strongly
held or are somehow better, wiser, or more important than the other.
Contact counting strikes it as too simplistic, subjective, and uncertain.
Contacts, after all, can be multiplied and manipulated, and in practice
218. Reese, supra note 161, at 514.
219. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEtLL. REv. 315
(1972).
220. In discussing choice-of-law methodology, I assume throughout, for the sake of
simplicity, that only two states are involved and that the action is brought in the courts of one
of them. This is in fact far more often the case than not. But it is of course possible that a
conflicts case can involve more than two states, and it is also possible that the forum will be
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someone has to decide which ones are to be counted, whether some are more
important than others, and what happens if the contacts are more or less
evenly divided between the two states.
What the court feels the need for at this point is an arbitrary solution. It
wants a way of deciding that does not involve the appearance of deciding.
Its instinct, however, is for a method that will be as. impartial and free from
bias as possible, much like the simple toss of a coin. Hence, it rejects both
Currie's and Weintraub's proposals because, though arbitrary, each takes a
bias already present in these cases-one favoring application of forum law,
the other favoring the law that would validate the contract-and reintroduces
it into the process as a basis of decision. Like many courts, this court also
happens to be busy and overworked. With its crowded docket, it has neither
the time nor the inclination to make a "three-dimensional chess game' 221 of
these cases. It wants a quick, simple, and easy way to dispose of the case
before it and all others likely to arise, both for its own sake and that of the
lower courts who look to it for guidance. With a view to minimizing rather
than encouraging litigation, it wants a method that is certain and predictable
so that affected parties can suitably orient their actions and attorneys can
advise their clients with confidence. What this court wants, in short, is a
simple and easy-to-use approach that will be impartial in operation, certain,
and predictable in result. For these purposes the black-letter rules of the
specific sections should do nicely.
I want to emphasize that the suggested use of the Restatement in this
way is intended only for true conflict resolution. The first step in any case
should always be to determine the nature of the conflict by relating the
contacts of section 188(2) to the interest analysis provisions of section 6. If
the conflict is false, the law of the only interested state should be applied.
Only if it is true should the territorial contact identified in the appropriate
specific section be used and then only for the limited purpose of providing
an arbitrary way of resolving the conflict.
The Reporter supports his choice of particular contacts with a rationale
in the comments that accompany each black-letter rule, often to the extent of
saying that a certain state, by virtue of its territorial connection, is likely to
222have a "dominant" or "natural" interest in the determination of an issue.
This line of thought revives the territorial bias of the original Restatement in
an unfortunate way, attaching as it does near-talismanic significance to some
221. Rosenberg, supra note 81, at 644.
222. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 192 cmt. c (dominant interest);
id. § 193 cmt. c (natural interest); id. § 196 cmt. c (natural interest).
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one particular contact. The danger is that the state with the identified
contact may have no interest in the application of its law. A court can miss
this important point altogether if it omits the interest analysis step and
simply consults the black-letter rules directly. The point here has nothing to
do with the soundness of the Reporter's reasons for singling out a particular
contact; it is that those reasons, sound or otherwise, are essentially irrelevant
when the black-letter rules are used as default solutions for cases of true
conflict.
If all of this seems complex, it is a complexity inherent in the design of
the Restatement. Obviously it is not the monolith its predecessor was. It is
an agglomeration of just about every approach to choice-of-law that anyone
has ever thought of, and its eclectic assortment of contacts, principles,
policy-oriented provisions, and jurisdiction-selecting rules can accommodate
just about any approach a court might want to take. It is like an Erector set
with no directions. The only attempt at a unifying conception is the notion
of "a state of most significant relationship," yet that term is never defined.
Interest analysis is a major component, but its function and importance in
relation to other components are left unclear. In particular, no guidance is
provided for the critical case where each of two concerned states is legiti-
mately interested in the application of its law. There is only the unhelpful
assurance that one state must be more interested than the other because there
must be a state of most significant relationship. How that determination is to
be made is never specified. Nowhere does the Restatement confront Cur-
rie's central insight that a court of one state may have no business in making
that sort of relative judgment between its own law and policy and that of
another state.
Let me illustrate these concerns by returning to Lilienthal in order to
consider how a court might work through the Second Restatement in
deciding that case. It would probably start by referring to section 195, which
deals with "contracts for the repayment of money lent."223 That section
states that the governing law is that of the state "where the contract requires
that repayment be made,"224 which in this case would be California. Ergo,
the contract is valid and should be enforced against Kaufman, the Oregon
spendthrift. With this, we are essentially back to the traditional territorial
approach-albeit in a more refined version-and all the simplicity, ease,
certainty, and predictability that it affords. Some courts have taken just this
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approach, using the black-letter rules to the exclusion of everything else. 25
But there is a catch if the court reads carefully. Section 195 directs it to
apply California law unless some other state has a more significant relation-
ship to the transaction and the parties under the principles of section 6.226
What is a "significant relationship"? The term is not defined. Does Califor-
nia have one, or Oregon either, for that matter?
In search of guidance, the court might turn back to the general principle
of section 188(1), which only repeats the admonition to apply the law of the
state having the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties under the principles of section 6.227 Section 188(2) is more specific.
It says that in applying those principles, the court should take account of five
contacts .28 California has four. They are the place of contracting, the place
of negotiation, the place of performance, and the domicile of the lender.
Oregon has, at most, two. They are the location of the subject matter of the
contract-presumably the money lent-and also the domicile of the debtor.
But quantity is not the issue. The comments instruct the court, in
applying the principles of section 6, to consider the relevant policies of all
potentially interested states.22 9 They add that the states "likely to be inter-
ested are those.. .hav[ing] one or more" of the five contacts with the transac-
tion or the parties. 230 California's policy is one of security of transactions.
Application of its law would further that policy by enforcing the contract and
thereby insuring that its resident creditor is paid. Oregon is likewise an
interested state. Its legislatively determined policy is one of protecting
resident spendthrifts by relieving them of their contractual obligations.
Application of Oregon law would plainly serve that end.
What now? Both states are interested states. The comments to section
6 say that generally the law of the state whose interests are "most deeply
affected" should be applied,23' but unfortunately there are no directions on
how to make this determination. Nor is there anything to warn the court that
perhaps it is not its proper role to say that policies arrived at by its own
225. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 132 ("Other courts. essentially end their
analysis with the rules: little or no attention is paid to § 6, and instead the court makes the
presumption effectively irrebuttable. For these courts the Second Restatement is little more
than an updated version of the first.").
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 195.
227. See id. § 188(1).
228. See id. § 188(2).
229. See id. cmt. e.
230. Id.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
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legislature after full debate and consideration should yield to those of
California, or, for that matter, that California's should yield to Oregon's.
Some sort of resolution, of course, is not hard to come by. The point is that
the result reached, whatever it is, will necessarily represent a subjective
judgment that depends far more on the court's attitude and temperament than
on anything contained in the Restatement.
Compelled by the Restatement to make this relative judgment, how
should the court go about it? It knows, of course, that both Oregon and
California share a strong interest in the security of transactions, which in this
context means that contractual obligations should be enforced and, more
specifically, that debtors should be required to pay their debts. But the
Oregon Legislature, though well aware of this precept and generally in full
agreement with it, has nevertheless seen fit to carve out a special exception
for a discrete group of Oregonians who, by reason of psychiatric or person-
ality disorder, cannot control their compulsion to spend money. For their
own protection and the protection of those close to them, the legislature has
empowered courts to declare such persons spendthrifts, the practical effect
of which is to deprive them of the power to enter into valid contracts.
In other words, the Oregon Legislature has already struck the very
balance that the court is wrestling with: for the special class of persons
known as spendthrifts, it has determined that Oregon's interest in protecting
them takes priority over its more general interest in enforcing contracts. The
court also knows that the number of Oregonian spendthrifts is small, espe-
cially in relation to the number of potential debtors, and that it will not be
called upon very often to depart from the normal practice in order to protect
them. Enforcing the contract will therefore have a much greater impact on
the policy of protecting spendthrifts than not enforcing it will have on the
policy of security of transactions.232 Not only would enforcement deal a
serious blow to Oregon's protective scheme, but it would also require the
court to second-guess the legislature in order to do it. From this sort of
perspective, Oregon's interests might well strike the court as more deeply
affected than California's interests.
On the other hand, consider how easily a court with a different set of
values could reach the opposite result. It could reinforce California's
interest in the application of its law by counting contacts and concluding that
it is the center of gravity, hence the state most intimately concerned with the
outcome and, thus, the state whose interests are most deeply affected. Or it
232. See Kramer, supra note 87, at 323-24.
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could bring into play the other choice-influencing considerations of section
6, which, for contracts cases, boil down to enforcing agreements in order to
protect the justified expectations of the parties, thereby promoting certainty
and predictability and insuring that the interstate system continues to hum
along. Alternatively, if already at odds with its legislature, it could sniff
condescendingly and point out that Oregon's spendthrift policy is a legisla-
tive aberration, undoubtedly intended only for home consumption, and
therefore weak in comparison with California's policy of enforcing contrac-
tual obligations. California has a policy shared, not coincidentally, by
Oregon as well as most other states in the United States. On the other hand,
it could simply acknowledge the impasse and break the tie in an arbitrary
way with section 195's presumption that the governing law is that of
California, the state where the money was to be repaid.
Ironically, the one solution not readily available to a Second Restate-
ment court is the one actually adopted in Lilienthal. The Restatement
requires a court to determine that one state's relationship is more significant
than another's and then in some way to rationalize that determination. For a
court that thinks like the Lilienthal court, this will necessitate a degree of
dishonesty, or at least sophistry, for it will not be able to say, as the Oregon
Supreme Court did, that the policies of both states are important and would
be equally affected by non-application of their respective laws. Nor will it
be able to acknowledge forthrightly that it is an instrument of state policy
with a sworn constitutional duty to uphold the laws and policies of its own
state wherever possible.
It seems obvious that value judgments are involved here. To some
courts, separation-of-powers and role-and-function concerns will carry little
weight. It will not matter that they are dealing with the laws of two sover-
eigns; they will be only too happy to engage in the familiar task of weighing
and balancing competing considerations of social and economic interest to
reach what they think is a sound result, just as if the case were a run-of-the-
mill domestic one. Others may take pause, struck with the seriousness of
what it means to have to nullify, if only for one case, the laws and policies of
their own state. It is a decision as profound in its way as one declaring a
statute unconstitutional, and they will not be happy making it just because
the Restatement says so.
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IV. TEMPERAMENT AND ATTITUDE IN THE FLORIDA COURT'S DECISION
MAKING IN CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES
The Restatement's assortment of riches makes it an extraordinarily
flexible instrument for the resolution of conflicts problems. It contains
something for everybody, and it is not surprising that it has become the most
popular of the modem approaches as a replacement for traditional meth-
ods. 33 A number of commentators have pointed out, however, that the
results it has produced around the country thus far have not been noticeably
certain, predictable, or uniform, or even very satisfactory; 423 rather, they bear
out the assertion that the use that any particular court makes of the Restate-
ment is more likely to depend on what it values in a choice-of-law method
than on the Restatement itself.
In considering the desirability of extending the Restatement approach in
Florida, the most pertinent question to ask, it seems to me, is what the
Supreme Court of Florida values in a choice-of-law method. Obviously
there can be no definitive answer to this question. The court's membership
has changed frequently over time,235 and what it has done in the past is no
guarantee of what it will do in the future. All the same, there are marked
indications of attitude and temperament in the court's pattern of decision
making in conflicts cases over the years, especially in the torts cases it has
decided thus far with the approach of the Second Restatement. An examina-
tion of this history in some detail should prove instructive.
Drama in the conflicts arena usually comes when a court manipulates
the choice-of-law decision in order to produce what it obviously thinks is the
right result for the case before it. The bolder and more imaginative the
manipulation, the better, as witness the conjuring-act quality of the best of
233. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 377 & n.43; Borchers, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1992: Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 125, 129-33
(1992).
234. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 119, at 558-62; Kramer, supra note 29, at 466, 486-89;
Laycock, supra note 29, at 253; Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement
(Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 327-28 (1972); Singer, supra
note 29, at 77.
235. Of the seven justices who participated in the 1980 decision in Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980), in which the court adopted the Second
Restatement approach for torts cases, only two Justices, Justices Overton and McDonald, were
still on the court in 1988 when Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988) was decided.
Of the justices who participated in that decision, four Justices, Chief Justice Kogan and
Justices Grimes, Shaw, and Overton remain on the court today.
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Justice Roger Traynor's opinions for the California Supreme Court.2 36 But if
that sort of performance has been the stuff of soap opera, then the Supreme
Court of Florida's opinions, by comparison, have tended to resemble the
weather report on the nightly news.
The most innovative of these was, undoubtedly, Justice Robert's short-
lived 1967 opinion in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,237 a case arising
out of the death of a Florida resident in an airline crash in Illinois. In the
ensuing wrongful death action, brought in federal court in Tampa and
sounding in both tort and contract, the Supreme Court of Florida was asked
by way of certified question to say whether Florida, for reasons of public
policy or otherwise, would refuse to apply an Illinois limitation on wrongful
death damages, Florida having none.238
Writing for five members of the court, Justice Roberts found in earlier
cases a strongly expressed policy of giving "primary consideration, in
choice-of-law cases, to the public policy-legislative as well as organic-or
'any salutary interest' of this state and to decline to enforce a foreign law
when contrary thereto .... ,,239 But he did not stop with that. He went on to
declare that "the strict lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in favor of a
more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests
underlying the particular issue before the court.,,240 He quoted with apparent
approval the "most significant relationship" principle from a tentative draft
of the Second Restatement2 4' and stressed the importance of analyzing:
[T]he policies underlying and the purpose of the conflicting laws
and of the relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such
policies and purpose. By giving full effect to the law of a foreign
state when-and only when-such purposes or policies would be
served or effectuated, the forum state does, as a practical matter,
accord due 'deference and respect' to such foreign law .... 242
236. See People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957); Grant v. McAu-
liffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
237. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
238. Id. at 744-45.
239. Id. at 747.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 747 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 379(1) (Tentative
Draft No. 9, 1964)).
242. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 747.
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He failed to see that the happenstance of a plane crash in Illinois gave that
state any interest in the application of its law and concluded that Florida
would refuse to apply the Illinois limitation on wrongful death damages.
243
But on rehearing, the court reversed itself.244 A new majority of four
plainly thought the Illinois wrongful death statute the only one applicable.
245
It could find no basis in the rules of statutory interpretation for separating the
damage limitation from the underlying right to sue and posed the issue
squarely in terms of whether such a limitation was so repugnant to Florida's
statutory policy of unlimited damages as to be unenforceable. With no
discussion, it found that it was not.246 The New York Court of Appeals'
controversial decision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,247 in which that
court had done precisely what the court here was refusing to do, was sharply
distinguished in a footnote as basing its contrary conclusion on a constitu-
tional rather than a statutory prohibition of damage limitations. 248 And, in
the majority's view, any discussion of tort conflicts doctrine was inappropri-
ate in a case "explicitly characterized" as a warranty proceeding.
249
In its wooden and mechanical insistence on territorial principles, the
final opinion in Hopkins is the typical one. Whatever policy the absence of
damage limitations in Florida's wrongful death statute reflected, it was not
strong enough to override the normally applicable territorial rule that
wrongful death damages are a function of the law of the place of wrong.2
As a result, Florida's policy, and with it the claim of a Florida resident to the
protection of that policy, was subordinated to that of another state. The bias
so often apparent in these cases-the tendency of the forum to choose its
own law, particularly when that law would allow an injured plaintiff to
recover, and particularly when the plaintiff happens to be a forum resi-
dent25-was entirely missing. No one reading the final opinion could
accuse the court of result-oriented decision-making. With the abrupt
reversal, Justice Roberts lost his bid to place Florida in the forefront of the
choice-of-law revolution, which had erupted only five years earlier with the
243. Id. at 747-48.
244. Id. at 749.
245. See id. at 751.
246. Id.
247. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
248. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 751 n.3.
249. Id. at 751.
250. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 417 (1934).
251. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 6, at 780.
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New York Court of Appeals' watershed decision in Babcock v. Jackson.
252
More significantly, it was the first and last time that the Supreme Court of
Florida would speak in the language of interest analysis in a conflict-of-laws
case.
Despite the importance claimed by Justice Roberts for the public policy
exception in Florida's conflicts jurisprudence, it has never been invoked in a
torts case; and in contracts cases it has been used only infrequently, espe-
25
cially in recent years. The most notable example is Gillen v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n,24 decided in 1974, which involved an "other
insurance" clause in an automobile insurance policy. The clause was valid
in New Hampshire where the policy was issued and delivered and the
Gillens were resident at the time, but invalid in Florida where, with notice to
the insurer, they had permanently relocated and were living when Mr. Gillen
was killed and Mrs. Gillen seriously injured in a collision caused solely by
the negligence of an uninsured motorist.25 5 In an opinion by Justice Adkins,
the court refused to give effect to the clause, declaring that public policy
"requires this Court to assert Florida's paramount interest in protecting its
own from inequitable insurance arrangements. 2 56
Justice Adkins never said why the statutorily based public policy in this
case was strongly held whereas that in Hopkins was not, illustrating once
again the subjectivity inherent in the exception. The solicitude expressed for
Florida's policies and its residents would be more striking were Gillen not
such an isolated instance. The result should not obscure the fact that in most
of its conflicts decisions the court has been content to apply the traditional
territorial rules in mechanical fashion, letting the chips fall where they may.
The same kinds of considerations that underlie the public policy
exception are present in the interest analysis provisions of section 6, but they
have received remarkably short shrift in the cases which the court has
decided since 1980 when it adopted the Second Restatement approach for
252. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
253. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974); Cemiglia
v. C & D Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d I (Fla. 1967); Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla.
1956); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 199 So. 50 (Fla. 1940). Despite specific
urging, the court refused to invoke the exception in Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami,
Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985); Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank
& Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981); and Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat
Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
254. 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 7.
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torts cases in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.257 In fact, it would be
fair to say that the Restatement itself has received remarkably short shrift at
the hands of the court.
Bishop itself was an easy case, a paradigm false conflict, which the
court used only as a vehicle for abandoning its traditional adherence to lex
loci delicti and adopting the approach of the Second Restatement instead. It
seems safe to say that had the court reached the merits, it would have applied
Florida law. Members of the Bishop family, all Florida residents, were
guests aboard a small airplane leased and operated by Florida Specialty
Paint, a Florida corporation. They were flying to North Carolina for a
holiday weekend. The plane, piloted by the company's president, also a
Florida resident, crashed en route in South Carolina, allegedly due to the
pilot's negligence. The Bishops brought suit in Florida against the company
and its president to recover for their injuries. An airplane guest statute was
in effect in South Carolina that required guests to show intentional miscon-
duct or recklessness on the part of their host in order to recover. Florida had
no such statute and required only a showing of simple negligence.
258
A quick section 6 analysis would have revealed that South Carolina had
no interest in the application of its airplane guest statute, the purpose of
which was the protection of hosts from suits by ungrateful guests and the
elimination of collusive lawsuits3 9 The intended beneficiaries of this policy
were South Carolina residents and the insurance carriers who insured them,
none of whom were present in the case. Florida, in contrast, was interested
in the application of its law to further its policy of full compensation for
negligently inflicted injuries. As Florida was the only interested state, its
law should have been applied.260
Since Bishop there have been only three cases-State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Olsen,261 Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo,262 and Celotex
Corp. v. Meehan263-but they have a good deal to say about what the court
values in a choice-of-law method. And because the torts and contracts
provisions of the Restatement are so similar,264 these cases offer consider-
257. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
258. Id. at 1000.
259. Cf Ramey v. Ramey, 258 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 n.5 (S.C. 1979).
260. See Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 486-89.
261. 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
262. 453 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
263. 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988).
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188. Compare id. section 145
(stating "The General Principle" for torts cases). Section 145 provides:
1997] 835
61
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
able insight into the use to which the court might put the Restatement, were
it to extend its approach to contracts cases.
265
Olsen was decided in 1981 and arose out of a 1976 car accident in
Illinois between an Illinois uninsured motorist and Johnnie Olsen, a Florida
resident, who died from injuries sustained in the crash. Both drivers were
negligent in some unspecified degree. At the time of the accident, Illinois
was still a contributory negligence state; Florida had recently adopted pure
comparative negligence. Under the uninsured motorist provisions of Olsen's
insurance policy with State Farm, his widow was entitled to recover from the
company the damages that she was "legally entitled to recover" from the
Illinois uninsured motorist. Whether she could recover from that person
turned in the court's view on whose law would govern if she actually
brought such a suit.
266
The court held that Illinois law controlled. 267 It singled out and rein-
forced with italics the presumptive place-of-injury language of section 146268
and reiterated Bishop's cautionary injunction that the state of injury "would,
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are de-
termined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
Id. Section 145 is followed by a number of specific sections dealing with particular torts and
important issues in tort. In most instances these rules call for application of the law of the
state where injury occurred unless the principles of section 6 displace that law.
265. For a more detailed treatment of these three cases, see Southerland supra note 5, at
817-27, 847-63; Southerland &Waxman, supra note 1, at 497-512. The discussion in text is
drawn largely from these sources.
266. Olsen, 406 So. 2d at 1110.
267. Id. at 1111.
268. Id. Section 146, entitled "Personal Injuries," provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury oc-
curred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.
Id. at 1111 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 146).
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under most circumstances, be the decisive consideration in determining the
applicable choice of law."269 Illinois "certainly" had the most significant
relationship to the occurrence since the accident happened there.270 So far as
the "relevant policies" of section 6 were concerned, the court simply
asserted, without discussion, that Illinois' interest in protecting its resident
uninsured motorist from a subrogation suit by State Farm was "paramount to
the relevant policies of Florida as the forum state."271 It stressed throughout
the section 6 values of "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" and
"ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.' 272
Justice Adkins wrote the majority opinion, Justice Sundberg alone dissent-
ing.
Olsen was far more complex than the court's brief opinion made it
seem. It was a case with which a Second Restatement court with a different
set of values could have had a field day. It was first of all a case of true
conflict. Both states were interested in the application of their laws because
the policies of each would have been furthered by such application. Flor-
ida's policy, moreover, was not just any policy; it was one that plainly was
strongly held. When Olsen reached the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the
inflexible rule of lex loci delicti was still the law in Florida. That court
refused to apply the law of the place of injury, and instead invoked the
public policy exception to find that application of the contributory negli-
gence rule would offend Florida's public policy favoring comparative
negligence. 273 In this the court relied on Justice Adkins' majority opinion in
Hoffman v. Jones,274 the 1973 case in which Florida discarded contributory
negligence and adopted pure comparative negligence in its stead, roundly
condemning the rule as "unjust," "inequitable," "harsh," "wrong,"
"primitive," and no longer responsive to modem conditions.275 It also noted
the subsequent legislative recognition of the new rule in the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1976.276 All of this, it said, clearly
269. Olsen, 406 So. 2d at 1111 (quoting Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.
2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 1001).
273. See Olsen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), quashed by 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
274. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
275. Id. at 436-37.
276. Olsen, 386 So. 2d at 601. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (Supp. 1976).
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implied "that the concept of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery is
contrary to the public policy of this state.
' 277
Justice Adkins, the author not only of Hoffman but of Gillen too, passed
over this point in silence. It is true of course that the public policy exception
as such has no place in a Restatement analysis, but the considerations that
underlie it necessarily come into play in the assessment of policies and
interests called for by sections 6(2)(b) and (c), particularly for courts that
believe that state interests can be "weighed" in some way and then com-
pared. From this perspective, Florida's relevant policy was strong, but
Illinois' was not. Contributory negligence was on its last leg in that state.
Two months before the Olsen opinion appeared in slip-sheet form, the
Illinois Supreme Court repudiated contributory negligence and adopted pure
comparative negligence in its stead. 8
Moreover, Florida's interest in the application of its law to further its
policy could likewise be characterized as strong. Mrs. Olsen was a Florida
resident-a widow whose husband, also a Florida resident, had been
tortuously killed by an uninsured motorist. The application of Illinois law
would mean that she would recover nothing for her husband's death under an
insurance contract negotiated, issued, and paid for in the state of Florida,
insuring a risk principally centered here, and under which, without dispute,
she would have been able to recover had the accident occurred in Florida, or
for that matter in any number of other states. In all likelihood, the Olsens
purchased this coverage believing that it would protect them in the event of
an accident with an uninsured motorist. It strains belief to suppose that State
Farm ever told them that their right to recover might vary drastically de-
pending on the happenstance of where such an accident might occur.
By comparison, Illinois' interest in the application of its all but defunct
contributory negligence rule was virtually nil, especially in light of the fact
that the individual claiming its protection was driving without insurance,
almost surely in violation of his state's financial responsibility laws and very
possibly in violation of other laws as well. Justice Adkins expressed
concern for the rights of an Illinois resident subjected to a subrogation suit
by State Farm to recover any claim it might pay. A moment's thought makes
clear that the individual could never have been subjected to personal liability
even had Florida law been applied. Mrs. Olsen's right to recover against
State Farm turned on her hypothetical right to recover from the uninsured
277. Olsen, 386 So. 2d at 601.
278. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981). The Illinois Supreme Court liberally
and approvingly cited Hoffman. See id. at 888, 890, 895-97.
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motorist. Had she actually brought suit against that individual, the con-
tributory negligence doctrine would have barred her claim in Illinois, and she
could not have sued in Florida because there was no basis for obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the Illinois motorist. Any attempt by State Farm
to enforce its subrogation rights against the Illinois tortfeasor would have
foundered on these considerations. As a practical matter, the only loser had
Florida law been applied would have been State Farm.
These considerations make it easy to say that from almost any stand-
point of comparison-weight, strength, or degree of enlightenment-
Florida's interest in furthering its policy far outweighed that of Illinois and
that Florida's interests were therefore "more deeply affected." Olsen was a
case in which any court predisposed to "weighing" interests, to assessing the
wisdom of underlying policies or the strength with which those policies are
held, or to incorporating some or all of the familiar preferences for forum
law, recovery, and local residents in the search for "justice" in some larger
sense would have had no difficulty in rationalizing the application of Florida
law with the Second Restatement.
Florida's law and its policies likewise took a back seat in Hertz Corp. v.
Piccolo,279 decided in 1984. Frank Piccolo, a Florida resident, was injured in
Louisiana when his car was struck by a truck that had been rented in Louisi-
ana from the Hertz Corporation. Piccolo brought suit in Florida under the
Louisiana direct-action statute directly against Hertz as the insurer of the
truck to recover for his injuries. The alleged tortfeasor, a Tennessee resident
named John Kiern, was not joined in the action. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, considering this a
procedural matter governed by Florida rather than Louisiana law. 0 The
first district reversed, holding that the issue was substantive and that the
Louisiana direct-action statute controlled.28'
The supreme court agreed and devoted most of the opinion to saying
why. But it said first that even if the question of joinder was substantive, it
would still be possible for Florida law to apply if Florida had a more
"significant relationship" to the issue under the Second Restatement ap-
proach adopted in Bishop. 282 Which state, then, had the "most significant
relationship?" The court made that complex choice-of-law determination in
279. 453 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
280. Id. at 13.
281. Piccolo v. Hertz Corp., 421 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), affid, 453 So.
2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
282. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 14.
1997]
65
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
a single sentence: "clearly in the instant case Louisiana has a more signifi-
cant relationship to the issue than Florida.,
283
This unsupported and painfully brief assertion all but obscured the
profound conflict in underlying policies. Louisiana's direct-action statute in
terms permitted any person injured in Louisiana, resident or nonresident, to
sue the tortfeasor's insurance company directly.284 The real problem, never
mentioned by the majority, was focused by Justice Shaw in his dissent.285
Section 627.7262 of the Florida Statutes provided in pertinent part that
[i]t shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of
a cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an in-
sured under the terms of the liability insurance contract that such
person first obtain a judgment against a person who is an insured
under the terms of such policy for a cause of action which is cov-
ered by such policy.
286
The constitutionality of this statute had been upheld a few months earlier in
VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co.,28 7 ending, as
Justice Shaw observed, "some fourteen years of effort by this Court and the
legislature to resolve the issue of whether an injured party could concur-
rently sue both the insurer and the insured. 288 The relevant policy of the
statute, in other words, was about as forcefully hammered out, sharply
focused, and strongly held as a policy can be. That policy prohibited
precisely what the court allowed, the use of Florida courts for the mainte-
nance of a direct action against an insurance company.
Piccolo, like Olsen, was a true conflict, but one in a different pattern.289
Louisiana was interested in the application of its direct-action statute to
283. Id.
284. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978). The statutory language is set out in
the margin of the opinion, Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 13 n.2. Compare Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) ("Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are
most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.").
285. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 16 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
286. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1) (Supp. 1982).
287. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983).
288. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 16.
289. If a state's law is enacted for the benefit or protection of its own residents, then it
will be interested in the application of that law only when the party urging its application is
such a resident. Cases arise in which the parties are from different states, and each claims the
benefit of the other state's law. This, Currie said, was an "unprovided" case, because
"[n]either state cares what happens." CURRIE, supra note 98, at 152. A classic example is
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), a case in which, as a result of an accident
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further its policy of protecting all persons tortuously injured in Louisiana,
even though Hertz, seen as a Louisiana resident, would be disadvantaged as
a result. Florida was similarly interested in the application of section
627.7262 to prevent the use of its courts for the maintenance of a direct
action against an insurer, even though such application would work to the
disadvantage of a Florida resident.
After these two cases, one had to wonder whether any policy embodied
in Florida law would ever be considered sufficiently strongly held or
important enough to override the place of injury as the decisive factor, at
least in a case of any difficulty. Indeed, for all the use made of it, it was hard
to see why the court adopted the Second Restatement approach in the first
place. The comments to section 6 counsel the forum to give consideration to
the policies and purposes of its own law, sayirig that if they would be
furthered by the law's application to out-of-state facts, "this is a weighty
reason why such application should be made."290 They likewise direct the
court to give the same consideration to the relevant policies of other con-
cerned states.291 Yet in neither case did the court do this, much less attempt
the relative determination that one state's interests were more deeply
affected than the other's. Instead, for the announced reasons of ease and
simplicity in decision making and certainty, predictability, and uniformity of
result, it simply followed the presumption of section 146, which is nothing
more than lex loci delicti by another name.
Both Olsen and Piccolo were true conflicts, the kinds of cases which, in
Currie's view, could not be resolved by any rational calculus. In light of the
results, it was at least possible to suppose that the court had imaginatively hit
in Ontario, an Ontario plaintiff sued a New York defendant in New York claiming the benefit
of New York's ordinary negligence standard, while the New York defendant sought the
application of Ontario's stricter gross negligence standard. The purposes of neither state's law
would have been furthered by its application. Critics have used the phenomenon of the
"unprovided" case to argue that interest analysis, as a choice-of-law method, is fundamentally
flawed. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 173. See generally id. at 171-75.
Piccolo, however, was not an "unprovided" case since the policies of both Florida and
Louisiana would have been furthered by the application of their laws. It is a good case with
which to make the point that a state's interest in the application of its law is not necessarily
tied to cases in which such application would benefit or protect its own residents. A statute or
common law rule may be intended by its makers to work to the disadvantage of the individual
residents of a state in order to further a public purpose of a different order. The only question
that interest analysis asks is whether the policy underlying a law would be furthered by its
application. See Sedler, supra note 87, at 624; see generally Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-
Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get it, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1121 (1994).
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. e.
291. Id. at cmt. f.
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on the place of injury as an arbitrary solution for these difficult cases,
primarily for reasons of certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and
simplification of the judicial task, but also as the most neutral and least
biased way of making the choice-of-law determination. There would have
been much to commend such an approach.292 It avoids the subjectivity that
always seems to infect the apples-and-oranges comparison of state interests,
and it is deferential to the legitimate interests of other states, thus contribut-
ing to the maintenance of interstate order and harmony. Commentators and
academicians are prone to discount the fact that courts are busy and over-
worked,293 and they often fail to appreciate the dilemmas that practicing
lawyers face in mapping litigation strategy and trying to give their clients
cost-effective advice. From this point of view, a simple and relatively
inflexible rule can be preferable to some more complex, cumbersome, and
less predictable approach.
Unfortunately, these considerable virtues were lost altogether in Celotex
Corp. v. Meehan,294 decided in 1988. In that case, the court managed to
transform the Restatement's "most significant relationship" approach into
the "significant relationships test.' 295  According to Justice Overton's
majority opinion, "[t]he criteria for determining whether significant relation-
ships exist" are the four contacts of section 145(2):296 1) the place of injury;
2) the place of the injury-causing conduct; 3) the domicile or residence of
the parties; and 4) the place where their relationship, if any, is centered.297
This amounted to the adoption of a contact-counting method in its simplest
possible form. After Meehan, presumably, one simply adds up the contacts
of section 145(2) by state and applies the law of the state with the most. It
would be a profound understatement to say that with this case the court left
292. See Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 549-58; Southerland, supra note 5, at
815-17.
293. But see CURRM, supra note 98, at 629 n.2.
294. 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988). The case consolidated for argument and decision three
cases from the Third District Court of Appeal-Meehan v. Celotex Corp., 466 So. 2d 1100
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (revised panel opinion adopted on rehearing en bane); Nance v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 466 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); and Colon v.
Celotex Corp., 465 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)-all of which involved the
application of Florida's borrowing statute to claims arising out of asbestos-related injuries.
Meehan was the principal case. For a discussion of the facts and disposition in Nance and
Colon, see Southerland, supra note 5, at 851-52.
295. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144.
296. Id.
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 145(2). See supra note 264
(providing full text of section 145).
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conflicts resolution under the Second Restatement more muddled than it
found it.
Meehan is a perfect illustration of all that is wrong with contact
counting. The case involved the application of Florida's borrowing statute
to a claim arising out of an asbestos-related injury. Charles Meehan was
exposed to asbestos products while working at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in
New York from 1942 to 1944. At the time, he was a New York domiciliary
and continued to make his home there until 1969, when he moved perma-
nently to Florida. He had been a Florida domiciliary for eight years when, in
1977, he was diagnosed as having asbestosis and mesothelioma, a rare form
of lung cancer, both diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibers. He
died from these diseases in 1978.298
In 1979 his wife, Carmella Meehan, filed a wrongful death suit in
Florida against the Celotex Corporation and a number of other defendants,
all corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of asbestos products.299
Her action was brought on theories of strict liability, failure to warn,
breaches of implied warranty, and negligence.30 Celotex, a Delaware
corporation, had at some point after 1944 acquired the successor corporation
to the Philip Carey Corporation, which was the Ohio company that had
actually manufactured the asbestos products to which Meehan was exposed.
None of the asbestos products involved were manufactured in New York,
nor did any of the corporate defendants have its principal place of business
there. °1 Meehan's former employer was not named as a defendant.
Florida's borrowing statute, section 95.10, provides that a cause of
action that arises in another state and is barred there by the statute of
limitations cannot be maintained in Florida.0 2 Where Meehan's cause of
action arose was, therefore, the critical issue, and it was one on which the
domestic rules of New York and Florida differed sharply. Under New York
law, Meehan was injured when he was last exposed to asbestos during the
period 1942 to 1944; his cause of action arose at that point, and any claim
for damages resulting from this exposure was barred by the New York three-
298. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144.
299. Id.
300. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 852 n.327 (citation omitted).
301. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302. See FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1979). In 1987, while Meehan was pending, the supreme
court decided Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1987), in which it determined that the
question of where a cause of action arose for borrowing statute purposes was substantive
rather than procedural, and was to be resolved under the "significant relationships test" of the
Second Restatement. Id. at 1114-15.
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year statute of limitations by 1947, at the latest.3 °3 The exposure rule, a
distinctly minority view, was not the law in Florida. Florida considered that
Meehan's cause of action arose when he knew or should have known that he
had been injured.0 4 If that event occurred in Florida in 1977 as the plaintiff
claimed, then the borrowing statute was inapplicable and the suit was timely.
In short, the two states defined the concept of "injury" in different ways.
Applying the so-called "significant relationship criteria," the court
found that New York clearly had "the significant relationship with Mee-
han. , 3
05
Meehan was a resident of New York at the time of his exposure;
the employer was domiciled in New York; the entire asbestos ex-
posure was at one place of employment in New York; and Meehan
continued to reside in New York for twenty-five years after his ex-
posure to asbestos. These circumstances establish that the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred, Meehan's domicile,
and the domicile of Meehan's employer at the time of the conduct
causing the injury were all in the state of New York. The only sig-
nificant contact with Florida is that the injury manifested itself and
was discovered in this state. We find these circumstances establish
a significant relationship with New York and, consequently, under
the law of New York at the time of the district court of appeal deci-
sion, section 95.10 barred the action in Florida.
306
This was not the end, however. While Meehan was pending, the New York
Legislature enacted a statute that revived any time-barred claim for personal
injury caused by the latent effects of exposure to asbestos, whether previ-
ously dismissed or otherwise, provided the action was brought within the
one-year period from July 1986 to July 1987.307 The majority briefly
discussed the effect of this statute and concluded that Meehan's claim had
been revived and could proceed in Florida, conditioned on the application of
New York substantive law to other issues in the case.
308
The court was straightforward enough in its adoption of a contact-
counting method and in its identification of the contacts that were relevant
303. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 145.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 146
306. Id. (citations omitted).
307. Id.
308. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 146.
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for this purpose-the four contacts of section 145(2).309 But the first
problem with the majority's approach was that the addition was wrong. The
court never dealt with the place where injury occurred because it never
decided whether it was exposure or discovery that constituted Meehan's
"injury." The fact that New York and Florida defined injury differently lay
at the heart of the dispute, intertwined with the place of injury and with the
ultimate issue, the question of which state, by virtue of "significant relation-
ships," should determine where a cause of action based on the injury
arose.310 The court simply fudged the question, saying that "Meehan was a
resident of New York at the time of his exposure," and that "injury mani-
fested itself and was discovered in... [Florida]. 311 Presumably, the place-
of-injury contact belonged to neither state.
As to the second contact, the court assumed without analysis or discus-
sion that the place of injury-causing conduct was New York, apparently
because Meehan was exposed to asbestos dust there.312 The wrongful
conduct complained of, however, was not the fact of exposure. It was the
manufacture and sale of products in an unreasonably dangerous condition
with no warning of that fact.313 Carmella Meehan chose to sue the manu-
facturers of these products in strict liability-Celotex in particular as the
successor in interest to Philip Carey, an Ohio corporation whose asbestos
products had been manufactured in Ohio, and from there sold and shipped to
various states, among them New York. It is hard to see how this "significant
relationship" could fall to New York.
The court's treatment of the third contact was equally superficial. So
far as the facts in the opinion disclosed, none of the defendants were New
York corporations or had principal places of business there. 14  Their
products, manufactured elsewhere, found their way into New York and were
used there, as in many other states. Celotex itself was a Delaware corpora-
tion, present and doing business in any number of states, including Florida.
Since the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Meehan's former employer, was not a party
to the action, it is hard to see how its domicile was significant. The court
asserted that decisively significant relationships with New York existed
309. Id.
310. Id. at 145-46.
311. Id. at 146.
312. Id.
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because Meehan was a resident of New York, was exposed to asbestos there,
and continued to make New York his home for some time thereafter.315 It
failed to mention in this part of its analysis that he was, and had been for
eight years, a resident of Florida when his illness was discovered, continued
to make his home in Florida thereafter until his death, and was survived by
his wife, plaintiff in the action, who was also a Florida resident. If New
York domicile at the time of exposure was a significant relationship with
New York, then surely Florida domicile at the time of discovery was an
equally significant relationship with Florida.
The particular facts of the case gave little scope to the place where the
relationship between the parties, if any, was centered. An Ohio corporation
manufactured the injury-causing product in Ohio. By chance, Meehan was
exposed to that product in New York, where he lived and worked at the time;
by chance, he was living in Florida when it first became apparent that he had
suffered injuries from this exposure. Meehan's widow brought suit in
Florida against the defendant, Celotex, a Delaware corporation who had
stepped into the shoes of the original manufacturer through a series of
corporate acquisitions, and who was present and doing business in Florida.
Whatever the "center" of a relationship between parties is, and the court's
opinion contained no discussion of this abstraction, no obvious one existed
here.31
6
The facts thus provided little basis for the court's conclusion that the
significant relationships added up to New York rather than Florida. The
contacts were either split between the two states, belonged to neither, or
were too diffuse to be of help. The chief flaw in the majority's arithmetic
was in attempting to decide where Meehan's cause of action for injury arose
without first deciding what constituted his injury. In fact, the case presented
the rather rare situation in which the place of injury was not a given, but
itself was the underlying issue in dispute.
The second problem with the court's approach was that it effectively
read section 6 and its interest analysis provisions out of the Restatement.
The Restatement never suggests counting the four contacts of section 145(2);
it directs a court to take them into account in applying the principles of
315. Id. at 146.
316. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Barkett argued that "the plaintiff had been a Flor-
ida resident for eight years before the disease manifested. All of the witnesses and testimony
on damages will be in Florida. Thus, on the damages issues, the relationship between the
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section 6. The court's utter failure to do this left it blind to the fact that it
was dealing with a false conflict, one in which Florida was the only state
interested in the application of its law. This point was sharply focused by
Justice Barkett in her dissent:
Several of... [the section 6] criteria are applicable here. For
example, Florida clearly has an interest in protecting its residents
from the hazards of occupational disease and allowing resident
victims a right of action in such cases, based not upon the time of
exposure but upon the victim's reasonable discovery of the disease.
In light of New York's recent legislation, New York has the identi-
cal interest and policy. In fact, the recent legislation indicates that
New York now favors the plaintiffs right to sue in such actions
over the defendant's right not to be subjected to such suits even
where the incubation period of the disease is great. Thus, there is
no countervailing policy consideration to... [Florida's] interest in
allowing this action to proceed.317
Justice Barkett also pointed out that there would be no conflict of policies
even without New York's one-year revival statute.318 No defendant was
sufficiently connected with New York, either at the time of exposure or the
time of suit, to claim the protection of its exposure rule. In light of this,
Justice Barkett stated, "it is difficult to see what interest New York has in the
action at all. 319
New York's exposure rule reflects a policy of "outlawing stale
claims" 32° in order to grant repose "to every person and industry who could
be a potential defendant., 321 But the intended beneficiaries of this policy, as
Currie might have said, are those defendants with whose welfare New York
is legitimately concerned-namely, those who are residents or domiciliaries
of New York, or possibly, with corporations, those having their principal
places of business there. Since none of the corporate defendants had such a
relationship with New York, application of its law would not have furthered
that policy. Conversely, because Carmella Meehan was a Florida resident,
as was her husband during the last nine years of his life, the compensatory
policy reflected in Florida's rule delaying accrual of a cause of action until
317. Id.
318. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151.
319. Id.
320. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 827-28 (N.Y. 1936).
321. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142, 145 (N.Y. 1963).
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discovery 322 would have been furthered by its application. Florida was the
only interested state, and its law should have been applied.
The court's opinion in Meehan shows that despite its seeming arith-
metical simplicity and certainty, contact-counting as a method can be highly
subjective and unpredictable. Even an accurate and exacting count would
have left the contacts split at best, with no obvious "center of gravity. 323
And if the contacts are fairly evenly divided, what can arithmetic tell a court
then? One danger at this point is that a court may yield to the temptation to
ascribe more "weight" to some contacts than others, to multiply them, or
invent new and possibly irrelevant ones in order to make the count seem
more decisive, much as the court did, for example, with the domicile of
Meehan's employer.324  That contact had no actual relevance since the
employer was not a party; it was, in any case, only another way of saying
that Meehan lived and worked in New York at the time of exposure.
More critically, the method adopted in Meehan is at complete variance
with the plain text of the Restatement. Section 6 was never mentioned
except as part of the quotation of section 145(2), and most certainly its
principles were never applied. In reading section 6 and its interest analysis
provisions out of the Restatement, the court left itself with no way of
distinguishing the easy cases of false conflict from the harder ones in which
the clash of underlying policies is real. It is a little stunning to realize that
after Meehan, a paradigm false conflict like Bishop could conceivably be
resolved by the application of South Carolina law since two of the four
contacts, the place of injury and the place of injury-causing conduct, would
fall immediately to South Carolina.3 5 Presumably the Restatement was
adopted in the first place to avoid this sort of result. Almost all of the
modem approaches, the Restatement prominently among them, make use of
interest analysis to identify false conflicts, and almost all resolve such cases
in the same way, by applying the law of the only interested state.326 Flexible
and eclectic though the Restatement approach may be, it simply cannot be
used to support the result reached in Meehan.2 7
322. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. C.D. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1956).
323. See supra note 211.
324. See Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 146.
325. Compare the comment of Chief Judge Schwartz in Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi,
435 So. 2d 290, 299 n.8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), that "Bishop
did not hold that the lex loci might not be applied, upon proper analysis, in the case itself."
326. See sources cited supra note 204.
327. In fairness, this assertion requires qualification. Florida is not alone in indulging in
what I consider to be a misuse of the Restatement's methodology. Many commentators have
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These three cases, then, represent the sum total of the court's decision
making with the Second Restatement to date. Even though the approach
taken in Meehan differs radically from that of Olsen and Piccolo, the three
cases nevertheless have important elements in common. Most striking,
perhaps, is the fact that all end with the application of the law of some state
other than Florida. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court of
Florida is indifferent to the policies embodied in Florida's laws or thinks
them unimportant. Yet it is clear that when these policies come into conflict
with those of another state, it is Florida's that will yield. This pattern is
evident in the whole of the court's conflicts jurisprudence, which literally
bristles with references to comity, the principle by which the courts of one
state give effect to the laws of another out of deference and respect.32 The
court has rested much of its conflicts doctrine on comity and evidently takes
seriously its role in "the fostering of amiable and respectful relations among
individual states. 329
A second striking feature in these cases, closely related to the first, is
the court's marked unwillingness to employ the techniques of interest
analysis. Section 6 and its interest analysis provisions are a major compo-
nent of the Restatement approach. Yet in none of these cases did the court
give serious consideration to the content of Florida's laws and the impor-
tance of the policies they reflect, much less the extent to which Florida might
be interested in the application of its laws to further those policies. In like
fashion, the court paid little attention to the relevant policies reflected in the
competing laws of the other states involved or the degree to which they were
interested in their application. Even had it wanted to, the court was obvi-
ously in no position to make the comparative judgment that the Restatement
calls for, the determination of which state's interests are "most deeply
affected."
Also apparent in these cases is the court's preference for a simple and
easy approach, one likely to produce certain, predictable, and uniform results
without much fuss or bother. This tendency can be seen in the cases that
identified the parallel between the "most significant relationship" concept and the contact-
counting approach pioneered by the New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten, 124
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954). See, e.g., Kay, supra note 119, at 527-28. The courts of several
states appear to treat the two as virtually the same. See id. at 557 & n.229, (citing as examples
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Ariz. 1968); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d
831, 833 (Iowa 1968); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 245 A.2d 891, 893-94 (Vt. 1968);
Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P.2d 623, 625 n.1 (Wash. 1967)).
328. See cases cited supra note 8.
329. Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3, 7 (Fla. 1974).
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antedate the Restatement, and it is especially pronounced in Olsen and
Piccolo. Even Meehan, unwise and misguided though I think it is, can be
read as an attempt to simplify and streamline the Restatement's complex
approach. Given the mess that some courts have made of conflicts cases, it
is hard to fault this attitude, but neither should its implications be missed.
The cases show that the court's primary emphasis in conflicts cases is on the
choice-of-law decision itself, not the result it produces. In a purely domestic
case, the court is as diligent as any in its search for substantive justice-in
reaching a result, that is, that seems fair and just and that makes good socio-
economic sense for the case as a whole. In a conflicts case, on the other
hand, what the court seems to value most is a quick and uncomplicated way
of choosing the governing law, leaving the chips to fall thereafter where they
may.
This sort of decision making is not to everyone's taste. It is unspec-
tacular and passive, perhaps excessively deferential to the interests of other
states, and usually results in the suppression of the policies embodied in
Florida's laws, and along with them, frequently, the fortunes of Florida
residents claiming their protection. In all three cases the policies implicated
in Florida's laws were ones that could have been fairly characterized under
traditional theory as "strongly held," and in all three Florida was interested
in the application of its laws to vindicate those policies. With a case like
Gillen on the books and the open-ended, policy-oriented provisions of the
Restatement at its disposal, it is a little hard to understand why none of this
seemed to count with the court.
After Olsen and Piccolo, it was at least possible to ascribe to the court a
principled basis for its decision making, the use of the place of injury as an
arbitrary solution for cases of true conflict, primarily for reasons of simplic-
ity, certainty, and convenience, it is true, but principled nonetheless.
Meehan changed all that. There is no warrant in the Restatement for simply
counting the contacts of section 145(2) and in the process reading the
principles of section 6, the Restatement's most important single section, out
of it altogether. In taking this approach in Meehan, the court cut itself off
from interest analysis and now has no way of distinguishing easy cases like
Bishop, in which the choice-of-law is clear, from hard ones like Olsen, in
which it is more difficult. Certainty, predictability, and ease of decision
making were lost as well. Contact counting can be messy, indecisive,
uncertain, and subjective. Meehan proves that, if nothing else.
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A great deal of experimentation in choice-of-law methodology has gone
on around the country in this century, particularly in the last forty years.
From near unanimity at the turn of the century, the states have arrived today,
with the choice-of-law revolution, at a point of astonishing diversity. Some
continue to use traditional territorial methods in all areas; others have
adopted one of the modem approaches; others, like Florida, use a combina-
tion of the two; and still others use a blend or synthesis of modem ap-
proaches in what has aptly been called "judicial eclecticism. '330 Across the
states, the elusive goal of uniformity of result has become unattainable as a
practical matter. Without knowing in what state a lawsuit will be brought, it
is impossible to predict whose law will govern. For those who can afford it,
forum shopping has become the order of the day.
The source of all the diversity, some might say confusion, is not hard to
identify. With the steady erosion of territorial constraints, it has become
increasingly evident that there is no widely shared agreement on what it is
that a choice-of-law method is supposed to accomplish. 331 Everyone has an
opinion, but there is still no consensus on the basic underlying question
whether it is the method that should count or the results that it produces.
About the most that any one court can do is to adopt an approach with which
it is temperamentally comfortable and then adhere to it consistently. At least
in that way there can be a measure of uniformity, predictability, and cer-
tainty within a single jurisdiction.
Today there are almost as many choice-of-law theories as there are
scholars and commentators. Of the modern approaches, at least nine have
found sufficient favor to be adopted as rules of decision by one or more of
330. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 60, at 281-82. The authors say that "j]udicial deci-
sions in choice-of-law cases in the 1980's are not as diverse as the variety of [modem]
theories and approaches ... might suggest. The majority of American courts are synthesizing
most of the theories, bringing them by loose interpretation closer together... The effect is
that all the modem theories are being bundled together by the courts, to make up 'the new
law' of choice of law." At a later point, the authors assert that "most of the modem decisions,
regardless of exact language, are substantially consistent with each other. [Whatever] ... the
opinion language... the real reasons and the results are likely to be about the same." Id. at
304. This "coming together" assessment of current developments is not a universally
applauded one. See, e.g., Reppy, supra note 204. For an invaluable survey of the approaches
in use in courts around the country through 1989, see Kay, supra note 119.
331. See, e.g., CRAMTON ETAL., supra note 28, at 230-37.
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the states.332 The Second Restatement is the most popular of these, but it has
also been the most criticized.333 In my view, it has suffered unfairly at the
hands of its critics. It can hardly be faulted for reflecting the confusion and
uncertainty of the choice-of-law revolution in its combination of open-ended,
policy-oriented provisions and presumptive, jurisdiction-selecting rules. The
thrust of the criticism seems to be that it is too "flabby and amorphous" to be
of real help in the choice-of-law process. 334 Yet the blueprint provided by
the text and the accompanying comments is a good deal more precise than
this criticism would suggest.
The comments to section 188(2) direct a court to relate the enumerated
contacts to the interest analysis provisions of section 6.335 The purpose of
this is to determine whether a state having one or more of these contacts with
the parties or the transaction is interested in the application of its law.336
"Interest" in this sense means that the relevant policy of the law would be
furthered were it applied. If so, this constitutes a "weighty reason" for
applying it.337 It seems self-evident that this process also supplies content to
the term "significant relationship," which is not otherwise defined. Any
state interested in the application of its law will have such a relationship. If
there is only one such state, then it is the state of "most significant relation-
ship."
To this point, the Restatement's method is clear. If there is fault, it is
that at this point the Restatement fails to provide exact guidance for the
resolution of cases in which both states are interested in the application of
their laws-for true conflicts, in other words. Yet this is the Gordian knot
that no court or commentator has thus far been able to cut in a satisfying or
convincing way. It seems idle to criticize the Restatement for leaving a court
to its own devices at this juncture. Everybody knows the game cannot end in
a tie. To avoid the appearance of bias, or perhaps for reasons of ease,
certainty, and predictability, some courts will want an arbitrary way of
denominating the state of "most significant relationship"; others will prefer
332. See Kay, supra note 119, at 585. Professor Kay states that along with the
"traditional vested rights" approach, "American courts follow, either singly or in combination,
a 'center of gravity,' 'governmental interest,' 'comparative impairment,' 'most significant
relationship,' 'better law,' 'principles of preference,' 'functional,' [or] 'lex fori' . . . approach
to choice of law questions." Id.
333. See, e.g., CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 28, at 132-33.
334. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 300.
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(2) cmt. e.
336. See id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
337. Id. § 6(2) cmt. e.
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to debate degrees of significance as a way of rationalizing the conclusion
that one state's relationship is more significant than another's. The Re-
statement seems to invite a relative judgment with its "most deeply affected"
language,338 but it can support either approach.
In the final analysis, how these difficult cases ought to be resolved has
to remain for each court a matter of individual attitude and outlook rather
than methodology. Use of the Restatement approach in the manner de-
scribed quickly and easily enables the untroubling cases of false conflict to
be recognized and disposed of, leaving a court free to spend its time and
energies in deciding how it wants to resolve the harder cases of true conflict
with the other values of section 6 as a guide. Taken on its own terms, the
Restatement provides as sound an approach as any to choice-of-law. The
problems that have arisen in actual use are not so much with the Restatement
as with the courts themselves.
Florida is a case in point. The supreme court adopted the Restatement
approach for torts cases in 1980 and has used it in three cases since. 339 In the
first, the analysis was painfully superficial, in the second, nonexistent.
Though each was a true conflict, lex loci delicti better explains the results
than anything contained in the Restatement. In the third case, Meehan, the
court transmuted the "most significant relationship" approach into one of
counting "significant relationship criteria."34° In the process it read section 6
and its interest analysis provisions out of the Restatement and managed to
end with New York law, even though the conflict was false and Florida was
the only interested state.341 This is Second Restatement decision-making in
name only.
One can only wonder why the court adopted the Restatement in the first
place. The court has barely mentioned section 6, the Restatement's single
most important section, and in particular has made no use of its interest
analysis provisions. This is hard to understand. Interest analysis represents
the most profound advance in choice-of-law thinking in this century and is
an integral part of most modem approaches. 342 It is not a novel idea, nor an
338. See id. cmt. f.
339. Celotex Corp. v. Meehan, 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988); Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo, 453
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984); State Farms Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
340. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144-45.
341. Id.
342. See sources cited supra note 204.
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overly complex one.343 Certainly lack of awareness cannot explain it; Justice
Barkett employed the technique with telling effect in her dissent in Mee-
han344 -an opinion, incidentally, which can stand as a textbook example of
how the Restatement ought to be used.
It was presumably to avoid the sterile and indefensible results that lex
loci delicti was wont to produce in false conflicts like Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co.345 that prompted the court to make the change originally.
One of the Restatement's great strengths is the emphasis it places on the
relevant policies of the states whose laws conflict. The Restatement allows a
court to distinguish false conflicts like Bishop and Meehan from true
conflicts like Olsen and Piccolo, and it opens the road to serious thought
about how the more difficult cases should be resolved. That strength was
dissipated in Meehan, along with the simplicity, certainty, and predictability
that the court has always seemed to favor in a choice-of-law method.
Meehan's effect was to confuse choice-of-law, not to simplify it or make it
more rational. It seems clear that the court has yet to reach the stage of
considering what approach to take to true conflict resolution, and it has now
left itself with no way of recognizing one when it arises.
At the supreme court level, the adoption of the Restatement for torts
346
cases has gained little while costing much, and that is reason enough in
itself to oppose its extension to the area of contracts. It is obvious that the
court is free to use the Restatement in any way it wishes. It is also obvious
that what today's court or tomorrow's might do is at best a matter of con-
jecture. Still, it seems all too likely that the court would soon call the five
contacts of section 188(2) the "significant relationship criteria" and use the
sum of these as its basis for choice. Contact counting is not the approach of
the Second Restatement: it ignores the relevant policies of the states whose
343. The enormous literature that has grown up around Currie's work, much of it critical,
might suggest otherwise. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 152 (listing some of the
more important critiques and responses thereto). See generally id. at 152-206.
344. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
345. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980). See Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Messinger v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
346. The same cannot be said of the district courts of appeal. At this level, the effect of
adopting the Second Restatement has been profound and decidedly salutary. Most of the
cases decided by the district courts with the approach of the Second Restatement thus far have
been false conflicts. These have been sensibly resolved under the new freedom conferred by
Bishop in favor of the law of the only interested state, although with a somewhat uneven
appreciation for the method of the Restatement generally and interest analysis in particular.
See Southerland, supra note 5, at 803 nn.121 & 123; Finch, supra note 30, at 683-84.
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laws conflict and their interests in furthering those policies.347 As a method,
it is subjective. Contact counting allows a court to rationalize an intuitive
sense of whose law should govern without the need to articulate, even to
itself, the nature or source of the intuition. It is subjective also in that
someone must decide what contacts are to be counted and whether some are
weightier than others; it can tempt a court to the manipulation, multiplica-
tion, and invention of contacts. And finally, it is inexact and uncertain, with
no clear answer for cases where the contacts are closely divided or the count
is indecisive.34
From its general pattern of decision-making in conflicts cases, it also
seems clear that the court feels no real need for a method as complex as the
Restatement's. Bishop itself was something of a fluke; the opinion began
life as a lone dissent by Justice England, and the court's use of the Restate-
ment has been grudging since, as if it were still of two minds in the matter.
The court has seldom shown any inclination to control the outcome of a case
by manipulating the choice-of-law decision; it has never seemed concerned
with results in this sense, only with a quick and easy way of making the
determination, preferably one reflecting an over elaborate concern for the
laws and policies of other states.349 The bias for forum law so often detect-
347. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 378-382.
348. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 98, at 726-39.
349. This is particularly true in the area of torts. In its application of the law of some
state other than Florida, the court's record.is almost unblemished. See Southerland, supra
note 5, at 863 n.355 and accompanying text.
In contracts cases, on the other hand, the overall impression is rather one of randomness.
There is no clear pattern in the decisions apart from the fact that they are rather faithfully rule
oriented; the "chips fall where they may" cliche best describes the tone of the opinions and the
results reached. In chronological order, the cases are: Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555 (1856)
(forum law) (Florida law applied to permit Alabama plaintiff to recover from Florida
defendant); Walters & Walker v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86 (1860) (place of making) (no conflict
between South Carolina and Florida law); Walling v. Christian & Craft Grocery Co., 27 So.
46 (Fla. 1899) (place of making) (Florida married woman cannot invoke emancipated status
under Alabama law to validate contract made in Florida); Brown v. Case, 86 So. 684 (Fla.
1920) (forum law) (Florida five-year statute of limitations bars action to recover on promis-
sory notes made and enforceable in New York from defendant who thereafter relocated to
Florida and resided there for six years prior to institution of suit); Lloyd v. Cooper Corp., 134
So. 562 (Fla. 1931) (public policy) (married woman's contract made in Ohio and valid there
not enforceable in Florida); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 199 So. 50 (Fla. 1940)
(public policy) (refusing enforcement of Florida married woman's contract valid in Wisconsin
where made and plaintiff resided, but invalid in Florida where she subsequently became
domiciled); Scott v. Scott, 61 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1952) (place of making) (enforcement in
Florida of separation agreement valid in Pennsylvania, where not contrary to Florida public
policy); Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956) (public policy) (clause in
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able in the choice-of-law decisions of courts elsewhere 350 has been notably
lacking in Florida. Relevant policies and state interests are clearly not a
contract waiving execution on homestead property valid in Virginia where made denied
enforcement in Florida on public policy grounds); Ray-HofAgencies, Inc. v. Petersen, 123 So.
2d 251 (Fla. 1960) (place of making) (finding that place of making of employment contract
was Georgia and not Florida, and denying workmen's compensation benefits to Florida
resident injured outside of Florida); Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1967) (per curiam) (public policy) (noncompetition agreement valid where made denied
enforcement in Florida on public policy grounds); Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So.
2d 18 (Fla. 1972) (place of making) (contract of carriage for interstate transportation made in
Florida, where ticket was purchased so that Florida contract statute of limitations applied in
damages suit for breach of contract); Wingold v. Horowitz, 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974) (forum
law) (applying Florida remedial law favoring Canadian resident suing Florida resident for
breach of contract made in the Bahamas and expressly subject to Bahamian law); Gillen v.
United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (public policy) (denying effect to "other
insurance" clause in policy issued in New Hampshire as contrary to Florida public policy);
Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1975) (place of making) (usurious nature of lending
agreement made in New York governed by New York and not Florida law in suit by New
York lender against Florida borrower); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Grounds, 332 So.
2d 13 (Fla. 1976) (place of performance) (clause prohibiting excess judgment recovery valid
in Mississippi where contract was made held invalid in Florida where insured was sued and
insurer was obligated to provide good-faith defense); Continental Mortgage Investors v.
Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981) (party autonomy) (upholding choice-of-law
clause in interstate loan contract made in Massachusetts, even though interest rate was
usurious under Florida law); Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank &
Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981) (party autonomy) (upholding choice-of-law clause in
mortgage agreement valid in Louisiana where made, but usurious under Florida law);
Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985) (party autonomy)
(contractual provision fixing shorter limitation period, valid in Michigan where contract
entered into but void under Florida law, enforced in Florida lawsuit as not contrary to Florida
public policy); Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988) (place of making) (applying
New York law where insurance contract was entered into to prohibit interspousal suit in
Florida to recover for negligently inflicted personal injury); and Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
August, 530 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1988) (place of making) (applying Massachusetts statute of
limitations in Florida lawsuit against insurer for uninsured motorist benefits arising out of
accident in Florida).
350. See, e.g., LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 263. A good example of apparent bias in
favor of forum law can be found in the New York Court of Appeals' well-known line of guest
statute decisions in the 1960s. The majority notes in Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y.
1969), that Judge Breitel, in his dissenting opinion, went so far as to suggest that the court's
choice-of-law method amounted to nothing more than "a rule which will always result in the
application of New York law." Id. at 401. Criticizing the majority's indifference to the
significance of the place of injury, he said: "What has happened of course, is that lip service
is paid to the factor of place, and promptly ignored thereafter, if the forum prefers its own
policy preconceptions and especially if it requires denial of recovery to a plaintiff in a tort
case." Id. at 411 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
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concern. For a court with these predilections, an approach as sophisticated
as the Second Restatement's is largely redundant.
Extending it to contracts cases, moreover, has the potential for causing
a great deal of unnecessary confusion and uncertainty at the level of the
district courts of appeal, where most of the decision-making in conflicts
cases goes on. Since 1980, the supreme court's sporadic and doctrinally
inconsistent opinions have given these important appellate courts little in the
way of guidance, and they have been left to find their way through the
Restatement's labyrinth pretty much on their own. In contrast to the su-
preme court, the district courts have tended to approach conflicts cases as if
they mattered, but the opinions reflect some striking variations in methodol-
ogy with nothing like consensus emerging from the considerable number of
cases decided at this level.351 To the extent that there is a predominant
approach, it is, unfortunately, that of counting contacts or "significant
relationships"35 2 -a method, as I have said, that finds little support in the
Restatement and that is fraught with uncertainty, unpredictability, and
subjectivity.
Decisions in this vein, in fact, are probably responsible for the approach
taken by the supreme court in Meehan; and with that case now it place, it is
almost certain that contracts cases would be dealt with in the same way,
certainly by panels already inclined in that direction. In relatively few
instances has there been much attempt to relate contacts to the policies
underlying laws in conflict and thus little in the way of identification or
discussion of the interests of concerned states in the application of their
laws.53 In the district courts, as in the supreme court, reluctance to employ
the interest analysis provisiolis of section 6 is the most striking methodologi-
cal feature of decision making with the Second Restatement.
35 4
The opinions of Chief Judge Schwartz of the third district are notable
exceptions to this generalization,355 however, and Judge Baskin continues to
utilize interest analysis in her opinions though expressly disclaiming its
351. See Finch, supra note 30, at 680-81; Southerland, supra note 5, at 827-28.
352. See Finch, supra note 30, at 687-90; Southerland, supra note 5, at 827-29, 839-42.
353. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 839 & n.261; Finch, supra note 30, at 690-703.
354. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 839 & n.261.
355. See Adams v. Brannan, 500 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Young v.
Hertz Corp., 496 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Schwartz, C.J., concurring
specially); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d 290, 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting opinion).
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appropriateness to a Second Restatement analysis. 356 As a court, the fifth
District has made the most determined use of policy-oriented methodology
in its decision making. 357 In Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 35 8 the
first district rested the result there on a section 6 policy analysis that resem-
bled a weighing of interests more than anything else.359 What this suggests,
unfortunately, is that there are significant differences of opinion among the
judges of the district courts as to how the Restatement ought to be used.
These differences would undoubtedly carry over into the area of contracts
with the result that decision making in that area would be far less certain and
predictable than it is at present.
The confusion and uncertainty that have surrounded the use of the
Second Restatement at all levels in Florida make for the strongest argument
against extending its approach to the area of contracts. The Second Re-
statement was designed to accommodate a variety of outlooks on choice-of-
law, but not all in one place and at the same time. The district courts would
probably welcome the Restatement's greater flexibility and sensitivity and
on the whole would probably make imaginative use of its protean possibili-
ties. But without strong leadership from the supreme court-something that
so far has been significantly lacking-its virtues could all too easily become
liabilities in an area like contracts, where the need for certainty and predict-
ability is so great.
Lex loci contractus, as Justice Kogan observed in Sturiano, is old but
not yet outdated.3 ° It has been the rule in Florida for almost a hundred years
and has fit well on the whole with the temperament and interest of Florida's
courts. If nothing else, it has familiarity to commend it, ingrained not only
in judicial thinking and that of the practicing bar, but, as much as any rule,
understood and relied upon by those who enter into contracts. It hardly
needs to be said that the area of contract is quintessentially one in which it is
more important to have a certain and predictable approach rather than one
356. See Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d at 297; Harris v. Berkowitz, 432 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
357. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Ring Power Corp., 450 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Andrews v. Continental Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 434 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); cf. Olsen v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (pre-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) opinion refusing to apply Louisiana law permitting thief to convey
good title to innocent purchaser as contrary to Florida's public policy).
358. 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
359. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 844-47.
360. See Sturiano, 523 So. 2d at 1129.
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that can be manipulated on an ad hoc basis to produce the result that strikes a
particular court on a particular day as most "just."
Yet in marked contrast to its torts counterpart with its relentless
mandate for the law of the place of injury, lex loci contractus has survived
and continues to enjoy a significant measure of popularity today precisely
because it has never been a rule just for the sake of having a rule; it actually
bears a certain correspondence to the world of people and affairs of which it
is a part. There is widely shared agreement as to what constitutes a "just"
result in a contracts case. It is one that effectuates the intentions of the
parties and protects their expectations. People ordinarily intend to make
valid agreements, and it is still apt to be more true than not that they tend to
gauge such matters by the law of the place where they act.3 61 To find on a
later day some court upholding and enforcing an agreement that was valid
where it was made may be disappointing, yet not out of line with the parties'
original expectations. There is probably no such thing as a "good" or "bad"
accident, but American society freely tolerates, even applauds, the idea of
bad bargains. Without losers, after all, there can be no winners.
Moreover-and again in sharp contrast to the place-of-injury rule-
there has always been some play in the joints of lex loci contractus. In
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Grounds,362 for example, the court
invoked the performance branch of the rule to uphold an excess judgment
award against an insurance company which had breached its obligation to
provide its insured a good faith defense. The company's insured caused an
accident in Florida and was sued there. Though liability was clear, the
company refused to accept an offer to settle for the policy limits, and the
case went to trial. The resulting judgment far exceeded the policy limits,
and the insured sued his company to recover the excess. Florida law
permitted such an action; the law of Mississippi, where the contract of
insurance was made and entered into, did not.363 The court applied Florida
law, holding that "the place of performance was Florida, where the cause of
action against... [the insured] was maintained and was defended by... [the
company] .,,364 Wingold v. Horowit 365 involved a real estate financing deal
that was concluded in the Bahamas between a Florida resident and a resident
of Canada, the contract being made in the Bahamas and expressly subject to
361. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 29, at 318-20.
362. 332 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
363. Id. at 14.
364. Id. at 15.
365. 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974).
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Bahamian law.366 When the Florida resident defaulted on his obligations and
was sued in Florida, the supreme court invoked the forum law branch of the
rule to give the Canadian partner the benefit of Florida's more favorable
remedial law.
367
Decisions like these have tended to be the exception rather than the rule
in Florida, but they suggest that Justice Kogan may have overstressed the
inflexibility of lex loci contractus a bit in his Sturiano opinion. There will
no doubt be cases where the place of making is fortuitous and has little to do
either with the parties or their transaction, 368 but it is unlikely that this will
also be true of the place of performance. Lex loci contractus offers enough
choices to be useful, but not so many as to become unpredictable. And for
the relatively rare case where the otherwise applicable law would produce an
intolerable result, there is always the public policy exception to fall back
on.3 69 The main flaw in using territorial connecting factors as a basis for
choosing law is that this approach either ignores or at least tends to obscure
the policies underlying laws in conflict and the interests of the concerned
states in their application. But in its studied refusal to utilize the techniques
of interest analysis, the Supreme Court of Florida, as well as most of the
district courts of appeal, seems committed to this course already. As long as
state interests are going to be ignored, they might as well be ignored in as
simple and uncomplicated a way as possible.370
366. Id. at 585-86.
367. Id. at 586.
368. In contrast to the First Restatement, the Second Restatement takes the position that
the place of contracting, standing alone,
is a relatively insignificant contact.... [I]ssues involving the validity of a con-
tract will, in perhaps the majority of situations, be determined in accordance with
the local law of the state of contracting. In such situations, however, this state
will be the state of the applicable law for reasons additional to the fact that it
happens to be the place where occurred the last act necessary to give the contract
binding effect.... By way of contrast, the place of contracting will have little
significance, if any, when it is purely fortuitous and bears no relation to the par-
ties and the contract .....
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 188(2) cmt. e.
369. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
370. Compare the remarks of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Paul v. National Life,
352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986), a guest-statute case in which the court refused to abandon its
long-standing adherence to the lex loci delicti rule. The court said: "Nevertheless, we remain
convinced that the traditional rule, for all of its faults, remains superior to any of its modem
competitors. Moreover, if we are going to manipulate conflicts doctrine in order to achieve
substantive results, we might as well manipulate something we understand." Id. at 556. The
[Vol. 21:777
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Southerland
Despite its richness, the scholarship of the choice-of-law revolution has
not succeeded in reconciling the conflicting demands of "justice" in cases
with multistate implications.371 Considerations of substantive justice-in a
nutshell, the impulse to decide cases in ways that make good socio-economic
sense 372-continue to compete with the array of values associated with the
need for rules and the attendant pressure to follow them.373 It is no denigra-
tion of contemporary scholarship to say that much of it seems to skirt the
role that value judgments play in the process,374 perhaps in tacit recognition
of the fact that the whole subject represents a wildly unpredictable variable
that no theory can control for.
Yet long ago Holmes identified value judgments as the "very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding, ' 375 cautioning that courts decide cases not so
much by rules as by value judgments.37 6 These, like beauty, exist only in the
eye of the beholder; they are statements not of what is but of what ought to
be, and so are necessarily as subjective as the individual who holds them.
Whether an open-ended approach that allows a court to concentrate on good
socio-econon-ic results is better than a set of hard and fast rules like those of
the First Restatement that offer neutrality, ease, simplicity, certainty, and
predictability is a question that can only be answered with a value judgment.
So, too, for that matter, is the question whether a particular socio-economic
result is "good" or "bad," "just" or "unjust." The reality is that almost any
conceivable choice-of-law method can be manipulated to achieve the result
court invoked the public policy exception to refuse enforcement of the guest statutes of other
states. Id.
371. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICr OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DI-
RECTIONS (1991); Kramer, supra note 87; Laycock, supra note 29; Sedler, supra note 106;
Singer, supra note 29.
372. See Leflar, supra note 70, at 1588; see also LvFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 297-
300.
373. See L. FULLER, THE MoRAirry OF LAW 39 (1964). See, e.g., Hancock, Torts Prob-
lems in Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Halley and Other Older
Cases Revisited, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331 (1968). Compare Rosenberg, The Comeback of
Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1981).
374. The writings of Professor Joseph Singer are a notable exception to this generaliza-
tion. See Singer, supra note 29, at 74-127.
375. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920).
376. See id.; see also THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). In his separate opinion in Brooks v.
Sturiano, 497 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), Judge Hugh Glickstein made the
following remark: "In less than eloquent fashion, this writer has often described our work as
appellate judges to be, more often than not, a verbalizing of our individual value judgments,
however relative and nonabsolute they may be." Id. at 980 (Glickstein, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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that a court wants to reach. In the end, the method is less important than the
use a court makes of it.
To make this point more concretely, I want to return to Gillen v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n,3 77 a case in which the Supreme Court of Florida,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Adkins, invoked the public policy exception
to avoid giving effect to an "other insurance" clause in an automobile
insurance policy that had originally been delivered not in Florida, but in New
Hampshire.378 The Gillens were residents of New Hampshire when they
separately insured their Karmann Ghia and Volkswagen bus with United
Services. The two policies, issued for one year, both contained uninsured
motorist coverage, and separate premiums were paid on each. Six months
after the issuance of the policies, the Gillens relocated permanently to
Florida. They notified United of the move. A month later they sold the bus
and bought a Volkswagen Squareback. United canceled the policy covering
the bus and issued a new policy on the Squareback. A month after that,
while riding in the Squareback, they were involved in a collision with an
uninsured motorist in which Mr. Gillen was killed and Mrs. Gillen seriously
injured.379
United refused to pay the combined total amount of both policies,
taking the position that the "other insurance" clause in the Karmann Ghia
policy was applicable because other similar insurance was available"
380
under the policy on the Squareback. Mrs. Gillen and the personal represen-
tative of her husband's estate brought a declaratory judgment action against
United seeking to recover under both policies. The trial court found that
"other insurance" clauses were valid and enforceable in New Hampshire but
void in Florida, because contrary to its public policy. 38' Since the Gillens
were Florida residents at the time of the accident and the cars were licensed
and garaged in Florida, all with United's knowledge, the court held the
clause invalid and awarded Mrs. Gillen and her husband's estate the com-
bined total of the coverage under both policies.82
377. 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
378. lit at 6-7.
379. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Gillen, 280 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
380. See id. at 53-54. The critical language in the policy provided that "if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other insurance .... Id. at 53 n. 1.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Southerland
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Karmann
Ghia policy was governed by the law of New Hampshire where the policy
was issued and the insureds were living at the time.383 "The rights and
obligations of the respective parties under the contract, once entered into,
should not vary or fluctuate from state to state depending upon fortuitous
circumstances of where an accident might occur, or the arbitrary decision of
where the insured might elect to thereafter reside., 3 84 The Florida statute in
question, which the supreme court had earlier interpreted as invalidating
"other insurance" clauses, in terms applied to policies delivered or issued for
delivery in Florida.385 Hence the question confronting the supreme court
when the case reached it on certiorari was whether underwriting considera-
tions applicable to insurance contracts made in Florida could also be applied
to contracts made elsewhere, at least in a case where the principal location of
the risk had shifted to Florida during the policy term.
Lex loci contractus certainly gave an unequivocal answer: the contract
was made in New Hampshire and was valid there, and recognition of that
fact should follow everywhere. But Justice Adkins left no doubt what he
thought "justice" required in the case. He conceded United's point that
Florida's statute applied to policies delivered in Florida but rejected the
expressio unius implication that a case like this one was thereby meant to be
excluded.386 United specialized in insuring officers in the armed services, "a
rather mobile group. 387  The fact that United had been notified of the
Gillens' move to Florida and had issued a new policy on the Squareback
constituted knowledge on its part that the risks covered by the policies had
been shifted to Florida. "Yet premiums were collected on both policies by
United, who now says it is liable under only one. There is nothing in law or
equity which should aid an insurance company in so one-sided an arrange-
383. Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 54.
384. Id.
385. See Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 185 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla.
1966). In construing section 627.0851 of the Florida Statutes, the court said that the statute
does not permit "other insurance" clauses in the policy which are contrary to the
statutorily limited amounts of coverage. It is clear that the statute does not limit
an insured only to one $10,000 recovery under said coverage where his loss for
bodily injury is greater than $10,000 and he is the beneficiary of more than one
policy issued under § 627.0851.
Id. at 692.
386. See Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 6.
387. Id. at 6.
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ment., 388 The Gillens were in the process of becoming permanent residents
of Florida. Comity, "in theory a beneficial exercise in interstate har-
mony,'389 was not a sufficient basis for ignoring their status as "proper
subjects of this Court's protection from injustice or injury." 3 °
In their effort to escape the mandate of lex loci contractus, the plaintiffs
had urged the court to apply the "most significant relationship" test of
section 188 of the Second Restatement. In light of the view he took of the
case, Justice Adkins found it unnecessary to take that step; but he then
proceeded to demonstrate how the Restatement approach would work and
with what effect. Florida, he said, had a "significant relationship" to the
case because the Gillens had become Florida residents and had given their
insurer notice to that effect; their cars were now garaged in Florida, and the
risk covered by the policy was centered there.39' In contrast, "[t]he only
relationship with New Hampshire was established during the making of the
contract. Although the place of negotiation was New Hampshire, very little
importance should be attached to this fact. The Gillens merely received a
standard form insurance policy from... [United's] main office in Texas
which was completed and returned.39 2
New Hampshire's relevant policy was "grounded in general on freedom
of contract principles ... [and its main purpose] was to provide protection
only up to the minimum statutory limits.' 3 93  Florida's statute had "no
similarly restricted purpose and, in fact, has been interpreted... to implicitly
forbid 'other insurance' clauses. 3 94 He then said that
[w]hile it is generally undesirable to unduly criticize the decisions
of a sister state, it becomes necessary to evaluate one court's posi-
tion on an issue and the reasons behind it in order to accurately as-
sess the respective states' interests. Here, the substantial interest of
Florida in protecting its citizens from the use of "other insurance"
clauses rises to a level above New Hampshire's interest in permit-




391. Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 6-7.
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paramount interest in protecting its own from inequitable insurance
arrangements.
395
He might just as well have said that Florida's interests were those "most
deeply affected." It was really a Restatement opinion; the only difference
was the substitution of "public policy" at the end for the conclusion that
Florida was the state of "most significant relationship. 396
395. Id.
396. It is obvious, of course, that Justice Adkins did not intend this portion of his opinion
to represent a complete and authoritative exposition of the Second Restatement approach. If
he had so intended, he would undoubtedly have made mention of section 193, the specific
section dealing with contracts of casualty insurance, which calls for application of the law of
the state "which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk
during the term of the policy," subject to the usual qualification as to displacement under the
principles of section 6. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 193. At the time the
policy was applied for and issued, the parties certainly understood that the principal location
of the risk was New Hampshire. The comments raise the possibility that that location may
change during the policy term:
There may also be occasions when following the issuance of the policy the prin-
cipal location of the risk is shifted to some other state. In such a situation, this
other state will have a natural interest in the insurance of the risk and it may be
that its local law should be applied to determine at least some issues arising un-
der the policy. In any event, application of the local law of the other state would
hardly be unfair to the insurance company, at least with respect to some issues, if
the company had reason to foresee when it issued the policy that there might be a
shift to another state of the principal location of the risk.
Id. cmt. d. Citing two cases and an ALR annotation, the Reporter's Note following section
193 adds that "[a] shift in the principal location of the risk has been held not to affect the
applicable law in the absence of a novation." Id. at 615. The Gillen case itself is the subject
of a later ALR annotation which deals specifically with "other insurance" clauses and
concludes in the usual way that the authorities are divided on the question. See Robert A.
Brazener, Annotation, Automobile Liability Policy: Choice of Law as to Validity of "Other
Insurance" Clause of Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 83 A.L.R.3d 321, 326 (1978).
None of this helps that much in assessing what effect a shift in the principal location of the
risk should have on the validity of terms contained in the policy at the time of issuance and
delivery. Dissenting in the court below, Judge Mager thought that the "grouping of contacts"
test set forth in section 188 gave Florida a more significant relationship to the issue than New
Hampshire. See Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 56-57 (Mager, J. dissenting). This illustrates once
again what Professor Finch has aptly called the "inscrutable hold" that contact counting seems
to have on many of Florida's courts in their reading of the Second Restatement. Finch, supra
note 30, at 687. 'The phenomenon of contact counting," he continues, "usually takes the form
of a court's enumeration of the various facts that associate a dispute with particular states,
together with a summary conclusion that one state has the most 'significant relationship"' to
the issue. Id. Judge Mager's assessment of the contacts fits this description precisely:
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Gillen was a true conflict, and the opinion is a graphic example of the
kinds of subjectivity inherent in the Restatement approach when it is used as
a device for weighing interests in that kind of case. Because the Gillens had
become Florida domiciliaries, Justice Adkins plainly thought that Florida
had a strong interest in extending to them the protection of its statutory
policy prohibiting the use of "other insurance" clauses in insurance policies.
This would follow, of course, only if one accepts his unsupported assertion
that the legislature did not necessarily intend to limit the statute's application
to policies delivered or issued for delivery in Florida.397 He was perhaps a
trifle disingenuous, too, in minimizing New Hampshire's interest as he did,
an interest which stemmed from that state's desire to protect the integrity of
contracts entered into under its auspices and authority, here an insurance
contract made in New Hampshire between New Hampshire residents and an
insurer licensed to do business in the state and conditioned on New Hamp-
In the instant case, the accident occurred in Florida; at the time of the accident
the domicile of the insured was in Florida; the location of the automobile was in
Florida; and, logically, the place for the performance to have occurred was in
Florida. However, the place of negotiation as well as the place of contracting
was in New Hampshire. It would seem, under the "grouping of contacts" test,
that the State of Florida had a more significant relationship with the dispute than
the State of New Hampshire.
Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 52, 57 (Mager, J., dissenting). Actually the location of the subject matter
of the contract and the Gillens' domicile were divided between the two states. Where the
accident occurred, which Judge Mager seemed to equate with the place of performance, is
essentially irrelevant to assessing the effect of a shift in the principal location of the risk at
some point during the policy term. The accident might have occurred anywhere, either before
the Gillens' move or after it. None of this gets to the core issue, which is whether the validity
of the clause should be determined by the law of the state where the risk was principally
located at the inception of the policy or by the law of the state to which it was relocated at a
later point. By comparison, the approach sketched by Justice Adkins seems far superior.
Compare CURRM, supra note 98, at 138-40.
397. This point was obviously troubling to Justice Dekle, who concurred specially in the
result and holding only on the ground
that the insureds ... had, prior to the accident, become residents of Florida, the
vehicles were garaged here and their insurer had been so notified, thereby plac-
ing the carrier upon notice of the application of our statute ....
[O]therwise... Florida's public policy against "other insurance" clauses would
not extend to policies issued and delivered in another state, for the statute on
which Florida's public policy in this regard is founded ... is hinged upon the
predicate expressed in the statute itself as to insurance "delivered or issued for
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state." Our Florida statute cannot be engrafted upon New Hamp-
shire legislation which that sovereign has seen fit to provide for its citizens.
Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 7 (Dekle, J., specially concurring).
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shire underwriting policies and requirements. Even though the Gillens had
left New Hampshire, United was a continuing presence there and was
entitled to invoke that interest in order to secure the benefit of its original
bargain.
Certainly in terms of the "justified expectations of the parties," the
Second Restatement's supreme criterion in matters of contract,398 United
arguably had a stronger claim than the Gillens. If we indulge the unlikely
assumption that they had read and understood their policies, then they would
have expected to recover at most the limits of a single policy in any accident
with an uninsured motorist. That expectation, certainly United's also, could
hardly have changed simply because they chose to move to Florida. And yet
it is precisely here that the elusive and not-to-be-controlled for element of
"justice" enters the picture. Justice Adkins knew perfectly well that there
had been no real bargaining between the parties over the terms and condi-
tions of the policy and, at least on the Gillens' part, probably even less
understanding of its provisions. As he noted, they had "merely received a
standard form insurance policy ' 399 from United which was dutifully com-
pleted and returned. Nor was it lost on him that United could reasonably
have foreseen that the Gillens, part of "a rather mobile group" 400 which the
company specialized in serving, would relocate at some point during the
policy term. They were diligent in notifying United of the move, and there
was ample opportunity for the company to rewrite the policy to conform to
Florida law and to adjust the premiums to reflect the change if it had wished
to do so.
The opinion, by a man who in my opinion was one of the truly great
judges to serve on the Supreme Court of Florida in this century, 4°' is rich in
its appreciation of the realities of life in a complex, technologically advanced
society in thrall to the automobile4°2 and utterly dependent on the insurance
398. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(1) cmt. b.
399. Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 7.
400. Id. at 6.
401. See also Dedication-The Honorable James C. Adkins, Jr., 46 FLA. L. REv. vi-xi
(1994).
402. Part of the price of the car and the freedom it bestows to go where we please when
we please is the death of approximately 50,000 persons a year. In the forty-year period from
1944 to 1984 alone, 1,787,600 persons lost their lives in automobile accidents at an approxi-
mate cost of almost two trillion dollars. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 788 n.27. I am
aware of no study that has attempted to calculate what the automobile has cost this society in
gross over its approximately 90-year history, but if the direct and long-term costs of nonfatal
accidents were added in, the dollar figure would probably approach the incomprehensible. By
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industry as the only available, if never quite adequate, offset against the
catastrophic risks and hazards attendant on its use. Justice Adkins would
certainly have been the last person to deny the importance of contract or the
general societal interest in providing stability in contractual arrangements
and protecting the integrity of bargains. 403 But his strong-handed treatment
of the competing claims of the parties in this case left no doubt where he
thought the equities lay. He simply made a value judgment. And for that
purpose, as his opinion amply demonstrated, one conflict-of-laws method
was as good as another.
way of comparison, the 40-year death toll of 1,787,600 considerably exceeds the 1,177,936
persons killed in all of the major wars in which this nation has participated. See id.
403. Cf. Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988). Unlike the Gillens, the Sturi-
anos had not come to Florida with the intention of taking up permanent residence there; they
were described as "lifelong residents of New York" who, for several years prior to their
accident, had migrated to Florida to spend the winter months. See id. at 1129. Also important
in the court's mind was the fact that they had given their insurer no notice of this practice. See
id. at 1129. See also id. at 1131 (Grimes, J., concurring).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Qui tam, or standing in the shoes of the king, is an old occupation but
never before has it been so profitable. A qui tam suit is one brought by a
person who prosecutes a suit for the king as well as for himself.'
Federal qui tam suits are brought under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 2
which provides penalties for one who knowingly presents a false claim to the
government, and also offers incentives to whistleblowers who expose the
false claims. In the ten years since the passage of the 1986 Amendments to
the FCA, both the number of cases and the size of the awards have skyrock-
eted. Even the Internet responds with thousands of "hits" when search
words such as "qui tam" and "whistleblower" are entered. The reason for
the increasing interest in qui tam litigation becomes obvious with a quick
calculation. Using the penalty of $10,000 for each fraudulent act, one
determines that 100 proven transgressions yields a penalty of $1,000,000. In
addition, treble damages are awarded except under certain conditions, stated
in the statute, in which cooperation by the defendant reduces the penalties to
only double the damages as well as reasonable costs and attorney fees.
At the end of 1995, the government reported the following informa-
tion:
3
Qui Tam filings by Fiscal Year:
FY87 33 cases
FY 88 60 cases
FY 89 95 cases
FY 90 82 cases
FY 91 90 cases
FY 92 119 cases
FY 93 131 cases
FY 94 221 cases
FY 95 274 cases
Qui Tam Recoveries (approximately):
FY 88 $2 million
FY 89 $32 million
1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES III "160.
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
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FY 90 $40 million
FY 91 $36 million
FY 92 $124 million
FY 93 $193 million
FY 94 $379 million
FY 95 $243 million
Total fraud recovery from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 1995
totaled $3,342,390,684,4 of which approximately one-third was from qui tam
actions. The lure of qui tam actions appears to be irresistible.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF Qui TAM
The concept of qui tam can be traced to at least the thirteenth century
where the process allowed one to gain access to the royal courts.5 Although
there were several laws dating back to 1790 in the United States authorizing
suits by private informers who would share in a percentage of the govern-
ment's recovery,6 the FCA first became a viable and profitable action under
Abraham Lincoln.7 Rampant fraud was being committed against the gov-
ernment during the Civil War. In 1861, for example, Grant testified about
the inoperable rifles he found when he took over command in Cairo, Illi-
nois,8 and further testimony was given in the debates preceding the passing
of the act regarding spoiled food and the fact that the same horses were sold
over and over again to the government. This fraud increased both the cost of
the war and the suffering of the Union soldiers, as well as seriously ham-
pered the war effort. The government needed public help to stop these
actions since many government officials were apparently involved in
perpetrating the fraud.9 At that time, the damages assessed against the qui
tam defendant were taxed at twice the damage suffered by the government
4. Arent Fox (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http://www.arentfox.comfeatures/quitamquitam.
stat.html>.
5. BLAcKsToNE, supra note 1, at *160.
6. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 101, 102; Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25,
§1, 1 Stat. 129; Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 131; 133, Act of July 22, 1790, ch.
33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38.
7. 31 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
8. Phillips & Cohen (visited Sept. 20, 1996) <http://www.whistleblowers.com>.
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plus a $2,000 penalty per incident with the relator getting fifty percent of the
recovery.
1°
Although fondly known as the Lincoln Law, the FCA remained fairly
inactive until the 1930s and 1940s when individuals began to use informa-
tion obtained from public records as the basis for qui tam actions. These
parasitic suits did not bring new information to the government but relied on
information the government already had as the basis for the recovery claimed
by the relator. The high point of these actions, or low point depending on
your point of view, was the case of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess"
where the relator obtained all his information from the public record and
alleged false claims presented by a contractor. Although the question of the
relator's share in that case went to the Supreme Court, the law was clear that
there was no restraint on the relator's source of information. Specifically,
the relator was not required to be an original source of information, and
Marcus got his statuary percentage of the recovery. Congress changed the
law to eliminate these parasitic cases, but the amended statute had a chilling
effect on further cases. The costs of pursuing discovery in qui tam cases was
high, and few attorneys were willing to risk representation of a qui tam
plaintiff under that form of the law. The Senate Report for the 1986
amendments restates the Senate version of the 1943 amendments
"specifically provided that jurisdiction would be barred on qui tam suits
based on information in the possession of the Government unless the relator
was the original source of that information."' 2 But inexplicably these terms
failed to make the final version of the Amendment. Even though these
restrictive terms were not in the 1943 act, courts interpreted the Act in the
light of the Senate Report. In United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v.
Dean,13 the State of Wisconsin was denied the right to maintain its position
as relator in a matter of Medicaid fraud because it had already told its tale to
the United States government as part of its reporting process. In the mid-
1980s, the country once more found itself facing rampant fraud and was in
need of assistance from its citizenry so that it was necessary to amend the
relevant statutes. Congress did not feel that Dean represented its true
attitude toward qui tam suits.
10. 31 Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
11. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
12. S. REP. No. 345, at 12, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). Inexplicably this clause was
eliminated from the final 1943 amendments.
13. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
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In order to encourage qui tam suits, the 1986 amended statute allows
persons who are the original source of the government's information to bring
suit even though some of the information may have been available in the
public record. If there has been previous public disclosure, anyone who is
not an original source is proscribed from bringing suit and the case will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As the court in Wang ex
rel. United States v. FMC Corp.14 stated: "Qui tam suits are meant to
encourage insiders privy to a fraud on the Government to blow the whistle
on the crime. In such a scheme, there is little point in rewarding a second
toot."'15 The court goes on to state:
Anyone who helped to report the allegation to either the
[G]overnment or the media would have "indirectly" helped to pub-
licly disclose it. If, however, someone republishes an allegation
that already has been publicly disclosed, he cannot bring a qui tam
suit, even if he had "direct and independent knowledge" of the
fraud. He is no "whistleblower." A "whistleblower" sounds the
alarm; he does not echo it.16
The Amendments of 198617 provided more opportunity for the whistle-
blower to obtain a recovery and yet presented certain restrictions which
provided the government some degree of protection from parasitic suits. The
1986 amendments were "aimed at correcting restrictive interpretations of the
act's ... qui tam.., provisions."18 As the court later said in United States
ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,19 "[o]ne must have been a source to
the entity that first publicly disclosed the information on which a suit is
based." As the court stated in Wang, "[tihe history of the False Claims Act
and the legislative history of its most recent amendment make clear that qui
tam jurisdiction was meant to extend only to those who had played a part in
publicly disclosing the allegations and information on which their suits were
based.'
14. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 1419.
16. Id.
17. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.
18. Act of October 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 3153)
5266, 5269 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733).
19. 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
20. Id at 17.
21. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418.
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The 1994 Amendments excluded suits which relate to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 replacing the reference in the 1986 Amendments to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. An interesting discussion of the history
of the early years of the FCA appears in a number of places,2 2 as well as on
an increasing number of web sites.23
Il-. THE STATUTES
The FCA is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.24 Because of its
nature in controlling discovery and investigation of the case, 31 U.S.C. §
3733 will not be included in this paper.
22. Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool for the Private Litigant in
Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 446 (1972); JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui
TAM AcTiONS (1993) (updated 1995, 1997); JAMES B. HELMER, JR. ET AL., FALSE CLAIMS AcT
(1994).
23. See, e.g., Taxpayers Against Fraud, The False Claims Act Legal Center (visited Feb.
2, 1997) <http://www.taf.org>; Whistleblowers' Web Site, About Phillips & Cohen (visited
Sept. 2, 1997) <http://www.whistleblowers. com>.
24. These specific sections provide:
§ 3729 False Claims
(a) L.ABI.rrY FOR CERTAIN Acrs.-Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States a false and fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be
used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully
to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the
amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Govern-
ment, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the infor-
mation on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the
Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which
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(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished offi-
cials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations
with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days
after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of
such violation; and
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the informa-
tion about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative
action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the
person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into
such violation;
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this
subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a
civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
(b) KNOWING AND KNOWINGLY DERND.-For purposes of this section, the
terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to informa-
tion-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
(c) CLAIM DEFIED.-For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any re-
quest or demand, whether under a contact or otherwise, for money or property
which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States
Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or de-
manded.
(d) ExEM'TION FROM DiscLoSuRE.-Any information furnished pursuant to
subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be exempt from disclosure
under section 552 of title 5.
(e) EXCLUSION.-This section does not apply to claims, records, or state-
ments made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
§ 3730. Civil actions for false claims
(a) RoSPONSIBIMEs OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL-The Attorney General
diligently shall investigate a violation under section 3729. If the Attorney Gen-
eral finds that a person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action under this section against the person.
(b) AcrIONS BY PRIVATE PERSONS.-(l) A person may bring a civil action for
a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.
The action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the
dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all mate-
rial evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Gov-
ernment pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days,
and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Govern-
Burke
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ment may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it
receives both the complaint and the material evidence and infoimation.
(3) The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court for exten-
sions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph
(2). Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or other submissions in
camera. The defendant shall not be required to respond to any complaint filed
under this section until 20 days after the complaint is unsealed and served upon
the defendant pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(4) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained
under paragraph (3), the Government shall-
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted
by the Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action.
(5) When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action.
(c) RICHTrs oF THE PARTIES TO Qtn TAM ACIoNs.--(1) If the Government
proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting
the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action.
Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to
the limitations set forth in paragraph (2).
(2)(A) The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the
Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person
with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.
(B) The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwith-
standing the objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines,
after a hearing, that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable un-
der all the circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be
held in camera.
(C) Upon a showing by the Government that unrestricted participation
during the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would in-
terfere with or unduly delay the Government's prosecution of the case, or would
be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, impose limitations on the person's participation, such as-
(i) limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;
(ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses;
(iii) limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses; or
(iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the litigation.
(D) Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation dur-
ing the course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would be for
purposes of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unneces-
sary expense, the court may limit the participation by the person in the litigation.
(3) If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who
initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action. If the Government
so requests, it shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and
shall be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the Government's
expense). When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the
status and rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the
Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good cause.
[Vol. 21:869
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(4) Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, upon a
showing by the Government that certain actions of discovery by the person initi-
ating the action would interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecu-
tion of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay
such discovery for a period of not more than 60 days. Such a showing shall be
conducted in camera. The court may extend the 60-day period upon a further
showing in camera that the Government has pursued the criminal or civil investi-
gation or proceedings with reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in
the civil action will interfere with the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or
proceedings.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government may elect to pursue its
claim through any alternate remedy available to the Government, including any
administrative proceeding to determine a civil money penalty. If any such alter-
nate remedy is pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action
shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if
the action had continued under this section. Any finding of fact or conclusion of
law made in such other proceeding that has become final shall be conclusive on
all parties to an action under this section. For purposes of the preceding sentence,
a finding or conclusion is final if it has been finally determined on appeal to the
appropriate court of the United States, if all time for filing such an appeal with
respect to the finding or conclusion has expired, or if the finding or conclusion is
not subject to judicial review.
(d) AWARD TO Qui TAM PLAnnTi.-(1) If the Government proceeds with
an action brought by a person under subsection (b), such person shall, subject to
the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15 percent but not more
than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depend-
ing upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecu-
tion of the action. Where the action is one which the court finds to be based pri-
marily on disclosures of specific information (other than information provided by
the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Gov-
ernment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, the court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no
case more than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of
the information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the
case to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of
this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also re-
ceive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been nec-
essarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. All such expenses,
fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
(2) If the Government does not proceed with an action under this section,
the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount which
the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages. The
amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds. Such
person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court
finds to havebeen necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant.
(3) Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, if the court
finds that the action was brought by a person who planned and initiated the vio-
lation of section 3729 upon which the action was brought, then the court may, to
Burke
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the extent the court considers appropriate, reduce the share of the proceeds of the
action which the person would otherwise receive under paragraph (1) or (2) of
this subsection, taking into account the role of that person in advancing the case
to litigation and any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation. If the per-
son bringing the action is convicted of criminal conduct arising from his or her
role in the violation of section 3729, that person shall be dismissed from the civil
action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the action. Such dis-
missal shall not prejudice the right of the United States to continue the action,
represented by the Department of Justice.
(4) If the Government does not proceed with the action and the person
bringing the action conducts the action, the court may award to the defendant its
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in the action
and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly
frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.
(e) CERTAIN ACrIONS BARRED.-(1) No court shall have jurisdiction over an
action brought by a former or present member of the armed forces under subsec-
tion (b) of this section against a member of the armed forces arising out of such
person's service in the armed forces.
(2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under sub-
section (b) against a Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior
executive branch official if the action is based on evidence or information known
to the Government when the action was brought.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "senior executive branch official"
means any officer or employee listed in paragraphs (1) through (8) of section
101(f) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).
(3) In no event may a person bring an action under subsection (b) which is
based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an
administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is al-
ready a party.
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Govern-
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bring-
ing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the alle-
gations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern-
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.
(f) GOVERNMENT NOT LIABLE FOR CERTAIN ExPENSE.-The Government is
not liable for expenses which a person incurs in bringing an action under this
section.
(g) FEES AND EXPENSES TO PREVAING DEFENDANT.-In civil actions
brought under this section by the United States, the provisions of section 2412(d)
of title 28 shall apply.
(h) Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, har-
assed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions
of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the em-
ployee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this
section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in
an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief nec-
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IV. THE FORM OF THE LITIGATION
Presently, qui tam actions may entitle whistleblowers to receive part of
the damages and penalties awarded to the government by filing suit on
essary to make the employee whole. Such relief shall include reinstatement with
the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the discrimina-
tion, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation
for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including liti-
gation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee may bring an action in
the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection.
§ 3731. False claims procedure
(a) A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a trial or hearing
conducted under section 3730 of this title may be served at any place in the
United States.
(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be brought-
(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of section 3729
is committed, or
(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action
are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event
more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed,
whichever occurs last.
(c) In any action brought under section 3730, the United States shall be re-
quired to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages,
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, or the Federal Rules of Evidence, a final judgment rendered in fa-
vor of the United States in any criminal proceeding charging fraud or false state-
ments, whether upon a verdict after trial or upon a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
dere, shall estop the defendant from denying the essential elements of the offense
in any action which involves the same transaction as in the criminal proceeding
and which is brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730.
§ 3732. False claims jurisdiction
(a) ACrIONS UNDER SECION 3730.-Any action under 3730 may be brought
in any judicial district in which the defendant or, in the case of multiple defen-
dants, any one defendant can be found, resides, transacts business, or in which
any act proscribed by section 3729 occurred. A summons as required by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be issued by the appropriate district court
and served at any place within or outside the United States.
(b) CLAIMS UNDER STATE LAw.-The district courts shall have jurisdiction
over any action brought under the laws of any State for the recovery of funds
paid by a State or local government if the action arises from the same transaction
or occurrence as an action brought under section 3730.
§ 3733. Civil investigative demands (The text of this section is not included in
this paper).
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (footnotes omitted).
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behalf of the government 25 and may also receive damages and penalties for
themselves if they have been damaged by the blowing of the whistle.26 For
the remainder of this paper, the qui tam plaintiff shall be designated as "he"
although it is equally probable that the party be a female as a male. If the
government chooses not to intervene, the litigation may be pursued directly
by the whistleblower in which case he will get a larger percentage of the
government damages.27
The process of the suit is statutorily controlled.28 The relator must first
inform the government of the information he has obtained concerning the
fraudulent actions of the defendant. He must be an "original source" of this
information29 if the information has already been placed in the public
record.30 The statute is very specific about what constitutes public disclo-
sure. 3 ' The concept of original source is the key factor in commencing a qui
tam suit if enough of the information has been publicly disclosed. The issue
of whether a government employee can bring a suit has also been litigated.
The relator files the suit under seal on behalf of the government and
himself. The complaint remains under seal for a period of sixty days while
the government investigates the case and determines whether it will inter-
vene.32 The government may ask the court to extend this period of time, but
it has to present a well-founded argument for this extension. 33 If the gov-
ernment decides not to intervene initially, it may only intervene at a later
date upon the showing of good cause to the court.3 4 If the government
chooses to initially intervene, it will carry the case forward itself, "and shall
not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action. 35 If the govern-
ment intervenes, the relator will receive between 15% and 25% of the
recovery as determined by statute. 36 If the government does not choose to
intervene, the relator may continue the case on his own and receive between
25% and 30% of the recovery.37 Pursuant to statute, the government is not
25. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
26. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
27. Id.
28. Id. §§ 3730, 3733.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
30. Id. § 3730(2) 4A, 4B.
31. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
32. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
33. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
35. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
36. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
37. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
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responsible for the relator's costs of the suit whether or not it intervenes.
The government also cannot simply step back into the case and intervene at
any time and at its own choosing. If the government desires to intervene in
the case at a later date, it must present a very compelling case to the court to
permit such intervention.38 Once the case is initiated, whether or not the
government has intervened, the relator may not generally dismiss the case or
enter into a settlement with the defendant without the government's agree-
ment. However, the court may approve the settlement agreement or the
dismissal if it is shown that the relator has carried out the case in good faith
39
and that the settlement is fair or the dismissal legally sufficient. In general,
however, once the complaint is filed it may only be dismissed by the consent
of the court and the attorney general.4° In United States v. Griswald,4" the
relator, called the prosecutor at the time, B.I. Dowell, objected when the
government tried to accept a token amount of money and a piece of land in
satisfaction of a much larger judgment.42 It was held that if a settlement is
reached which is approved by the parties and the court, the government
cannot accept a lesser settlement for the relator's share. The relator's share
is vested when the judgment is entered.
In a recent case of first impression, the court in United States ex reL
Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co.,43 considered the
conditions upon which the relator was entitled to a hearing if the government
moved to dismiss the suit whether or not the government had intervened.
The court said that if the finding can be made that the government's decision
to dismiss is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose and that
dismissal is not arbitrary, fraudulent, or illegal, the inquiry is at an end.
44
The court then applied this standard to the facts of the case to determine if
the government had presented'a "facially satisfactory" basis for dismissal or
whether Sequoia had shown a "substantial and particularized need" by
"challenging the legitimacy of the asserted Governmental interest," or by
"pointing to facts that indicated the claimed interest is pretextual," or "that
dismissal is fraudulent," or if it appears that dismissal does not rationally
38. Id. § 3730 (c)(3).
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (c)(2)(A)-(B).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pedicone v. Mazak Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.
Ohio 1992).
41. 24F. 361 (D. Or. 1885).
42. Id. at 366.
43. 912 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
44. Id. at 1338.
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advance the asserted interest. 45 In the end, the court found that Sequoia had
made a "colorable claim" and ordered a hearing at which the government
would have to demonstrate a valid governmental interest. Then the relator
would have to present evidence that dismissal is arbitrary, fraudulent, or
illegal.46
Along with the complaint, the relator provides the government with a
disclosure document which is not filed and is maintained under seal. This
disclosure document is generally kept from the defendant and may be
considered to be work product. In the disclosure document, the relator
presents all of the information he has so that the government can understand
the nature of the claim. It is not necessary that the relator know "everything"
about the evidence at this initial stage but enough information must be
presented so that the government can carry out its own investigation. Mere
allegations without some underlying evidence will not meet the pleading
criteria. In Mikes v. Strauss47 the court stated:
[T]he Court never expected plaintiff to be able to detail every as-
pect of defendants' alleged fraudulent scheme prior to conducting
any discovery. Instead, the primary concern of the Court was to
prevent plaintiff from conducting a fishing expedition through the
intricacies of defendants' business in the hopes of uncovering some
unlawful conduct on which to base the instant action.
48
As may be expected, qui tam cases are expensive and lengthy to litigate.
If they survive motions to dismiss, summary judgment, and judgment on the
pleadings, they may settle rather than be litigated.
V. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the courts to hear a qui tam case is determined by
statute.49 Several states have passed their own qui tam legislation including
California and Florida. The federal court has jurisdiction if state claims
involve false claims which were perpetrated on the federal government.
Since the defendant is often a corporation which transacts business in many
locations, the relator often has the option of choosing a location convenient
45. Id. at 1346.
46. Id. at 1347.
47. 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
48. Id. at 751.
49. 31 U.S.C. § 3732.
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for him or his attorney. Subject matter jurisdiction will be discussed under
the topic "Relator".
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations is either six years from the date on which the
violations of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 is committed, or
three years after the date when facts material to the right of action
are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of
the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circum-
stances, but in no event more thai ten years after the date on which
the violation is committed, whichever occurs last as imposed by 31
U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1). 50
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A standard defense posed by a number of defendants in qui tam actions
is an attack on the constitutionality of the FCA. This defense has failed in a
number of different courts but for different reasons.
A. Standing
The question of standing of the relator is but one aspect of the uncon-
stitutionality argument. In a claim filed under 31 U.S.C. § 3729, it is the
United States government which has suffered injury, not the relator, al-
though the relator may have separate claims under section 3730(h). As the
Court held in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,s' to have standing
under Article III of the Constitution, the plaintiff must show an actual or
threatened injury that can be redressed by the judgment requested. In
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,5 2 the Court found that
the injury must be concrete.5 If the government chooses to intervene, the
question of standing is overcome but if the government does not choose to
intervene then the standing of the relator is not so clear. There is a substan-
tial body of case law which holds that individuals cannot bring an action
against the executive branch without a showing of injury on the part of the
50. Id. § 3731(b).
51. 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
52. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
53. Id. at 209.
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plaintiff.54 As the Court stated in Warth v. Seldin,55 unless the plaintiff has
an "interest" because he suffered an injury, he might not pursue the litigation
vigorously.56 Faced with an impressive history of cases, the courts involved
have sought to deny the motion to dismiss for lack of standing but for
apparently conflicting reasons. The Court in Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 7 held that
there was a historical basis for finding standing.58 The court in United States
ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopers, Inc.59 found standing for the relator
based on a history of courts finding standing for the relator.60 Although this
appears to be circular reasoning, it is apparent that the Hughes court wanted
to find standing. In addition, Hughes found that the statutory bounty gave
the relator a personal stake and thus created injury in fact.6 ' The court also
recognized standing since the relator was usually an employee who had
suffered possible termination or other job harassment because of the suit.
The relator normally suffers personal injuries since the relator may lose his
job or be prosecuted and therefore the action creates an injury in fact for the
relator.62 Alternatively, the court in United States ex rel. Burch v. Piqua
Engineering63 did not find the historical basis postulated by the other courts,
but did find there were potential ramifications to the employment status of
the relators. 64 In United States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp.,65 the court
dismissed the theories of the other two courts, stating that since most of the
cases which formed the historical basis occurred before the modem theory of
"standing," the historical basis for standing was not viable. It also viewed
any ramifications as to employment as "speculating harm." It found the
basis for standing lay in the injury to the United States government in whose
54. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
American United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
55. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
56. Id. at 498-99.
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
58. Id. at 488-89 n.24.
59. 714 F. Supp. 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
60. Id. at 1096.
61. Id. at 1098.
62. Id. at 1099.
63. 803 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
64. Id. at 119.
65. 728 F. Supp. 615 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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name the suit had been brought.6 This was a simple and direct conclusion
to a problem that had been troubling the courts.
A related issue is whether the claim is made against the United States if
the false claim was actually made against a state which receives funding
from the federal government for a particular project. The court in United
States v. Azzarelli Construction Co.67 held that since the federal highway
program gave a set amount of money to the state and did not deal directly
with contractors, unlike, for example, open-ended money disbursement
programs such as Medicare, the federal government did not suffer any
injuries from the alleged bid-rigging and a qui tam action could not be
brought.68 Responding to Azzarelli, Congress, in passing the 1986 Amend-
ments, enacted 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c), which includes in the definition of a
"claim" requests for funds made to a grantee or recipient of federal funds so
long as the United States government has provided any of the money which
is requested from the grantee. As the court in Wilkins ex rel. United States v.
Ohio69 noted, "[t]he definition makes no distinction between money pro-
vided as a fixed sum and money provided under an open-ended program, but
rather is broad enough to include any request for money which was origi-
nally obtained from the United States government." 70 A relator, therefore,
may have standing based on government's funding of state projects even
though the false claims were submitted to the state rather than directly to the
federal government.
B. Separation of Powers
The Truong court also addressed the issue of dismissal of the action
based on Northrop's claim that the FCA violated the doctrine of separation
of powers by unconstitutionally undermining the authority of the executive
branch but the court rejected this claim. 71 The court looked to the case of
Morrison v. Olson72 which addressed a similar issue regarding a separation
of powers challenge to the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978.73 That act created a "Special Division" of the
66. Id.
67. 647 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 761.
69. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
70. Id. at 1062-63.
71. 728 F. Supp. at 620-21.
72. 487 U.S. 654 (1988), remanded and aff'd, 857 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
73. Id. at 659.
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Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which was empow-
ered to appoint an independent counsel and define his prosecutorial jurisdic-
tion.74 Paralleling the Morrison Court's reasoning, the Truong court ana-
lyzed various phases of the litigation, more specifically Phase One: Initiat-
ing the Suit;75 Phase Two: Conducting the Litigation; 76 and Phase Three:
Terminating the Litigation,77 and stated that:
In sum, the False Claims Act grants the executive branch greater
litigative control than that provided for in the Ethics in Government
Act of 1978, which the Supreme Court validated in Morrison v. Ol-
son. Accordingly, defendant's constitutional challenge based on
the separation of powers doctrine will not lie. 78
C. The Appointments Clause
In Truong, the defendant also raised a constitutional challenge based on
a violation of the Appointments Clause, by allowing government litigation to
be conducted by individuals who are not appointed in one of the ways
enunciated in the Appointments Clause and thus are not "officers" of the
United States.79 The Truong court looked to distinguish the case in point
from the holding of the Court in Buckley v. Valeo80 which held that "[s]uch
functions may be discharged only by persons who are 'Officers of the United
States' within the language of [the Appointments Clause].",81 The Truong
court agreed that the "relators" were not "officers" within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause,82 further stating that "[t]hey enjoy limited powers,
have no formal duties, hold no established office, have no prescribed tenure,
and receive no federal emoluments. As such, they are more appropriately
classified as 'agents' for Appointments Clause purposes. '8 3 The Truong
74. Id. at 661.
75. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 621.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 622.
78. Id
79. Id. at 622-23.
80. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
81. Id at 140 (alteration in original).
82. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 623.
83. Id. See also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (stating that the
"position is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous duties, and he acts
only occasionally and temporarily. Therefore, he is not an 'officer,' within the meaning of the
clause of the [C]onstitution referred to.").
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court distinguished the Buckley case on the basis that the Buckley court was
concerned that Congress, through its appointments, was encroaching
impermissibly on executive branch functions84 and "[t]he Supreme
Court... struck down what it regarded as congressional attempts to enlarge
the legislative authority at the expense of that of the Executive Branch."85
But in a qui tam suit, the relator is a private person, in no way linked to
Congress or the judicial branch.86 The court pointed out that "[l]ower courts
have, moreover, limited the potential reach of Buckley, finding the case
inapplicable to private parties." 87 The Troung court then found that "as long
as private participation is not a subterfuge for Congressional control, the
executive branch's Article II responsibility to execute the laws faithfully is
not threatened. Accordingly, defendant's challenge based on the Appoint-
ments Clause cannot survive here."
88
D. Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment provides that "nor shall any person be subject to
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."89 In a case
under the FCA, a civil qui tam case is stayed pending the criminal trial of the
defendant and, not only is the matter resjudicata if the party is found guilty,
but the defendant is also considered to have been found guilty for purposes
of the civil trial if he has plead nolo contendere, and the civil trial proceeds
only to determine damages. 90 The issue of double jeopardy arose in United
States v. Halper.91 Halper had already been convicted and sentenced to two
years imprisonment and fined $5,000 for submitting sixty-five false claims
for Medicare reimbursement. These claims had been submitted for $12
rather than the correct $3, resulting in a government loss of $585. The
government sought a penalty of $2,000 per claim (the statutory penalty at
that time) or $130,000. The Supreme Court ruled in the face of such a large
fine and small loss, that a defendant who had already been punished in a
criminal case could only receive a second civil sanction if that could be
84. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 623.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 623. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F.
Supp. 620, 624 (D. Md. 1987); see also NRDC v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801,
816 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
88. Truong, 728 F. Supp. at 624.
89. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
90. United States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
91. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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characterized as remedial.92 The Court also presented standards to use in
determining if that sanction was remedial, which included other costs
experienced by the government. 93 The holding in Halper, however, applies
only to a case in which the defendant has already been tried in a criminal
case and received some punishment.
E. Unjust and Unusual Punishment
Another issue is the question of the amount of fines imposed by the
statute which may be said to infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights
under the Eighth Amendment. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 94
This argument can only be made after the case has been tried, the damages
suffered by the government determined, and the penalties assessed. This
will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. As stated above, the
Halper case is only applicable when there has been a related criminal case.
VI. THE RELATOR
The relator qualifies solely by being the provider of the information
which forms the basis of the qui tam suit. It is the relator who brings the
information to the government either prior to the suit or by the actual filing
of the suit itself. If the information has been the subject of public disclosure
and the relator is not the primary provider of information, the court will not
have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.
The FCA95 provides that:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a con-
gressional, administrative, or Government [General] Accounting
Office report, hearing audit, or investigation, or from the news me-
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the per-
son bringing the action is an original source of the information. 96
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the infor-
92. Id. at 450-51.
93. Id. at 451.
94. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e).
96. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
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mation on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily pro-
vided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information. 97
In Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp.,98 the court held that if
there "has been no 'public disclosure' within the meaning of section
3730(e)(4)(A), there is no need for a qui tam plaintiff to show that he is the
'original source' of the information." 99 As the court stated in United States
ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency,&°° the qui tam plaintiff
need prove his status as an "original source" under section 3730(e)(4)(B)
"only if an exception is sought to the bar of 4(A)."'' 1
The Stinson cases are an example of different rulings coming down on
basically the same set of facts. During discovery in an unrelated action,
which was not a false claims case, Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante,
P.A., a law firm, became aware of alleged fraud being perpetrated by a
number of insurance companies. The firm then filed a series of qui tam suits
against a number of insurance companies with itself as the relator in each
case. The question arose whether the information which was revealed by the
defendant to the plaintiff during depositions in the discovery phase of the
litigation had been "publically disclosed" so that the law firm was proscribed
from bringing a qui tam suit based on it unless the firm could show that it
was an original source. In United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential
Insurance Co.,102 the court found that information revealed in a "hearing" or
deposition taken in discovery was thereby placed into the public domain. 03
The court in United States ex rel. Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Georgia, Inc.1°4 found that information obtained in a deposition was not
based on a public disclosure. 05 The two cases are an interesting compari-
97. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
98. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 1416.
100. 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991), af'd, 81 F.3d 1465 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. See also United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1991) (stating that "the district court in Raytheon determined that the government
employee cannot qualify for the 'original source' exception to the jurisdictional bar of section
3730(e)(4)(A). The court here implied that because the government employee is required, as a
condition of employment, to uncover and report fraud, two of the requirements for the
'original source' exception were not met . .
102. 944F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 1160.
104. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
105. Id. at 1050.
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son. In both cases there was the same relator and information obtained in
approximately the same manner but a very different ruling. In United States
ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn,1°6 the court took a middle
ground between the two previously cited Stinson cases, stating that the
danger of parasitic suits is minimized when discovery is not filed and
therefore is not put into the public record.10 7 The court stated that qui tam
actions are barred only when enough information exists in the public domain
to expose the fraud transaction or the allegation of fraud.'0 8
The court in United States ex rel. Neher v. NEC Corp. '° analyzed the
case law relating to whether the qui tam action survives the death of the
relator." 0 The court quoting several cases"' stated, and the parties agreed,
that the survival of the action depended on whether it was remedial in nature
or penal and that it could be remedial for one plaintiff and penal for another.
It is clear that actions under the FCA are remedial to the government and that
the death of the relator has no effect on the government's claim. The court
went on to find, however, that
a qui tam relator suffers substantial harm and the qui tam provi-
sions of the FCA are intended to remedy that harm. First, a qui tam
relator can suffer severe emotional strain due to the discovery of
his unwilling involvement in fraudulent activity. Moreover, the
actual or potential ramifications on the relator's employment can be
substantial .... Finally, the relator can suffer substantial financial
burdens as a result of the time and expense involved in bringing a
qui tam action. We thus believe that the FCA's qui tam provisions
are intended to redress wrongs suffered by individual relators such
as Williams, rather than the general public.
112
The court continued:
106. 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
107. Id. at 657.
108. Il at 647.
109. 11 F.3d 136 (llth Cir. 1993).
110. Id. at 137.
111. See, e.g., Ex Parte Schreiber, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884); Kilgo v. Bowman Transporta-
tion, Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Wood, 643 F.2d 188, 190-191 (5th Cir.
1980); James v. Home Constr. Co. of Mobile, 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 1980); Murphy v.
Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1977).
112. Neher, 11 F.3d at 138.
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The recovery of a qui tam relator is intended to remedy the harm he
suffered in several ways: by distancing the relator from the fraud
and rewarding him for his involvement in the government's fight
against unlawful activity; by compensating the relator for any harm
he suffered with respect to his employment; and by compensating
the relator for the substantial time and expense involved in bringing
a qui tam action.1
13
The court went on to hold that "a relator's qui tam action survives his
death."'
14
IX. DISCOVERY FROM THE GOVERNMENT
Although the relator is acting on behalf of the government, there are
many barriers erected between the government and the relator if the govern-
ment does not intervene in the case. For example, the relator might believe
that obtaining documents from the government to prove the claim for the
government would be simple, as the government certainly wants to have the
claim proven so that it can get its share of the damages and penalties. It
certainly might be considered to be the least the government can do since it
did not intervene and all the costs of the action are being born by the relator.
In fact, the relator and his attorney may find that obtaining documents from
the government is more difficult than obtaining them from the defendants.
For example, the government has a set of elaborate procedures known as
Touhy regulations, which have been derived from United States ex reL
Touhy v. Ragen," 5 by which the government will furnish information and
grant access to government employees in connection with litigation. In
many instances, it may be more difficult for the relator to obtain discovery
materials from the government than from the defendant.
The relator does not have to provide the information to the government
before filing his claim, although generally this is done. In such a case, the
government has certain statutory protection if it has already been investigat-
ing the claim. The government has sixty days to intervene but it may get an
extension if it has a good basis, which may be the continuation of its investi-
gation. During this period, the complaint is under seal. The government
may choose to intervene and carry out the case according to its own deci-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 139.
115. 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
1997]
117
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
sions. If the relator has not been an original source, in the event that there
has been public disclosure, the relator will not be able to carry on the case
because there will be an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. If the relator
provides valuable information to the government as a direct and original
source, he will then share in the recovery and penalties.
[T]he United States as against the defendants has the right to adopt
as its own what was from the first claimed in its name, unpreju-
diced by any thing the relator may have done or omitted to do; but
as respects the relator the United States must reward him out of the
proceeds if he has really contributed original information in bring-
ing the suit. It is when the United States fails to adopt or prosecute
the suit, and the relator carries it on, that the defendants may raise
an issue with the relator as to the merit of his activity in bringing it,
and on this collateral issue may defeat it utterly.116
X. THE CLAIM
A. What Constitutes a Claim?
While the definition of "claim" lies within the statute itself 1 7 and
includes
any request or demand, whether under a contact or otherwise, for
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of
the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the
Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other re-
cipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested
or demanded[,] 18
there still has been considerable litigation regarding the nature of a claim.
The elements of a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 were outlined by the court
in Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio.1 9
116. United States v. Pittman, 151 F.2d 851, 853 (5th Cir. 1945).
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
118. Id.
119. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
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[1] The elements of a claim under § 3729(a)(1) are: (1) that
the defendant presented or caused to be presented to an agent of the
United States a claim for payment; (2) that the claim was false or
fraudulent; (3) that the defendant knew that the claim was false or
fraudulent; and (4) that the United States suffered damages as a re-
suit.
[2] The elements of a claim under 3729(a)(2) are: (1) that the
defendant made, used, or caused to be made or used, a record or
statement to get a claim against the United States paid or approved;
(2) the record or statement and the claims were false or fraudulent;
(3) the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim
were false or fraudulent; and (4) the United States suffered dam-
ages as a result.
[31 The elements of a claim under § 3729(a)(3) are: (1) that
the defendant knowingly conspired with one or more persons to get
a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid by the United States; (2)
that one or more of the conspirators performed any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy; and (3) that the United States suffered
damages as a result of the false or fraudulent claim.
[4] A claim under § 3729(a)(7) requires proof: (1) that the
defendant made, used, or caused to be used a record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to the United States; (2)
that the statement or record was false; (3) that the defendant knew
that the statement or record was false; and (4) that the United States
suffered damages as a result.
[5] The knowledge element of the above claims is defined in
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b). Under that section,
the terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with re-
spect to information-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required. 12°
These formulations are most useful in the preparation of a complaint.
120. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1059 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson v. Provident
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
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B. The Reverse Claim
Among the 1986 amendments, Congress made provisions for what has
been termed the "reverse" claim, in which the defendant allegedly has
reduced a payment owed to the government through some fraudulent means,
rather than submitting a fraudulent claim for payment to the government. 121
This addition to the list of causes of action has greatly increased the range of
qui tam cases filed since 1986.
In Wilkins, the court considered the situation in which the defendant
omits certain information from records so as to reduce the payments owed to
the government. 122 The court concluded that for there to be a "reverse false
claim," the government has to be made aware of the false statement, misrep-
resentation, or misleading omission in some fashion, i.e., there has to be a
"claim.' , 23
C. False Claims or Fraud: The Element of Intent
The amendment created by 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) which removes the
requirement of proof of intent to defraud has made the qui tam cases sub-
stantially easier to prosecute. The courts, however, have drawn a line with
regard to the minimal degree of knowledge that the defendant must have had
of the alleged fraudulent action. 24 Yet the courts are clear that
[m]ere negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient to satisfy the
above standards for knowledge. Rather, defendant must act at least
with "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the truth or
falsity of the information.
Although plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge as that term is defined in §3729(b), plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove that the defendant acted with the intent to deceive.
The gist of the violation is not an intent to deceive but the knowing
presentation of a claim, record or statement that is either
"fraudulent" or "false" and the requisite intent is the knowing pres-
entation of what is "known to be false" or "a lie.
' 125
121. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(7).
122. 885 F. Supp. at 1064.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilkins, 885 F. Supp at 1059.
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United States ex rel. Stevens v. McGinnis, Inc.126 stands for the proposition
that an omission of information from records which are required to be
maintained may constitute a false statement or record under the FCA, but the
defendant must have knowingly submitted the false claim. As the court
stated in Hagood:
Innocent mistake is a defense to the criminal charge or civil
complaint. So is mere negligence. The statutory definition of
"knowingly" requires at least "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless
disregard." To take advantage of a disputed legal question, as may
have happened here, is to be neither deliberately ignorant nor
recklessly disregardful. 127
Although one may believe that the essence of the qui tam action is fraud in
fact, the legislature, in referencing a "false claim" rather than fraud, has
effectively removed the requirement of proving intent.
D. Must Claims Under the FCA Be Plead with Specificity?
The standard for pleading fraud under the FCA is not Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but a substantially modified version of rule
9(b) based on exceptions which have been identified by several courts.
Durham v. Business Management Associates"28 held that rule (9)(b) must be
read consistently with rule 8 and, thus, must not abrogate the concept of
notice pleading. As the court in Colonial Penn Insurance v. Value Rent-A-
Car, Inc.129 stated: "In Durham, the Eleventh Circuit stated that '[a]lle-
gations of date, time or place satisfy the rule 9(b) requirement that the
circumstances of the alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity, but
alternative means are also available to satisfy the rule." ' 130 "The Eleventh
Circuit approves this alternative means... ... 13 The purpose of requiring
that fraud be plead with specificity under rule 9(b) is: 1) to put defendants
on notice as to the conduct complained of so that they have sufficient
information to formulate a defense; 2) to protect the defendants from
126. No. C-1-93-442, 1994 WL 799421, *4-8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1994).
127. Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421; see also Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 751 (S.D.
N.Y. 1995).
128. 847 F.2d 1505 (1lth Cir. 1988).
129. 814 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
130. Id. at 1092 (quoting Durham v. Business Management Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1512
(11th Cir. 1988)).
131. Id. at 1092.
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frivolous suits; 3) to eliminate fraud actions in which all of the facts are
learned through discovery after the complaint is filed; and 4) to protect a
defendant from harm to its goodwill or reputation. 132 The Stinson court has
emphasized that these conditions can be met in other ways. 133 The FCA has
other safeguards against multiplicity of suits. If there has been public
disclosure, the relator must have "'direct and independent knowledge,' that
is, be an 'original source,' of the allegations under section 3730(e)(4)(B)"'
' 34
in order to apply the exception to rule 9(b).1
35
The courts have found that the imposition of a strict enforcement of rule
9(b) would frustrate the purpose of the FCA, therefore courts allow an
exception to the stringent rule so that the qui tam plaintiff can plead infor-
mation which he knows exists but which may only be available to him now
through discovery.' 36 The requirement of pleading fraud with particularity
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes it difficult
for many persons to bring a qui tam suit and frustrates the legislative intent
of the statute.
Furthermore, pleadings cannot generally be based on information and
belief unless the factual information is "peculiarly within the defendant's
knowledge or control."'' 37 In such a case, allegations made on information
and belief are acceptable if the complaint adduces "specific facts supporting
a strong inference of fraud."'' 38 Where, however, this factual information is
peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control, rule 9(b)'s require-
ment is relaxed somewhat. 139 "In such a case, pleading on information and
belief is acceptable. ' '14°
The court in United States v. Napco International, Inc.14 1 followed the
court in Bennett v. Berg 42 which held that "[i]n determining the sufficiency
of the pleading, the Court has considered 'such matters as the time, place and
contents of false representations, as well as the identity of the person making
132. United States ex reL Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 755 F. Supp.
1055, 1056-57 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
133. Id. at 1057.
134. Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 568.
136. United States ex rel. La Valley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351,
1355 (D. Mass. 1988).
137. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052.
141. 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
142. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
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the misrepresentation and what was obtained or given up thereby."' 143 The
Court in Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC International, Inc.144 stated:
We are not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the allegations
of fraud fail to comport with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b) because they fail to allege fraud with the requisite degree of
particularity. Nor are we convinced that Rule 9(b) bars Plaintiff
from pleading allegations based on "information or belief," where
the subject matter is "peculiarly within the adverse parties' knowl-
edge."1
45
Rule 9(b) requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall
be stated with particularity," and is to be read together with rule 8.46 A
plaintiff must allege fraud with sufficient particularity to permit "the person
charged with fraud... [to] have a reasonable opportunity to answer the
complaint and adequate information to frame a response."' 47 The court in
Merrill Lynch v. Del Valle148 stated that the allegations must be accompanied
by "'some delineation of the underlying acts and transactions which are
asserted to constitute fraud."' 49
However, pleading on "information and belief' must be done with great
caution. As the court stated in Stinson,
[i]n the usual case, "[t]o pass muster under rule 9(b), the complaint
must allege the time, place, speaker, and sometimes even the con-
tent of the alleged misrepresentation." 'Thus, pleadings generally
cannot be based on information and belief." Where, however, this
factual information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge
or control, rule 9(b)'s requirement is relaxed somewhat. In such a
case, pleading on information and belief is acceptable, but on one
condition: the "complaint must adduce specific facts supporting a
strong inference of fraud or it will not satisfy even a relaxed
143. Napco, 835 F. Supp. at 495 (quoting Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1062).
144. 833 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 1574 (quoting Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d Cir. 1972)). See also
In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
146. Fink v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 959 (D.C. Cir.1985).
147. In re United States Oil and Gas Litig., No. 83-1702-Al-CIV., 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2217, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1988).
148. 528 F. Supp. 147 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
149. Id. at 149 (quoting duPont v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 630 (D. Del. 1973)). See, e.g.,
Leisure Founders, 833 F. Supp. at 1574.
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pleading standard." ("[E]ven under a nonrestrictive application of
the rule, pleaders must allege that the necessary information lies
within the defendant's control, and then allegations must be ac-
companied by a statement of facts upon which the allegations are
based.") Bald or otherwise conclusory allegations will not suffice.
The "supporting facts on which the belief is founded must be set
forth in the complaint." And the complainant must be able to con-
nect the allegations of fraud to the defendant.15 .
In United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp.,151 the court
reaffirmed that "pleadings cannot generally be based on information and
belief unless the factual information is 'peculiarly within the defendant's
knowledge or control.' 1 52 In general, qui tam plaintiffs must meet the who,
what, when, and where pleading requirement for fraud.
153
[I]t is not enough for plaintiffs to allege that "a Northrop engineer"
or "Northrop employees" or "superiors" committed fraudulent acts.
The identification of the employee, or at least a more specific de-
scription of the person, is within plaintiffs' knowledge, and such in-
formation must be provided in the complaint.1M
Most of the allegations ... repetitively refer to unnamed per-
sons at unspecified times, even though the specifics are presumably
known to the plaintiffs. Defendant complains that it has 35,000
employees and cannot reasonably respond in those circumstances.
We agree. 1
55
The question of "when" is another matter which must be met. The
court in NCR Credit Corp. v. Reptron Electronics, Inc.15 6 dismissed a fraud
complaint where the plaintiff made "mere conclusory" allegations, rather
than alleging a specific date, time, name, or quoting specific misstate-
ments.
157
In contrast, in United States v. Napco International, Inc.,' 58 the gov-
ernment survived a motion to dismiss because it detailed each purchase
150. Stinson, 755 F. Supp. at 1052 (citations omitted).
151. 149 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. 111. 1993).
152. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Ma2 at 146.
156. 155 F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
157. Il at 693.
158. 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
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agreement, including the date of each invoice, the invoice number, the
invoice amount, the country from which the materials were obtained, and the
dollar amount spent on each procurement. This is possible when the
government intervenes in the case, but rarely can the qui tam plaintiff offer
such detail in the initial complaint, since he may have already left the
employ of the qui tam defendant and is rarely able to take the required
documents with him. They must, however, give reasonable delineation of
the specifics of the false claims so that exact proof may be obtained through
discovery. Discovery cannot be a complete fishing expedition, nor can the
case be created in whole after the complaint is filed on the basis that the qui
tam plaintiff has a "idea" that something may be occurring.
E. Standard of Proof
The standard of proof in a qui tam suit is by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 59 There are a number of "but for" qui tam cases in which the
government (or the relator) must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the government would not have taken a certain action "but for" the false
claim presented by the defendant. In United States v. First National Bank of
Cicero,1 60 the government had to show that it would not have guaranteed a
Small Business Administration loan but for the actions of the defendants.
The reliance of the government on the false claim must be shown if damages
in addition to penalties are to be awarded.'6
In United States v. Farina,162 it was determined that submitting a bid
based on false information is not a violation of the FCA, although it may
have been fraud. 163 It does become a violation, however, if the bidder wins
the bid and tenders a bill or false claim to the government for the work.
The court in Outlet Communications, Inc. v. King World Productions,
Inc.'64 also addressed this problem.
The court may consider only the pleadings, that is the complaint
and answer, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. "[T]he fact allegations of the complaint are to be taken
as true, but those of the answer are taken as true only where and to
the extent that they have not been denied or do not conflict with
159. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 64 F.3d 251,255 (7th Cir. 1995).
160. 957 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1992).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Fla. 1987).
162. 153 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1957).
163. Id. at 821-22.
164. 685 F. Supp. 1570 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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those of the complaint." In order to prevail, a motion for judgment
on the pleadings "must be based on the undisputed facts appearing
in all the pleadings."
Furthermore, the court is obliged to scrutinize the complaint,
construed in plaintiff's favor, and to allow it to stand "if plaintiff
might recover under any state of facts which could be proved in
support of the claim."'
165
"[T]he Court is confined to a review of the pleadings, must accept the
pleaded facts as true, and must resolve any factual issues in a manner
favorable to the non moving party."'166 The Colonial Penn court went on to
state that "a claim is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.' 1 67
The court in Swerdloff v. Miami National Bank 68 stated:
The posture of the case requires us to consider whether plaintiffs
could prove any set of facts which would permit recovery under the
Act. We make no suggestion as to whether such facts can be
proven in this case. We merely hold that in our view of the law
sufficient facts might possibly be shown under the cause of action
here alleged to permit recovery and defendant was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law at the pleading stage of the proceed-
ing. 16
9
The court in Outlet Communications, Inc. v. King World Productions, Inc.
continued: "In essence, the court must examine the pleadings to determine
whether any set of facts would permit plaintiff to recover as a matter of
law."'
70
165. Id. at 1572 (citations omitted).
166. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1090 (S.D.
Fla. 1992). See also Quinones v. Durkes, 638 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
167. Colonial Penn, 814 F. Supp. at 1090.
168. 584 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1978).
169. It at60.
170. Outlet Communications, 685 F. Supp. at 1572; see also International Union of Dist.
50 v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Security Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1966).
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. The Court held in Conley v. Gibson171 that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. '172 The NCR court went on to say:
The 'reasonable delineation of the underlying acts and transactions'
test should only be applied in those cases where due to the nature
of the litigation, such as securities fraud, it is impossible for the
litigant to have access to the detailed knowledge necessary to oth-
erwise meet the requirement of Rule 9(b). In such case, the strict
requirement of Rule 9(b) is relaxed so that substantial justice can
be done.1
73
The court in Wilkins repeats the statement of the Sixth Circuit, in Michaels
Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.,174 that "the purpose undergirding the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is to provide a defendant fair notice of
the substance of a plaintiff's claim in order that the defendant may prepare a
responsive pleading." 175  The court in Wilkins evaluated the plaintiff's
position in determining that "[t]his is not a case in which a plaintiff com-
pletely unfamiliar with ODOD or OCS had brought a qui tam ac-
tion .... This gives greater weight to plaintiff's representation that records
and documents relevant to his claims will be found in the defendants'
possession."'176 The court in Wilkins also found that because the plaintiff did
not have equal access to the documents he sought, it was an appropriate case
to apply the exception to rule 9(b). 177 "The purpose of harmonizing Rule 8
'notice pleading' requiring only a 'short and plain statement' with the
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is to allow that all pleadings be
construed as to do 'substantial justice' as required under Rule 8(f.' 78
171. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See also Wilkins ex rel. United States. v. Ohio, 885 F. Supp.
1055, 1058 (S.D. Ohio 1995); NCR Credit Corp. v. Reptron Elecs., Inc., 155 F.R.D. 690, 692
(M.D. Fla. 1994).
172. Id. at 45-46.
173. NCR Credit Corp., 155 F.R.D. at 692.
174. 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988).
175. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1060.
176. Id. at 1061.
177. Id.
178. NCR Credit Corp., 155 F.R.D. at 692.
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If the defendant has been convicted in a criminal case on the same facts,
it is collaterally estopped from contesting issues in the qui tam case, how-
ever, the government still has to prove damages.
179
F. Discovery
The Court in Retail Clerks International Ass'n v. Schermerhorn'
80
found that "the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that
fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged."' 8' As the court in
Mikes v. Strauss' 82 states: "The court never expected the plaintiff to be able
to detail every aspect of defendants' alleged fraudulent scheme prior to
conducting any discovery."'183 In Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC
Corp., 8 4 the court expected the plaintiff to conduct discovery to identify the
evidence of the alleged fraud. The court in United States ex rel. LeBlanc v.
Raytheon Co.'"5 found that evidence publicly disclosed for the first time
during the discovery phase of a qui tam suit is not barred from use in that
same suit by section 3730(e)(4)(A). However, if it were barred, qui tam
plaintiffs would have little choice but to waive their right to discovery for
fear of disclosing information that would bar the claims for which they might
wish discovery in the first place.
As previously discussed, there are several cases relating to the law firm
of Stinson Lyons which discovered rampant cheating among insurance
companies while it was conducting discovery against Provident Fire and Life
Insurance Company. The law firm brought qui tam suits both against
Prudential Insurance Co. and against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, but
these courts had different holdings. In United States ex rel. Stinson v. Blue
Cross of Georgia, 18 6 the court dismissed the complaint stating:
To prevail in this suit, Stinson Lyons necessarily would have to en-
gage in massive discovery to begin to substantiate its allegations.
It is precisely this conduct that Rule 9(b) is designed to pre-
179. See, e.g., United States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
180. 373 U.S. 746 (1963), aff'd, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
181. Id. at 753 n.6. See also Wheeldin v. Wheeldin, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (regarding
inferring fact from allegations of complaint); United States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp.
720, 723 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
182. 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
183. Id. at 757.
184. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
185. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
186. 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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vent .... There is nothing in the complaint that suggests that all of
the facts needed to support this sanction do not need to be pro-
duced in discovery .... In short, Stinson Lyons still has alleged no
facts that support an inference that BC-GA defrauded anybody.
187
G. Conspiriy
While 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) provides for a false claims action based
on conspiracy, this has rarely been plead successfully. In part, this is based
on the fact that most defendants are corporations rather than individuals. A
corporation cannot conspire with itself, its agents, or employees.1
88
XI. RETALIATION
A claim under section 3730(h) requires proof that: 1) the plaintiff
engaged in lawful protected activity in furtherance of a FCA action; 2) the
plaintiff is an original source; and 3) the plaintiff suffered the harm de-
scribed in the statute because of these actions. 8 9
The "whistleblower" provision of the FCA prevents the harassment,
retaliation, or threatening of employees who assist in or bring qui tam
actions. In particular, the statute provides:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened,
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms
and conditions of employment by is or her employer because of
lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or oth-
ers in furtherance of an action under this section, including inves-
tigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action
filed or to be filed under this section, shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make the employee whole. 190
187. Id. at 1057.
188. See, e.g., Leisure Founders, Inc. v. CUC Int'l Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562, 1575 (S.D.
Fla. 1993); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (S.D.
Fla. 1992); Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aft'd, 865 F.2d
1272 (11th Cir. 1988).
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Several district courts have held that section 3730(h) protects internal
whistleblowers.191 "To sustain an action under section 3730(h), plaintiff
must prove that: 1) she engaged in conduct protected under the statute; 2)
defendants were aware of her conduct; and 3) she was terminated in retalia-
tion for her conduct.' 92  One element of protected conduct is
"investigation.' 93 As the court indicated in Robertson v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc.,19 4 the qui tam plaintiffs conduct must be conduct protected
under the statute, such as investigating alleged fraud in an effort to bring or
help the government to bring an action under the FCA. The Robertson court
relied in part on the legislative history of the act stating, "[t]he legislative
history makes clear that a 'whistleblower must show the employer had
knowledge the employee engaged in protected activity."
' ' 95
The court in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.196 explained that the actual filing
of a qui tam suit should not be a prerequisite to protection, and stated that
"we hold that the whistleblower protection provision of the False Claims Act
forbids discrimination against an employee who has made an intracorporate
complaint about fraud against the Government."' 97  Indeed, in Pogue v.
United States Department of Labor,198 the court held that the internal
whistleblower was protected even if no lawsuit was ever filed by the gov-
ernment or by another qui tam informant.'99 In Aiello, the court held that
"[t]he qui tam statute prohibits 'any ... manner [of] discrimination. ' '' 20
191. See, e.g., Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995); Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Ill.
1993), aff'd, 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp.
720, 723 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
192. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Robertson v.
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
193. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
194. 32F.3d at 951.
195. S. Rep. No. 345 at 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300. See
Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (restating Senate
Report No. 345).
196. 826 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
197. Id. at 273. See Aiello, 836 F. Supp. at 724 (discussing Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826
F. Supp. 266 (N.C. Ill. 1993)). See also Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio, 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
198. 940 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1991).
199. Id. at 1290.
200. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. at 726 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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The court in Aiello20° also found that the relator was protected even if
the relator was terminated by a later employer because of the influence of the
qui tam defendant on the terminating employer.
The right of a government employee to be a relator has been challenged
in a number of cases. In Wilkins,2°2 the defendant claimed that the plaintiff
was acting on behalf of the state because he was required by his job to
investigate irregularities in the use of federal funds.23 The Wilkins court
found that "[a]n employee can be acting on his own behalf in investigating
matters in furtherance of a qui tam action even though he or she would also
be conducting those same investigations on behalf of the employer." 204 The
court notes "that section 3730(h) applies to employees who engage in lawful
acts on behalf of the employee or others."205  In United States ex rel.
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.,2°6 the court found that a government employee
could bring an action under the FCA based upon information obtained while
acting as an employee. But Raytheon also held that a government employee
could not qualify as an original source.207 The Eleventh Circuit in United
States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp.2°8 rejected the holding of the First
Circuit in Raytheon stating that the court improperly relied on an "original
source" consideration where there had been no public disclosure.20 9 The
Raytheon court also made a number of public policy arguments against the
employee getting a share of the recovery when he was paid to work for the
government210 which were rejected by both the Williams 211 and Wilkins
courts.2 12
The Williams court dismissed the dubious logic of the concept that a
government employee held a dual status, so by telling himself the informa-
tion, he was, in fact, publicly disclosing it.213 That court also pointed out
that the statute in section 3730(e)(4)(A) enumerates the circumstances in
which information is considered to be publicly disclosed. The statute is very
201. Id. at 724-25.
202. 885 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
203. Id. at 1065.
204. Id. at 1066.
205. Il (emphasis added) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
206. 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
207. Id at 20.
208. 931 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).
209. Id. at 1500 n.13. See also id. at 1500-01.
210. Raytheon, 913 F.2d at 20.
211. Williams, 932 F.2d at 1500.
212. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1066.
213. Williams, 932 F.2d at 1499.
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specific about the methods of "public disclosure" and does not imply that
these are the only examples of public disclosure. Therefore, a government
employee telling the information to himself does not amount to public
disclosure. In addition, Congress has barred certain actions by specific
government employees and, by being so specific, has indicated that other
government employees can bring such actions if they are not specifically
excluded by the Act and if they meet the other criteria of the Act.214
In order that a relator qualify under a section 3730(h) claim, the
defendant must know that the plaintiff is engaging in protected activity.215 If
the employee is engaging in assigned job activities while investigating and
gathering information relating to the false claim, it may not be apparent to
the employer that such protected activity is taking place.216 It is not neces-
sary that the qui tam action be brought by the protected individual 217 nor is it
necessary that the plaintiff threaten to file such a suit.21 8 Often the plaintiff
has not heard of qui tam causes of action until he goes to an attorney after
being fired because he blew the whistle. It is necessary that the employee
make it known to the employer that he objects to the defrauding of the
government and that he requests the employer to either change its activities
or engage in one of the other activities which are protected under the statute.
"[The] employee must supply sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the employee was discharged because of activities which
gave the employer reason to believe that the employee was contemplating a
qui tam action against it.'' 219 "Internal whistle-blowing" is sufficient to
evoke the protection of the statute.22
XII. RIGHT TO AMEND COMPLAINT
The plaintiff has a right to amend his complaint at least once to elimi-
nate any deficiencies found by the court. With regard to the right to amend
the complaint, the Eleventh Circuit held, in Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue
214. Id. See also id. at 1503.
215. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
216. Wilkins, 885 F. Supp. at 1066.
217. See Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Clemes v. Del Norte
County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp 583, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1994); United States ex rel. Kent
v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. 720, 723-24 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
218. Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 753 (alteration in original).
219. Id.
220. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
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Shield of Florida, Inc., 221 that "Cooper is entitled to one chance to amend the
complaint and bring it into compliance with the rule. "2'2 The court in Griggs
v. Hinds Junior College"m held:
The Federal [R]ules of Civil Procedure provide that 'leave [to
amend the complaint] shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires.' Granting leave to amend is especially appropriate, in cases
such as this, when the trial court has dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim .... We think the refusal to grant leave was
not a valid exercise of the district court's discretion, rather it was
'merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of
the Federal Rules.'
2N
The court in Lockett v. General Finance Loan Co.2 held: "that it was
an abuse of discretion not to grant Lockett's motion to amend the com-
plaint .... ,,226 In Hildebrand v. Honeywell, Inc.227 the court stated that "if
the basis of the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was their
failure to prosecute, we find that the court's ruling was an abuse of discre-
tion."228 The Hildebrand court continued:
Moreover, Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when
justice so requires. Permission should be denied only if it appears
to a certainty that plaintiffs cannot state a claim showing they are
entitled to relief or defendant will be unduly prejudiced.229
XIII. THE FILED RATE DOCrRNE
There are a number of cases which are categorized by the nature of the
defendant. Utility companies, such as electric and telephone companies,
which are undoubtedly "deep pockets," are controlled by the laws of their
221. 19 F.3d 562 (llth Cir. 1994).
222. Id. at 568-69.
223. 563 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
224. Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
225. 623 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1980).
226. Id. at 1132.
227. 622 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1980).
228. Id. at 181.
229. IM. at 182. See also Griggs, 563 F.2d at 180.
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states, generally through a public service commission. The commission
regulates the rates which the utility can charge for its services, these rates
being known as the "filed rates." The "filed rate doctrine" essentially states
that the court does not have the power to change a rate for a utility charge
that has been set by the public service commission or equivalent body of a
state. Only the public service commission can make that change and the
change will be reflected in later rates.
In the en banc opinion of Taffet v. Southern Co. 230 the court stated that
"the filed rate doctrine recognizes that where a legislature has established a
scheme for utility rate-making, the rights of the rate-payer in regard to the
rate he pays are defined by that scheme. 23' In addition, the Tuffet court
pointed out that "federal courts have applied the filed rate doctrine in a
variety of contexts to bar recovery by those who claim injury by virtue of
having paid a filed rate., 232 In Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp.,23 3 the court
held that "[t]he filed rate doctrine bars suits against regulated utilities
grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by the utility are unreason-
able ' 234 and also held that the filed rate doctrine bars Federal RICO and
associated causes of action based upon an alleged scheme by NYNEX to
obtain inflated rates.235 Judge Brandeis's ruling in Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern 236 is quoted by the Wegoland CoUrt.2 37
[T]he legal rights between a regulated industry and its customers
with respect to rates are controlled by and limited to the rates filed
with and approved by the appropriate regulatory agency, and that
any attempt to reassess the reasonableness of rates would require
the judiciary to "reconstitut[e] the whole rate structure" of the in-
dustry.2
3s
The Wegoland court found that the filed rate doctrine is still applicable even
when there are allegations of fraud upon the regulatory agency itself.239
230. 967 F.2d 1483 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
231. Id. at 1490.
232. Id. at 1488.
233. 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994).
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id.
236. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
237. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 19.
238. Id. (quoting Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163).
239. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22.
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In Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Utilities Co.,240 the plaintiffs
claimed that the water and sewer utility perpetrated a complex accounting
fraud that misrepresented to the Association the actual operating costs and
resulted in a large sum of money being paid to the utility. 241 The Second
Circuit once more applied the filed rate doctrine as it had in Wegoland,242
holding that: "(1) legislatively appointed regulatory bodies have institu-
tional competence to address rate-making issues; (2) courts lack the compe-
tence to set utility rates; and (3) the interference of courts in the rate-making
process would subvert the authority of rate-setting bodies and undermine the
regulatory regime." 243
The basis for these decisions is identified by the court in Sun City24 and
is discussed again by the court in Wegoland:
If courts were licensed to enter this process under the guise of
ferreting out fraud in the rate-making process, they would unduly
subvert the regulating agencies' authority and thereby undermine
the stability of the system. For only by determining what would be
a reasonable rate absent the fraud could a court determine the ex-
tent of the damages. And it is this judicial determination of a rea-
sonable rate that the filed rate doctrine forbids. 2A5
While Wegoland involved RICO claims, the filed rate doctrine has been
applied in other actions.
246
The filed rate doctrine is essentially based on public policy. If the court
were to determine that a rate had been set based on false information and
then determine what the rate should have been in order to evaluate damages,
it would be second guessing the Association. Besides having the court
override the Association which set the rate, a factor which is clearly against
public policy pursuant to Wegoland and Sun City, it would also permit the
240. 45 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1995).
241. Id. at 61.
242. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.
243. Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62. See also H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d
485,490 (8th Cir. 1992).
244. Sun City, 45 F.3d at 62.
245. Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.
246. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417
(1986) (antitrust); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1981) (breach of
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party who brought the suit to get relief, while the parties who were equally
effected but were not involved in the suit do not get relief.
In United States ex rel. John Murray v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,247 the argument that under the FCA there are two possible penalties
assessed against the defendant, triple damages and a fine for each transgres-
sion. The penalty for each transgression remains even if the government has
suffered no damages and therefore there is no need to assess damages for the
assessment of the fine. On the basis of the filed rate doctrine, there can be
no damages as the rate charged is never "wrong" even if it is set because of
alleged fraudulent representations. In addition, in a false claims suit, only
the government and the relator can bring such a suit so there is no inequality
with relation to other rate payers. The court in Murray concluded that:
The FCA also provides for a penalty of between $5,000 and
$10,000 for each violation of the act. The penalty is mandatory.
The Court has been unable to find any legislative history or cases
regarding how a court should determine the exact amount of the
penalty to be imposed for each violation. The Court notes that
"[the] range in the amount of forfeitures apparently represents con-
gressional intent to allow discretion in assessing forfeitures." The
Court concludes that as long as any civil penalty imposed upon the
Defendant is not based upon any consideration of the actual dam-
ages suffered by the Government, then the filed rate doctrine does
not bar the Plaintiff's claim for civil penalties under §3729(a). 48
Although this was only a district court ruling, the argument may prevail
in other cases against publicly regulated defendants and permit qui tam
actions against publically regulated corporations.
XIV. DAMAGES
The FCA provides double or triple recovery for damages suffered by
the United States. The size of the recovery is not only determined by the
damage suffered by the government, but by the manner in which that damage
is measured and the actual number of claims submitted to the government by
the defendant or through an intermediary. There is no standard for measur-
ing damages stated in the statute itself, and often the manner selected by the
247. No. 94-6059 (S.D. Fla. filed January 19, 1994).
248. No. 94-6059, at 6 (S.D. Fla. July 30, 1996) (order denying in part and granting in
part defendant's motion to dismiss) (citations omitted).
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plaintiff depends on the nature of the false claim. The theory of damages is
a complex one, and an analysis of government damages according to
different theories is a prudent exercise for the qui tam litigator.
As a key case, we must look once more to United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess249 where the court established a simple "out of pocket" measure.
How much would the government have paid "but for" the fraudulent actions
of the defendants? The difference between that amount and what they did
pay is the measure of the government damages according to the Hess
Court.20 This method does not include the government's costs related to
investigation of the matter, including costs of delays for substandard prod-
ucts.
In United States v. Bornstein,251 the Court applied the "benefit of the
bargain" approach to calculating damages. "The Government's actual
damages are equal to the difference between the market value of the [item] it
received and retained and the market value that the [item] would have had if
they had been of specified quality. ' ' 2  The Bornstein Court cited United
States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co,253 as a basis for its choice of the benefit
of the bargain approach. Grunstein identified the measure of damages as
"the value of the property which the person defrauded would have received
but for the fraud, less, as a credit, the value of the property which he has in
fact received."5 4
While the Supreme Court in Bornstein used a benefit of the bargain
theory of damages, it did not overturn the "out of pocket" measure applied
by the Marcus Court, which appears to lead the practitioner to believe that
the Court will consider any reasonable method of calculating damages which
will fairly reimburse the government for its losses and expenses without
creating a windfall situation.
Under the FCA, controlling Supreme Court and lower court precedents
hold "that the Government need not show actual damages in order to prove a
violation of the False Claims Act."' 'z 5 In Marcus, electrical contractors
submitted fraudulent bills to the government for work on numerous projects.
249. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
250. Id. at 552.
251. 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
252. Id. at 316 n.13.
253. 137 F. Supp. 197, 205 (D.N.J. 1956).
254. 11 at 205.
255. United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see
also Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1946).
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In some instances, the government discovered that the fraud was committed
before payment was made, however, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
District Court held that failure to show actual damage in these instances
would not preclude recovery under the [FCA], ' z 6 and the Supreme Court
went on to affirm the district court.2 7 The Court in Rex Trailer reaffirmed
the holding in Marcus that "there is no requirement, statutory or judicial,
that specific damages be shown .... ,z The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
declared this rule in RohIeder when it stated that the FCA "permits recov-
ery.., thereunder without actual damage being proven." 59 These holdings
are all affirmed by the court in United States v. Kensington Hospital.
260
The question of consequential damages does not appear to be clear at
the present time since the present relevant cases involve the particular facts
of the cases in question.
Even if there are no damages, the FCA provides for penalties per
incident and the question arises as to the method for counting the number of
incidents. For example, in Bornstein, the question arose as to the actual
number of claims submitted and was confused by the fact that the subcon-
tractor had only submitted three false bills to the contractor whereas the
contractor had submitted thirty-five claims to the government. The Born-
stein Court held that the subcontractor would only be held to three claims
since the statute "penalizes a person for his own acts, not for the acts of
someone else. ' 26' Again the question as to the calculation of the number of
claims will have to be taken on a case-by-case basis.
The additional question of the amount of the penalty, whether $5,000 or
$10,000, or a number in between, has not been answered by the courts and
the statute does not provide guidelines. It will be up to each court to assess
the exact amount of consequential damages based on the individual facts of
each case.
256. Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 153 n.5.
257. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 552-53 (1943).
258. Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 152.
259. Rohleder, 157 F.2d at 129.
260. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. at 1128.
261. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 312.
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XV. TYPES OF RECENT CASES
While it appears that a number of different types of cases could be
brought against qui tam defendants, the cases that bring in the major recov-
ery for plaintiffs fall into certain specific categories:
A) Medicare Fraud 262
B) Defense Contractor Fraud263
C) Environmental Law Compliance2 4
D) Bid rigging with actual false claim265
E) Agricultural Supplements266
F) Overcharging and/or product substitution and/or falsifying
services performed267
It appears that in every instance where the United States pays a bill, is
paid, or where it gives money to a state from which other claims are paid,
that there is the potential for a qui tam suit.
XVI. CONCLUSION
The dramatic increase in the number of qui tam cases in the past few
years, the size of the awards, and the intricacies of the legal questions
regarding qui tam indicate that qui tam is an area of the law that must be
watched closely.
262. See e.g., Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
263. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
264. Pickens v. Kanawha River Towing, 916 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
265. United States ex reL Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (1lth Cir. 1991).
266. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F.
Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (mem.). A reverse false claim was submitted to the government
by commodity handlers who had exceeded their quotas for growing specific fruits and who
were therefore subject to a fine under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and who
submitted false information so that they would not have the fine imposed upon them.
267. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416 (9th Cir. 1991); United States ex reL Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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I. OVERVIEW
This note discusses one significant change made by a series of new
legislation regarding immigration, namely, the new authority vested in the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to remove undocumented
aliens found in the interior of the country without judicial review. Part II
reviews the current conditions of illegal immigration in the United States.
Part M distinguishes the two categories of undocumented aliens based on the
immigrant's entry status. Part IV examines the new legislation as it applies
to illegal immigrants who seek entry into the United States. Part V discusses
procedural due process concerns raised by the change made by the new law.
Part VI concludes with a summary of the significance of the new law in
addressing the problem of illegal immigration in the United States.
II. INTRODUCTION
Between four and five million illegal aliens currently populate the
United States. Approximately eighty percent of them live in only seven
states: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and
140
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Texas.' An estimated 400,000 additional illegal aliens enter the United
States each year.2 One major area of concern raised by this growing number
of undocumented aliens is employment. 3 Nearly thirty percent of all jobs in
the United States require low-skilled work, which illegal aliens typically
seek.4 Professor Donald Huddle of Rice University claims that for every
twenty undocumented aliens working in this country, thirteen Americans are
out of jobs. 5 The economic cost, according to Huddle, may run as high as
thirty billion dollars a year in unemployment payments, services, and lost
taxes.
6
In the early 1970s, the Federal Government's attention to immigration
heightened. At that time, Haitians began a steady migration to the United
States. By 1981, the number of undocumented Haitians living in the South
Florida area was estimated at thirty-five thousand.7 The number of Haitian
immigrants, however, pale somewhat in the face of the Cuban migration of
1980. The Mariel boatlift or "Freedom Flotilla" brought approximately
125,000 Cubans to the United States within a matter of weeks. 8 Today, the
number of illegal aliens estimated in this country continues to grow. 9
Contributing substantially to the illegal population is the influx of approxi-
mately 250,000 undocumented Mexican aliens that cross the border into
Texas every year.'0 The increasing number of illegal aliens and their
calculated burden imposed on the seven states with heavier concentrations of
illegal aliens have caused some politicians to seek action."
On March 14, 1995, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles appeared before
the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration to request reimbursement for the
1. John Boehner, Immigration in the National Interest Act, FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING
HOUSE, Mar. 18, 1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL 8784701.
2. Id. at *5.
3. David Goddy, Illegal Immigrants: What They Cost, What They Contribute, SCHO-




7. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1071
(1984), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1984).
8. Id at 1464.
9. Dick Kirschten, After The Flood, Boom Times?, 26 THE NAT'L J. 91, Jan. 8, 1994, at
12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
10. Gretchen Parker, Study Cites Inaccuracies in Illegal Immigrant Data, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995, at 6.
11. Ellen Debenport, Chiles Now Has Captive Audience on Immigration Series, ST. PETE.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at4B.
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one billion dollars a year the State spends for education, medical care, and a
justice system for illegal immigrants.'2 Requests like these, as well as the
growing concern over terrorism in this country,' 3 prompted Congress to
make changes in the immigration laws.'4 On April 24, 1996, Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA").15 One week later, the Senate voted to amend certain provisions
in the AEDPA including the replacement of expedited procedures for
removing undocumented aliens seeking entry into this country (as well as
illegal aliens found in the interior of the United States) with a less stringent
process. 16 Following months of debate concerning the amendments pro-
posed by the Senate, on the issue of expedited removal procedures, the
legislature struck a compromise which closely resembled the original version
of the AEDPA.17 On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
18 With regard to the issue under discussion in this note, the
IRIRA makes only slight conceptual changes to the law under the AEDPA
while leaving its substantive effect intact.
III. BACKGROUND
The legal rights of aliens vary according to their status under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").' 9 Two categories of
aliens were developed based on the alien's entry status: deportable aliens
and excludable aliens. 20 If the alien had effected an "entry" into the United
12. Id.
13. Recent acts of terrorism commonly cited in legislative discussion include the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma
City, and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103.
14. Thomas Martin, The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 201,205 (1996).
15. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
16. Senate Votes to Amend Terrorism Bill, Criminal Aliens Feel Impact, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 650 (1996).
17. Clinton Vows Veto of Immigration Bill if Gallegly Amendment is Included, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1111, 1112 (1996).
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
19. Jean, 711 F.2d at 1466.
20. Debora A. Gorman, Indefinite Detention: The Supreme Court's Inaction Prolongs the
Wait of Detained Aliens, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 49 (1994).
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States, whether lawfully or otherwise, and upon the INS' finding of statutory
reasons for the alien's removal from this country, the alien was "deportable"
and required a more extensive procedural course for removal. On the other
hand, aliens who had not yet "entered" this country and met the statutory
requirements for removal22 were "excludable" and were afforded less
procedural due process rights in an adjudication of their claim of entry. 2
The INA defined "entry" as "any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether
voluntary or otherwise .. .,,24 An alien who had entered this country and
was subject to deportation was protected by the constitutional right to
procedural due process.2 As part of this procedural due process, the
deportable alien had the right to advance notice of the charges against him.26
The alien was given a hearing before an immigration judge where the burden
of proof was placed on the government. 27 He had the privilege of being
represented by counsel (at no expense to the Government) and was given
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present
evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government.2 Final deportation orders entered against an alien were
reviewable directly in federal courts of appeal.29 Other determinations made
in the course of deportation proceedings were also reviewable on appeal, as
well as determinations that were made incident to motions to reopen such
proceedings.30
An alien who was seeking entry into the United States and was subject
to exclusion was limited in procedural rights as compared to an alien subject
to deportation. Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, an alien seeking entry
who was found to be excludable by an immigration officer at the port of
arrival (e.g., the alien was attempting to enter without legal documentation)
would be detained for further inquiry to be made by an immigration judge.3'
In such proceedings before the immigration judge, the excludable alien had
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994).
23. Jean, 711 F.2d at 1467.
24. 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1994).
25. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).
26. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1135 (1986).
27. Id. § 1149.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994).
29. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1247 (1986).
30. Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1994).
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the privilege of being represented by counsel at no expense to the Govern-
ment.32 During an exclusion hearing, a record of the proceedings was kept.33
An alien who was excluded from the United States by a decision from the
immigration judge, while not entitled to judicial review, was entitled to
administrative review.34 Both excludable and deportable aliens had the right
to habeas corpus review with certain individual limitations on the scope of
the review.35
Under this system of illegal alien removal, aliens entering the country
unlawfully were afforded greater constitutional rights in their removal than
aliens who presented themselves to the proper immigration authorities for
entry and had their admission request denied or delayed for something as
minor as improper documentation. Unfortunately, this scheme rewarded
the aliens who surreptitiously gain entry through unlawful means and served
to punish those aliens who sought entry in this country through the proper
channels. 37 With respect to this anomalous dispensation of due process
among deportable and excludable aliens, the AEDPA and the LIIRA make a
significant change.
IV. THE NEW LEGISLATION
The URIRA substantially changes the way excludable aliens may be
removed from this country by amending the INA to read:
(b)(1)(A)(i) In general.-If an immigration officer determines
that an alien... [other than a Cuban] who is arriving in the United
States or is described in clause (iii)38 is inadmissible under section
1182(a)(6)(C)39 or 1182(a)(7),40 the officer shall order the alien
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994).
34. Id. § 1226(b).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(d)(1)(A)-(D) (1994). Compare 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(e)(2)(A)-
(C) (West Supp. 1996).
36. Gorman, supra note 20, at 49.
37. Id.
38. Clause (iii) refers to undocumented aliens found in the United States who have not
been physically present in the country continuously for the prior two years. 8 U.S.C.A. §
1225 (West Supp. 1997).
39. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (West Supp. 1997). The text of the statute provides: "Ci)
Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has
sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or entry into the United States
or other benefit provided under this chapter is excludable." Ma
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removed from the United States without further hearing or review
unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum
under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution.4'
This section of the statute apparently gives the INS the authority to
remove an excludable alien from the country solely upon its own determina-
tion without the necessity of a hearing before an immigration judge. The
IRIRA further expands on this provision of limited judicial review by
providing that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review ... any individual
determination or to entertain any other cause or claim," arising from the
expedited removal process. 42 No court will have jurisdiction to enter
declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief, or to certify a class.43
Judicial review is limited only to habeas corpus proceedings. 44  Even so,
such proceedings are limited to determinations of: 1) whether the petitioner
is an alien; 2) whether the petitioner was ordered removed pursuant to the
summary removal procedures; and 3) whether the petitioner is a lawful
permanent resident, has been admitted as a refugee under section 207 of the
INA, or has been granted asylum under section 208.45 If the court deter-
mines that the alien was not subject to expedited removal, the court may not
grant any relief beyond requiring that the alien be given a hearing.46 Fur-
thermore, in an action against an alien for improper entry or re-entry under
section 275 of the INA (entry at improper place and concealment of facts) or
40. Id. § 182(a)(7)(A)(i). The text of § 1182 provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any immigrant at the
time of application for admission-
(I) who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry
permit, border crossing identification card, or... other valid unexpired passport,
or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such
document is required under regulations issued by the Attorney General under
section 1181(a) of this title, or
(II) whose visa has been issued without compliance with the provisions of
section 1153 of this title, is excludable.
Id.
41. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (alteration in original).
42. IaM § 1252(a)(2)(A).
43. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e)(2).
44. The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited Removal-What the INS Should
Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1572 (1996) [hereinafter Asylum and Expedited
Removal].
45. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Section-by-
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section 276 of the INA (reentry of deported aliens), no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear claims collaterally attacking the validity of orders of
exclusion.47 The IIRIRA also precludes administrative review of an exclu-
sion order, except in cases of aliens who claim that they are permanent
residents.48 The Attorney General shall provide a prompt review of a claim
made by an alien who maintains, under oath or under penalty of perjury, that
they have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
49
This new authority to summarily exclude an undocumented alien was
broadened even further by the following provision in the AEDPA found in 8
U.S.C. § 1251:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, an
alien fouid in the United States who has not been admitted to the
United States after inspection in accordance with section 122550 is
deemed for purposes of this chapter to be seeking entry and admis-
sion to the United States and shall be subject to examination and
exclusion by the Attorney General under part IV of this subchap-
ter.51 In the case of such an alien the Attorney General shall pro-
vide by regulation an opportunity for the alien to establish that the
alien was so admitted.52
Prior to the enactment of this law, the rather broad statutory definition
of "entry" was left to the courts to interpret when applying the term to
excludable aliens. In the case of In re Phelisna, 53 a boat carrying approxi-
mately 200 undocumented Haitian immigrants landed on a beach near
Miami. 54 While walking across a nearby causeway, Phelisna was appre-
hended by officials.5 Phelisna claimed that she had made an entry into the
United States and therefore qualified for the more comprehensive deporta-
tion proceeding rather than exclusion proceedings. 56 The court noted that
47. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1997).
48. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(C).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1225. This section references § 235 of the AEDPA entitled "Inspection by
Immigration Officers."
51. Chapter Four of the AEDPA was entitled: "Terrorist and Criminal Alien Removal
and Exclusion."
52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (West Supp. 1996).
53. 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
54. Id. at 961.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 962.
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"the statute cannot be read to mean that mere presence in the United States is
enough to show an entry."
57
In the case of In re Pierre, 8 a small boat of Haitian immigrants became
distressed at sea and was towed into West Palm Beach.59 Once in port, the
INS determined that the group did not appear to be entitled to entry and,
under the old statute, their case was referred to an immigration judge.60
While waiting for their case to be heard, the immigrants were paroled from
detention into the custody of a group of ministers. 61 After a claim for
political asylum was denied, the petitioners claimed that their removal
should be heard in deportation proceedings since they had made an entry
into this country. 62 The court in Pierre set out its conclusions of the ele-
ments of entry: "An 'entry' involves (1) a crossing into the territorial limits
of the United States, i.e., physical presence; plus (2) inspection and admis-
sion by an immigration officer; or (3) actual and intentional evasion of
inspection at the nearest inspection point; coupled with (4) freedom from
restraint.
' 63
The AEDPA appeared to clarify the previous statutory ambiguity
concerning entry in section 1251(d) and essentially eliminated the third and
fourth elements of the court's analysis. Undocumented aliens found in the
interior of the country, under the AEDPA, were considered to be seeking
entry and therefore met the requirements for the more expeditious exclusion
proceedings, regardless of their previous ability to elude immigration
officials.
In section 301(a) of the IIRIRA, the new law supersedes the AEDPA by
replacing the definition of "entry" with the concept of "admission." 64 The
terms "admission" and "admitted" now refer to "the lawful entry of the alien
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer."65 In addition, the law replaces the term "excludable" throughout
the INA with the term "inadmissible." 66  The IIRIRA only delineates
57. Id. See also Brancato v. Lehmann, 239 F.2d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 1956).
58. 14 1. & N. Dec. 467 (1973).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 468.
61. Id
62. Id
63. In re Pierre, 14 1. & N. Dec. at 468 (citations omitted).
64. The 1996 Immigration Act: Grounds of Inadmissibility and Deportability and Avail-
able Waivers, 73 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 1641, 1642 (1996).
65. Id (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (West Supp. 1997) (as amended)).
66. Id. at 1641.
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between "inadmissible" aliens who are subject to the statutory "screening"
process, which is in essence an expedited removal procedure similar to the
exclusion process of the AEDPA, and aliens who are subject to removal
proceedings, which is similar to the deportation procedure under the
AEDPA. Under the IIRIRA, an alien who is encountered by the INS after
they have entered the United States, and who in removal proceedings cannot
show by clear and convincing evidence that they were lawfully admitted,
will have the burden of showing that they are admissible.67 The change in
terminology made by the IIRIRA may appear to be a matter of semantics, but
this change may have avoided what some might have considered a legal
fiction in the AEDPA with respect to "entering" this country. Nevertheless,
the IRIRA leaves intact the underlying effect of the change in "entry" status
originally made by the AEDPA. The enlarged authority given to the INS to
summarily remove aliens found in the United States who have not been
admitted without judicial review raises concerns for those aliens who are in
this country illegally and are seeking political asylum.
A person may apply for asylum by two methods-affirmatively or
defensively.68 If the person seeks asylum affirmatively, then the person files
67. Id. The text of the IIRIRA concerning "admission" provides:
(13)(A) The terms "admission" and "admitted" mean, with respect to an
alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.
(3) An alien who is paroled under section 1182(d)(5) of this title or permit-
ted to land temporarily as an alien crewman shall not be considered to have been
admitted.
(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes
of the immigration laws unless the alien -
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in ex-
cess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under the legal process
seeking removal of the alien from the United States, including removal
proceedings under this chapter and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section
1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title, or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers or has not been admitted to the United States after in-
spection and authorization by an immigration officer.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13).
68. Maureen 0. Hurley, The Asylum Process: Past, Present, and Future, 26 NEw ENG. L.
Rav. 995, 1013 (1992).
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his or her claim before the government is aware that the applicant is in this
country illegally.69 A defensive claim of asylum is filed as a defense to
deportation or exclusion charges.70 The burden of proof in an asylum case
requires the alien to produce evidence of past persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution. 71 The persecution the asylum seeker suffers from must
be on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership
in a particular social group and not merely economic oppression.72 Because
expedited removal places almost complete decision making authority in the
hands of the INS asylum officers, one commentator points out that the
applicant will not have the opportunity to present his or her case de novo in
front of an immigration judge, nor will the applicant have the ability to
appeal an unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.73
In 8 U.S.C. § 1225, the Act addresses how the new provisions of the
IIRIRA approach the issue of asylum seekers in removal proceedings. When
an immigration officer encounters an alien who has not been admitted into
the United States or is suspected of carrying documents that were procured
by fraud, the officer will conduct a pre-screening interview to determine
whether the alien intends to apply for asylum or fears persecution. 74 If the
officer concludes that the alien does not have an intent to apply for asylum
or fear of persecution, the immigration officer can order the alien summarily
removed from the United States. 75 "This officer's removal determination is
not subject to any further administrative review, hearing or judicial over-
sight. '
76
If the immigration officer determines that the alien is inadmissible
(notice that under the AEDPA they would have been termed "excludable")
and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of
persecution, the officer must refer the alien for an interview by an asylum
69. Id. at 1013.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1016.
72. Id. at 1017.
73. Stacy R. Hart, Don't Call U.S., We'll Call You: A Look at Summary Exclusion as a
Means of Asylum Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1741, 1756 (1994).
74. Asylum and Expedited Removal, supra note 44, at 1571.
75. Id.
76. Id. The pre-screening process does not apply to Cuban immigrants arriving by plane
by operation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225, which states: "[s]ubparagraph (A) shall not apply to an
alien who is a native or citizen of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose govern-
ment the United States does not have full diplomatic relations and who arrives by aircraft at a
port of entry." Id. § 1225(b)(1)(F).
[Vol. 21:915
149
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Jones
officer.77 The asylum officer will determine whether the alien has a
"credible fear" of persecution. 78 A summary of the remaining process in
asylum determinations under the IIRIRA is as follows:
If applicants do not demonstrate "credible fear" they will be re-
moved without further review unless they request review by an
immigration judge (IJ). The IU review must be within seven days
of the asylum officer's decision, during which time the applicant is
to be detained. If credible fear is demonstrated, the applicant will
be detained pending "non-expedited" consideration of the applica-
tion. Aliens may consult with anyone prior to their asylum inter-
view or review, but at no expense to the government. The consul-
tation must not "unreasonably delay the process."79
Note that the review by the immigration judge is limited to inspection of the
immigration officer's determination of "credible fear."80  To assist in
expediting this review within the seven day requirement, immigration judges
may conduct the inspection via a telephonic or video connection rather than
in person.
8 1
V. DuE PROCESS CONCERNS
A. Supreme Court Cases from 1889 to 1902
The underlying issue among all of this legislation is whether the
expedited procedures for removing undocumented aliens without judicial
review infringes on the immigrant's right to procedural due process. Of the
earliest cases concerning the government's authority to exclude aliens is The
Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889.82 In that case, the Supreme Court held that
the power of exclusion of foreigners was an incident of sovereignty
"belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sover-
77. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
78. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). "Credible fear" of persecution means that there is a signifi-
cant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in
support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien
could establish eligibility for asylum under § 1158 of this title. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
79. Illegal Immigration, supra note 45, at 1335.
80. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
81. Asylum and Expedited Removal, supra note 44, at 1571.
82. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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eign powers delegated by the Constitution . .,,83 In 1892, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to address the due process rights of an excludable
alien in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.
84
In Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese immigrant was stopped at the port of San
Francisco and was refused entry after inspection by immigration officials.85
The immigrant claimed that her husband was living in the United States but
that she did not know his address. 86 She had twenty-two dollars and told
officials that she was supposed to stop at a hotel and wait for her husband to
call for her.87 The Inspector of Immigration at the port of San Francisco
determined that the immigrant was "without means of support, without
relatives or friends in the United States... and a person unable to care for
herself ... , 88 The inspector concluded that the immigrant was liable to
become a public charge and therefore inhibited her from landing.89 The
circuit court ruled that an immigration law vesting in immigration officials
the exclusive authority to determine a person's right to land did not deprive
that person liberty without due process of law. 90 Considering this case on
appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that the power to exclude or admit
foreigners into the United States was a power "vested in the national
government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations, in peace as well as in war."9 The Supreme Court
83. Id. at 609; see also Richard F. Hahn, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude
Aliens, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 957 (1982).
84. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
85. Id. at 652.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id. at 656.
89. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 656.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 659. The Supreme Court elaborated on how the Constitution vests in the na-
tional government the authority to admit or exclude aliens:
It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised
either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes en-
acted by Congress, upon who the Constitution has conferred power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the importation
of goods and the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States; to estab-
lish a uniform rule of naturalization; to declare war, and to provide and maintain
armies and navies; and to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for
carrying into effect these powers and all other powers vested by the constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Id. (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604, 609
(1889); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)).
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determined, as to those immigrants seeking entry into the United States, "the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by [C]ongress, are due process of law." 92
Similar conclusions were made by the Supreme Court in Li Sing v.
United States.93 In Li Sing, a Chinese immigrant was denied reentry into this
country based on afederal statute prohibiting the entry or reentry of Chinese
laborers. 94 In order for the immigrant to establish that he was previously a
merchant in the United States, as opposed to a laborer, and therefore quali-
fied for reentry, the statute required the testimony of two credible witnesses
who were not Chinese.95 Li Sihg challenged the statute claiming that it
violated the constitutional guarantees of "equal rights and equal law to all.",96
The Supreme Court answered, this claim by recognizing that deportation is
not equivalent to punishment for a crime.97 The Court reasoned that the
deportation of immigrants is a method of enforcing the return of aliens to
their own country who have not complied with the conditions, upon the
performance of which, the government has determined that the aliens'
continuing residence here shall depend.98 Accordingly, the Court declared
that there was no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.99
Concluding the early line of Supreme Court cases concerning the due
process rights of excludable aliens was Lee Lung v. Patterson.1' ° In Lee
Lung, a Chinese immigrant who had spent twenty years in Portland, Oregon
as a merchant went back to China and returned to the United States with his
wife and daughter. 10 The collector of customs at Portland agreed to admit
the merchant, but denied entry for his wife and daughter due to a technical
discrepancy in their certificates identifying them and their relation with the
92. Id at 660 (citing Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884)).
93. 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
94. I
95. Id. at492.
96. I1 at 494.
97. Id. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
98. Li Sing, 180 U.S. at 495.
99. Id. The Supreme Court recognized a delineation between forbidding aliens from
entering the country or expelling them from the country and subjecting them to hard labor or
confiscating their property. Id. The Supreme Court noted that if the latter circumstances were
the case, then the aliens would have a right to a judicial trial to establish guilt or innocence.
100. 186 U.S. 168 (1902).
101. Id at 169.
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merchant. 10 2 Upon further inquiry, it was discovered that the wife who
returned to the United States with the merchant was his second wife (in a
polygamous relationship) and the daughter was that of the merchant and his
first wife. 10 3 Based on the evidence, the immigration officials stood on their
denial of entry as to the wife and daughter. 104 The merchant claimed that the
applicable statute made the certificates evidence and the collector exceeded
his jurisdiction by not giving the certificates valid consideration."' The
Court cited Nishimura Ekiu'16 and noted that it was determined in that case
that "Congress might entrust to an executive officer the final determination
of the facts upon which an alien's right to land in the United States was
made to depend .. ,,'07 The Supreme Court held that if Congress did so,
then the executive officer's order was "due process of law, and no other
tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at liberty to re-
examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its sufficiency.' 0 8
Therefore, the Court reiterated that because jurisdiction is given to the
collector over the right of an alien to land, then jurisdiction is necessarily
given to the collector to pass on the evidence presented to establish that
right.1°9
B. Supreme Court Cases from 1950 to Present
Shortly after World War II and almost fifty years since Lee Lung, the
Supreme Court made the determination that admission into the United States
was a privilege and not a claim of right in Knauff v. Shaughnessy."0 In
Knauff, a United States Army veteran of World War II returned from
Germany in 1948 with a German born wife.' Immigration officials entered
a final order of exclusion against the German woman without a hearing
102. Id.
103. Id. at 173. The Supreme Court pointed out that even though plural marriages may
be recognized in China, the laws of the United States do not consider them valid and therefore
Lee Lung's second wife is not his valid wife under the laws of this country. Id.
104. Lee Lung, 186 U.S. at 173.
105. Id. at 168.
106. 142 U.S. at 651.
107. Lee Lung, 186 U.S. at 175.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 176. See also Lee Gon Young v. United States, 185 U.S. 306 (1902); Fok
Young Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S.
538 (1895).
110. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
111. Id. at 539.
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based on security reasons.' 12 The Supreme Court began its analysis of this
case by ruling that an alien seeking entry into this country does so under no
claim of right.113 The Court held that "[a]dmission of aliens to the United
States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government."
' 1 4
The Court explained that because the exclusion of aliens is a fundamental
act of sovereignty, the right is inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation and does not stem from legislative power
alone." 5 Therefore, according to the Court, the decision to admit or exclude
an alien is lawfully placed with the President, "who may in turn delegate the
carrying out of this function to a responsible executive officer of the sover-
eign, such as the Attorney General."'" 6 The Court stated that "[t]he action of
the executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive., ' 17 As to
those persons seeking entry into the United States, the Court concluded that
whatever the rule may be concerning the removal of such persons, "it is not
within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to
review the determination of the political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien."
'118
Further support for the Court's view in Knauff that rules pertaining to
persons seeking entry into this country fall outside the supervision of any
court comes from Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding."9 Kwong Hai Chew was a
Chinese seaman who was admitted to the United States in 1945.120 Thereaf-
ter Chew married a native American and the two bought a home in New
York. 21 Chew was also a World War II veteran having served in the United
States Merchant Marines.'22 After proving his good moral character for the
112. Id. Pursuant to the War Brides Act of June 21, 1941, the President, on November
14, 1941, issued a proclamation which stated that the interest of the United States required the
imposition of additional restrictions upon the entry into and departure of persons from the
United States and he also authorized the promulgation of regulations jointly by the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General. Id. at 540-41.
113. Id. at 542.
114. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
115. Id.; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
116. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543.
117. Id.
118. Id. See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at
698; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 651. Cf Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
119. 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
120. Id. at 592.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 593.
19971
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preceding five years, in 1949, Chew was admitted to permanent residence in
the United States. 123 With his petition for naturalization pending and after
being screened by the Coast Guard, in 1950, Chew accepted employment as
a seaman on a merchant vessel.' 24 The voyage on the merchant vessel which
Chew had embarked included ports in the Far East. 25 Upon the vessel's
return to port in the United States, Chew was "excluded" by immigration
officials and not permitted to land.126 The Supreme Court declined to follow
Knauff in this case and stated that the decision in Knauff "relates to the rights
of an alien entrant and does not deal with the question of a resident alien's
right to be heard." 127 The Supreme Court in Chew, however, noted that
"[Congress'] authorization of the denial of hearings raises no constitutional
conflict if limited to 'excludable' aliens who are not within the protection of
the Fifth Amendment."' 12
One month after Chew, the Supreme Court heard an unusual story of a
man without a country in the case of Shaugnessy v. United States. 129 Ignatz
Mezei, an immigrant from Hungary, had lived in this country as a resident
alien from 1923 to 1948.130 In 1948, Mezei went to Hungary to visit his
dying mother, was denied entry by the Hungarian government, and detained
for nineteen months due to some difficulty in securing an exit permit.
131
Upon his eventual return to the United States, Mezei's entry was reviewed
by immigration officials and permanent exclusion was ordered without a
hearing based on concerns for national security. 32 Mezei was returned to
countries he had come from on his trip to Europe; however, France and
Great Britain refused to give him permission to land. 133 Also, the State
Department negotiated with Hungary for Mezei's readmission with no
success. 134 Mezei applied for entry to approximately twelve Latin American
123. Id. at 593-94.
124. Chew, 344 U.S. at 593-94.
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id. at 594-95.
127. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 600.
129. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
130. Id. at 208.
131. Id. Mezei eventually obtained a quota immigration visa issued by the American
Consul in Budapest and proceeded to France where he boarded the lie de France in Le Havre
bound for New York. Id.
132. Id.
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countries, all of which denied his request.135 After twenty-one months of
detention on Ellis Island and a series of habeas corpus proceedings, the
district judge ordered Mezei's conditional parole on bond when the govern-
ment declined to divulge evidence proving Mezei's danger to the public
safety.
136
The Supreme Court observed that Mezei, regardless of his prior
presence in this country, was seeking entry and fell under the existing
immigration laws governing the admissions or exclusions of such aliens.
137
The Court stated that an exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the
national security, statutorily, does not provide for the detained alien to be
released on bond. 138 Furthermore, the Court noted that the federal statutes
provide that exclusion based on confidential information, the disclosure of
which may be prejudicial to the public interest, may be conducted without a
hearing. 39 The Court reasoned that because the power to exclude aliens
rests with the executive branch to enforce and the legislative branch to enact
laws to regulate such enforcement, largely immune from judicial control,
then the Attorney General cannot be compelled to disclose the evidence
underlying his determinations in an exclusion case and the procedures
elected for carrying out this "fundamental sovereign attribute" is due process
of law. 140 Though this case dealt primarily with the issue of detaining
excluded aliens, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier findings that due
process among aliens who have not been admitted into this country are
limited to the protections afforded by Congress.
The most recent Supreme Court case involving the procedural due
process rights of excludable aliens was the 1985 case of Jean v. Nelson.
141
"For almost thirty years before 1981, the INS had followed a policy of
general parole for undocumented aliens arriving on our shores seeking
135. Id. Mezei then notified the INS that he would exert no further efforts to depart from
the United States. Id.
136. Id. The district judge did not question the validity of the exclusion order but consid-
ered further detention excessive and justifiable only by affirmative proof of Mezei's danger to
the public safety. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
137. Id. at 213. See also Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
138. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
139. I. at210-11.
140. Id. at 210 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Knauff, 338 U.S.
at 537; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
141. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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admission to this country."' 42 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the influx of
undocumented aliens arriving in South Florida raised concern regarding the
unusually large number of immigrants and the current system of detention.
43
In response to such concerns, the Attorney General in the first half of 1981
ordered the INS to detain without parole any immigrants who could not
present a prima facia case for admission. 44 The aliens were to remain in
detention pending a decision on their admission or exclusion. 145 This new
policy of detention rather than parole was not based on a new statute or
regulation. 46 A group of Haitian immigrants who were incarcerated and
denied parole under the new policy filed a class action suit seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. 47 The group alleged that the INS' sudden change
in policy was unlawfully effected by not complying with the notice-and-
comment rule-making procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 148 The group also alleged that the restrictive parole policy, as
executed by INS officers in the field, violated the equal protection guarantee
of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated against petitioners on the
basis of race and national origin. 49 The district court held that because the
new policy of detention and restrictive parole was not promulgated in
accordance with the APA rule-making procedures, the INS' policy under
which petitioners were incarcerated was "null and void," and the prior policy
142. Id. at 849.
143. Id. Due to the sudden and massive immigration, President Carter appointed a Select
Committee on Immigration to examine the country's immigration problems and that commit-
tee issued a report in February, 1981 finding that an "immigration crisis" existed in the United
States. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11 th Cir. 1983). The "crisis" passed unresolved
to the new Administration and in March 1981, President Reagan appointed a special task force
to consider solutions. Id. at 1464. The task force included the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Transportation, Labor, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget. Id. One of the solutions recommended by the task force was
detaining aliens without parole pending a determination of their right to enter the United
States. Id.
144. Jean, 472 U.S. at 849.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 851. The district court certified the class as "all Haitian aliens who have ar-
rived in the Southern District of Florida on or after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry
into the United States and who are presently in detention pending exclusion proceed-
ings ... for whom an order of exclusion has not been entered .... Id. at 849-50 (quoting
Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982)).
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of general parole was restored to "full force and effect."' 0 The district court
also concluded that the "petitioners had failed to prove discrimination on the
basis of race or national origin in the denial of parole."'151 Appeals from both
sides were made, yet in the meantime, pursuant to the district court's
holding, the INS promulgated a new parole policy that was in compliance
with the APA and that required evenhanded treatment and prohibited the
consideration of race and national origin in the parole decision. 5 2 Since the
INS was no longer detaining any class members under the stricken incar-
ceration and parole policy other than those who have violated the terms of
their parole or have arrived subsequent to the district court's judgment, the
court of appeals, sitting en banc, held that the APA claim was moot and
ruled that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the consideration of unad-
mitted aliens for parole.15 3 The court of appeals remanded the case to the
district court for consideration of whether lower-level INS officials have
abused their discretion by discriminating on the basis of national origin with
regard to the remaining Haitian detainees. 54
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals properly remanded
the case to the district court.' With great anticipation that the Supreme
Court would rule on the constitutional issue involving the due process rights
of the excludable aliens, the Court noted that "[i]f there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it
is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such
150. Id. at 850 (citing Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 1006).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 850-51. The Supreme Court noted that this finding was based on the agree-
ment between the petitioners and respondents that the new rule promulgated by the INS was
neutral on its face and required evenhanded treatment of immigrants concerning parole
decisions. Jean, 472 U.S. at 850-51.
153. Id. at 852. The Supreme Court stated:
The question that the district court must therefore consider with regard to the re-
maining Haitian detainees is thus not whether high-level executive branch offi-
cials such as the Attorney General have the discretionary authority under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to discriminate between classes of aliens,
but whether lower-level INS officials have abused their discretion by discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin in violation of facially neutral instructions
from their superiors.
Id. at 852-53 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 963 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 469
U.S. 1071 (1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 857.
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adjudication is unavoidable."1 56 The Supreme Court held that because the
new INS policy and statutes provide petitioners with nondiscriminatory
parole consideration, which is all they seek to obtain by virtue of their
constitutional argument, therefore there was no need to address the constitu-
tional issue.157 One commentator criticized the Supreme Court's refusal to
address the constitutional issue by stating, the "Court has failed to vindicate
the due process rights of a group of persons who lack representation in the
political branches of government and who have no other avenue for re-
course." 158 That rejoins the question of whether excludable aliens have due
process rights at all. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a
dissenting opinion in Jean,159 where he defended the position that excludable
aliens are protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Marshall pointed out that the majority's decision rested "entirely
on the premise that the parole regulations promulgated during the course of
this litigation preclude INS officials from considering race and national
origin in making parole decisions."1 60  Justice Marshall argued, however,
that the majority points to no authority other than arguments in the parties'
briefs, which in turn, according to Justice Marshall, cite to nothing of
relevance.' 61 Justice Marshall then examined the applicable regulations,
statutes, and administrative practices governing the parole of unadmitted
aliens and concluded that there were not any nonconstitutional constraints on
the executive's authority to make national-origin distinctions.' 62 After this
examination, Justice Marshall continued that the majority therefore should
have addressed the constitutional issue involved, and proceeded with his
own analysis of the Fifth Amendment as applied to this case.
16 3
156. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854 (quoting Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,
105 (1944)).
157. Id at 854-55.
158. Gorman, supra note 20, at 54.
159. Jean, 472 U.S. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 859. Justice Marshall claimed that the Solicitor General's representations to
the Supreme Court were not supported by citation to any authoritative statement by the
Attorney General or the INS to the effect that the statute and regulations prohibit distinctions
based on race or national origin. Id. Furthermore, Justice Marshall stated that the Solicitor
General's contention that the statute and regulations do not make such distinctions is merely
an unsupported assertion by counsel apparently coming from the Solicitor General's office, to
which the Supreme Court owes no deference at all. Id. at 865-66.
162. Jean, 472 U.S. at 859.
163. Id. at 868.
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Among the cases cited by the Commissioner of the INS in Jean, in
support of his constitutional claim that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to
excludable aliens, was Knauff v. Shaugnessy, Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
and Shaugnessy v. United States.164 Justice Marshall stated that the narrow
question decided in Knauff and Shaugnessy was that the denial of a hearing
in a case in which the Government raised national security concerns did not
violate due process. 65 Furthermore, Justice Marshall pointed out that the
question decided in Chew was that the resident alien's due process rights
had been violated. 166 Therefore, according to Justice Marshall, the broad
judgment that excludable aliens are not within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment is dicta and deserves no deference at all. 67
Justice Marshall then made his argument, based on logic, for the
application of the Fifth Amendment to excludable aliens. He observed that
when an alien detained at the border is criminally prosecuted in this country,
he must enjoy at trial all of the protections that the Constitution provides to
criminal defendants. 68 Justice Marshall stated, "[s]urely it would defy logic
to say that a precondition for the applicability of the Constitution is an
allegation that an alien committed a crime."'169 Justice Marshall posited that
there is "no basis for conferring constitutional rights only on those unadmit-
ted aliens who violate our society's norms. 170
Justice Marshall noted that the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'' Justice Marshall stated that the Supreme Court
164. Id. at 868-69.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 872.
167. Jean, 472 U.S. at 872-73.
168. Id. at 873. Justice Marshall quoted Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896), in which the Court stated, in dictum, that "while Congress can 'forbid aliens or classes
of aliens from coming within [our] borders,' it cannot punish such aliens without 'a judicial
trial to establish the guilt of the accused."' Jean, 472 U.S. at 873 (quoting Wong Wing, 163
U.S. at 237). Also, Justice Marshall claimed that the right of an unadmitted alien to Fifth
Amendment due process protections at trial is universally respected by the lower federal
courts and is acknowledged by the government. Id. See also United States v. Henry, 604
F.2d 908, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Casimiro-Benitz, 533 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976).
169. Jean, 472 U.S. at 873.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 875.
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employed this standard in the case of Plyler v. Doe.172 In Plyler, a Texas law
allowed the withholding of state funds to school districts for the education of
children not "legally admitted" into the United States and also authorized the
denial of enrollment in public schools to these children. 173 While ruling that
the state's law was unconstitutional, Justice Marshall argued that the
Supreme Court made it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
aliens by quoting the Court in Plyler, which stated, for "[w]hatever his status
under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary
sense of that term."' 174 Justice Marshall contends that this constitutional
recognition and protection of aliens under the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to the states should also be found under the Fifth Amendment.175
According to Robert D. Ahlgren, writing for the Practicing Law
Institute, courts that have dealt with AEDPA issues have avoided constitu-
tional analysis almost completely. 176 "The court which took up the due
process issue was a panel of the [Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] and cited a
progeny of Knauff-Megei [sic].,' 7 7 The circuit court in Duldulao v. INS17 8
held that section 440(a) of the AEDPA denying judicial review of deporta-
tion orders for aliens convicted of firearm offenses did not offend due
process. 179 In its discussion of the AEDPA, the circuit court stated that
"[f]or reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.' 180  The
circuit court further explained that "[t]he power to expel aliens, being
essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative
and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, with
such opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit
to authorize or permit."''8
172. Id. at 875 (referring to Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
173. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 206-07.
174. Jean, 472 U.S. at 875 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210).
175. Id.
176. Robert D. AhIgren, Procedural Due Process in Exclusion/Deportation, in PRAC-
TICING LAW INSTITuTE 1996, at 78 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 71,
1996).
177. Id. (citing Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996) (as amended on Oct. 8,
1996)).
178. 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996). See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996);
Salazor-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996).
179. Duldulao, 90 F.3d. at 399-400.
180. Id. at 399 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
181. Id. at 400 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1951)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This country was founded by people who were trying to escape tyranny
and longed for a life based on freedom. These people who fought to estab-
lish the United States of America and drafted its Constitution were immi-
grants themselves. Since then, the United States has traditionally been a
place of refuge for those who seek to escape oppression from abroad. As a
result, this country has the most open-door immigration policy in the
world.182 Between 1921 and 1986 approximately 650,000 legal immigrants
were admitted to the United States each year. 183 In 1995, the number of legal
immigrants admitted to this country rose to 800,000.184 As the number of
immigrants in this country, legal and illegal, continue to grow, so too does
the population. As of January 1, 1996, the population in the United States
was 264,290,000 people. 185 America is known as the land of opportunity,
yet for the average worker that opportunity is finite. Currently, the unem-
ployment rate in this country is 5.6%.186 But in 1944, the unemployment rate
was merely 1.2% and in the mid-to-late 1960s it rested in the 3% range.
187
The proliferation of illegal aliens in this country has grown to the point that
it has moved to the forefront in legislative debate. The statistical data and
effect that illegal aliens have on the United States economy requires some-
thing to be done. As a country willing to help immigrants who are op-
pressed, the United States must be watchful for those who seek to take
advantage of our assistance and burden the welfare of United States citizens.
The IRIRA takes bold steps towards addressing the ever growing
problem of undocumented aliens in this country. The additional authority
given to the INS may help make the process of removing illegal aliens more
efficient. In 1995, approximately 80% of the 110,000 cases decided by
immigration judges involved undocumented aliens found in the interior of
182. Senate Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill After Removing Exclusion Provision, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 603 (1996).
183. Susan Crabtree, Immigration Crossroads, INSIGHT, Mar. 25, 1996, at 4, available in
1996 WL 8310958.
184. Id.
185. Factoids, RESEARCH ALERT, June 7, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 8842298.
186. Richard Estrada, Work Details Forget the Hype, Your Job Isn't Secure, Americans
Are Concerned About Current and Future Job Prospects, and for Good Reason, CHI. TRI.,




Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Nova Law Review
the country.1ls The new law may possibly free up the dockets of immigra-
tion courts, making more room for cases meriting a decision by an immigra-
tion judge.
Though the IRIRA vests authority in the INS officer to summarily
remove an undocumented alien found in the United States, the new law is
not without its own checks and balances. The URIRA supplies an in-depth
screening process of cases involving immigrants who may be truly fleeing
persecution by seeking asylum in this country including a review of credible
fear determinations by an immigration judge. The URIRA makes special
provisions for increasing the training of INS officers who will be handling
asylum cases. It also increases the administrative scrutiny of cases involving
illegal immigrants claiming asylum as a defense to their removal as opposed
to the typical removal procedure.
Whether or not an inadmissible alien enjoys constitutional protection
under the Fifth Amendment is a question, according to Justice Marshall,
189
yet to be decided by the Supreme Court. However, since 1889, the Supreme
Court has recognized, albeit in dictum, that excludable aliens are limited to
whatever due process that Congress may set forth in legislation. 190 The
IIRIRA is such legislation. Justice Marshall's dissent in Jean raises some
valid points and illustrates the legal arguments opponents of the new
legislation could raise. But as Justice Marshall rooted his analysis of the law
in logic, perhaps the more proper position that should be adopted is reflected
in a rather famous quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."' 9' Justice Holmes
explained that, "[t]he law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
192
The removal of undocumented aliens found in this country who have
not been admitted to the United States is a method of managing nomadic
citizens of other countries. The Court's historical view that matters of
international relations are under the complete control of Congress would
indicate that Congress' exercise of that power, to wit, the IRIRA's provi-
sions denying judicial review of inadmissible aliens should be left untouched
188. Final Anti-Terrorism Bill Contains Major Immigration Changes, 73 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 517, 523 (1996).
189. Jean, 472 U.S. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 865.
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by the judiciary. Furthermore, the individuals who are affected by the new
legislation are not citizens of the United States, therefore the resolution they
seek (i.e., admission to the United States) is not grounded in any claim of
right, but is a privilege granted by Congress. Accordingly, the denial of the
privilege to be admitted to the United States, which rests solely under the
control of Congress, does not fasten to it any guarantees of procedural due
process that the courts could review. Perhaps for the opponents of the
IRIRA, the new law is an overreaching attempt at correcting the immigra-
tion problems of this country. Nevertheless, endless discussion regarding
what should be done to correct a problem does little to resolve the matter at
hand. The IIRIRA is a comprehensive piece of legislation that includes
reasonable internal checks on the law's administration. Yet most important
of all, the URIRA is an affirmative attempt at remedying a problem in this
country that burdens every citizen of the United States-illegal immigration.
Paul S. Jones
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I. INTRODUCTION
"On each landing, opposite the lift shaft, the poster with the enormous
face gazed from the wall. It was one of those pictures which are so contrived
that the eyes follow you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
You, the caption beneath it ran."'
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 5 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961).
GEORGE ORWELL was the pen name of an Englishman named Eric Blair. He was
born in Bengal in 1903, educated at Eton, and after service with the Indian Impe-
rial Police in Burma, returned to Europe to earn his living writing novels and es-
says. He was essentially a political writer who wrote of his own times, a man of
intense feelings and fierce hates. He hated totalitarianism, and served in the
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As we approach the twenty-first century, the Orwellian visions depicted
in 1984 seep into our collective consciousness. Has Orwell's nightmare
become today's reality? Some would argue that it has.2
The increased use of computers, coupled with the advent of cyberspace
and the Internet, catapults the criminal defense attorney into a legal arena
undreamed of a short time ago. Various sorts of crimes can occur in cyber-
space,3 and as such, criminal procedure issues arising under the Fourth
Amendment lurk in the background.
The Fourth Amendment ensures that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... If law enforcement
officials violate one's Fourth Amendment rights in the process of searching
or seizing evidence, the defendant can move to suppress the evidence.
5
However, in order to assert one's Fourth Amendment rights and exclude
evidence, the defendant must have standing.
6
Loyalist forces in the Spanish Civil War. He was critical of communism but
considered himself a Socialist. He hated intellectuals, although he was a literary
critic. He hated cant and lying and cruelty in life and in literature. He died at
forty-seven of a neglected lung ailment, leaving behind a substantial body of
work, a growing reputation for greatness, and the conviction that modem man
was inadequate to cope with the demands of his history.
Preface to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961) (emphasis added).
2. To connect with others who share the view that we presently exist in an Orwellian
world, venture online and see, EPIC (visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http://www.epic.org./privacy>.
3. See discussion infra Part III.A.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
5. JosHUrA DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 109, at 219 (1991). The
notion that evidence illegally obtained can be suppressed at trial sprung from the celebrated
case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court decided that because
the government's conduct circumvented the Fourth Amendment when officials forced a citizen
to disclose certain incriminating papers, such evidence was inadmissible at trial against the
defendant. Id. at 631-32 The use of general warrants and writs of assistance, devices
employed by agents of the crown in England to rifle through homes of its citizens in an effort
to search for evidence, weighed heavily on the minds of the nine justices in Boyd. See
generally id. Accordingly, the development of the exclusionary rule began. See discussion
infra Part II (providing further analysis of the exclusionary rule and its application to the
standing doctrine). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled sub nom. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled sub nom. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The aforementioned cases outline the chronological develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule.
6. DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 109, at 219. See also discussion infra Part II.A.-E.
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For purposes of determining whether a defendant may challenge the
unconstitutionality of a search and seizure, standing is a threshold question.7
This note will focus on what constitutes standing for a motion to suppress
evidence searched and/or seized in cyberspace. First, the evolution of
standing jurisprudence will be discussed. Second, the federal wiretapping
statutes will be examined to determine whether they can shed light on this
issue. Third, as there are no cases directly on point which focus on standing
under the Fourth Amendment and the Internet, two fictional characters,
whom you will meet shortly, will take us on various hypothetical journeys
through cyberspace and Fourth Amendment analysis.8
II. WHAT IS STANDING?
When a defendant challenges the admission of evidence in a criminal
case on the premise that it was secured in violation of her Fourth Amend-
ment rights, she must be a party entitled to do so. 9 If the defendant is so
entitled, then she has "standing" to move to suppress the evidence vis-a-vis
the exclusionary rule.10 The exclusionary rule usually provides that when
evidence is unconstitutionally attained, it is inadmissible in criminal pro-
ceedings against the person whose rights were violated." This brings us to
7. See discussion infra Part 11.B (explaining Jones, Rakas, their progeny, and the Court's
current stance on standing jurisprudence as a starting point for analysis under the Fourth
Amendment).
8. Intriguing criminal cases may flow from the recent Heaven's Gate cult mass suicide.
Aside from the cult members' plans to board the mothership they believed to be trailing the
Hale-Bopp Comet, a central feature of this peculiar cult was its web site, the "Heavens Gate."
(The web site no longer exists.) Will the Heaven's Gate web site prompt legal discussion
concerning the Internet and the Fourth Amendment? For interesting discussions concerning
the impact of the cult's activity on the Internet, see Robert J. Hawkins & Matt Miller, Cult
Suicide in Rancho Sante Fe: Mass Suicide News Circles the World at Net Speed, SAN DIEGO
UNION & TRm., Apr. 1, 1997, at 12 (Computer Link Section); Sandi Dolbee, Cult Suicide in
Rancho Sante Fe: 18-year-old Recounts His Internet Visit with Cultist Sandi Dolbee, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRm., Mar. 30, 1997, at Al; and James Lileks, Cult Suicide in Rancho Sante
Fe: Death Cult Fantasy Disguised as Religion Drove Heaven's Gate Cultists to Delusion, and
Ultimately to Self-Destruction; 'New Age' Indulgence Led Odd People to Bizarre End, SAN
DIEGO UNION & TRm., Apr. 1, 1997, at G1.
9. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.1, at 459-60 (1992).
10. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 219.
11. Id. at 235. However, if police officers, in good faith, reasonably rely on what is later
determined to be an invalid warrant, the evidence may be used against the defendant at his or
her trial. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Leon firmly established the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 249-50. See also
United States v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
1997]
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the central issue: When does the defendant have standing; in other words,
when is one entitled to challenge the admission of evidence on grounds that
the search and seizure contravened the Fourth Amendment?
A. Katz v. United States
The linchpin for standing, and Fourth Amendment examination in
general, hinges on Katz v. United States.12 When Charles Katz called in his
wagers from a public telephone booth in Los Angeles, BIG BROTHER was
listening. Without a warrant, FBI agents surreptitiously attached electronic
listening and recording devices to the outside portion of the booth where Mr.
Katz placed his calls.' 3
Prior to the Katz decision, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence encom-
passed the rationale that physical penetration or trespass into a
"constitutionally protected area" was necessary for governmental conduct to
rise to the level of a violation under the Fourth Amendment. 14 The logical
implication of this standard translated into a legal principle which espoused
a property based model for determining whether a defendant had standing.
15
Thus, before Katz, standing was invariably entwined with the Court's
property based approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 6
It therefore came as no surprise that the government in Katz argued no
search occurred because there was no physical trespass into the phone booth
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
These cases discuss the chronological development of the exception to the exclusionary rule
for purposes of impeaching a defendant's credibility. See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984) (explaining the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule which states
that evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible because of an unconstitutional search or
seizure transforms into admissible evidence if in the final analysis, the evidence would have
been lawfully discovered independent of the initial bad search or seizure).
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 348-49. The physical location of the listening device, the outside portion of the
phone booth, is meaningful in that the Court's Fourth Amendment philosophy, up to this point
in history, hinged on whether there was physical penetration into a "constitutionally protected
area." If the Court adhered to its prior rationale, there could not be a Fourth Amendment
violation in Katz because the listening device did not actually penetrate any of the four walls
of the phone booth.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, government agents
intercepted the defendant's phone conversations without any physical trespass into the
defendant's home. The Court deduced that without a physical trespass, no search of a place
could have occurred under the rubric of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466.
15. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
11.3, at 118 (1996).
16. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 56.
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where Mr. Katz called in his bets.17 Katz was convicted, and the district
court, as well as the court of appeals, agreed on admitting the tape recorded
evidence.18 Both lower courts relied on the logic of Olmstead v. United
States and its progeny, ruling that no violation occurred because there was
no physical invasion of the phone booth where Mr. Katz placed his calls.
19
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, rejected the trespass rationale
stemming from Olmstead, stating the now oft-quoted phrase that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 20 His opinion, read together with
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, formed the crux for future Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.21 Standing would no longer be contingent upon
whether there was a physical intrusion into the area being searched. Justice
Harlan's concurrence advocated a two prong test: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
22
While the subjective prong is no longer critical to the overall calculus for
determining whether one has standing, both prongs still must be satisfied.
In fact, some contend that "inquiry into the particular defendant's subjective
state of mind has no place in the application of the Katz expectation of
privacy standard." 24 The focus of the objective prong examines what types
of self-protective steps were taken by the individual to ensure that his or her
activities would remain private.2 Were those self-protective steps sufficient
to justify a reasonable person in believing that his or her activity would be
free from uninvited eyes or ears? One who knowingly exposes her activities
to the public or acts in plain view, cannot be said to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.26 In the same vein, the Fourth Amendment does not
protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides information will not reveal it to the government.27
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
18. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir.), 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Id at 133.
20. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. Individual privacy (it was thought), not the arbitrary location
of a listening device, would be the detrimental factor for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 248.
21. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 58-59.
22. Katz, 398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 60.
24. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3(c), at 157.
25. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 63.
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
27. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Although Hoffa was not grounded
precisely on the standing issue, its logic is certainly relevant to the overall calculus as to
whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is because "the Fourth Amendment
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Applying this test to the facts in Katz, we can easily see why the FBI
surveillance constituted a search. First, Katz must have had an actual
expectation of privacy when he placed the call in the phone booth. Katz did
not know the phone booth was being monitored by the FBI; therefore, when
he picked up the phone, he had an actual expectation of privacy. Second,
Katz stepped into the phone booth and shut the door behind him before
placing his calls. He took adequate self-protective steps. Justice Stewart
points out that he did this to exclude the "uninvited ear.",28  "One who
occupies it [the phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.,
29
Despite abandoning the trespass rationale grounded in Olmstead, the
Court will sometimes utilize property concepts for purposes of standing
analysis.30 However, the Court is often weary of a property-based approach
to standing and prefers to tailor its reasoning to the Katz expectation of
privacy test. 31 Nevertheless, the property-based rationale can be reconciled
with the approach Katz takes.32
The fundamental inquiry regarding standing to object to a search is
that articulated in [Katz and] Mancusi: whether the conduct which
the defendant wants to put in issue involved an intrusion into his
reasonable expectation of privacy. In resolving that question, it is
useful to consider the factors which the Court has on other occa-
sions alluded to-whether the defendant had an interest in the place
searched, whether he had an interest in the items seized, and
[does not] protect[] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Id. at 302. This simple but crucial line of
reasoning will play an important role in the system operator/user relationship on the Internet
for purposes of determining whether the user has standing to object to evidence obtained in
cyberspace. See discussion infra Parts IV.A.-F.
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
29. Id.
30. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3, at 118. "[S]tanding may be acquired by having a
'proprietary or possessory interest in the premises' which were searched .... Id. (quoting
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973)).
31. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court held that the "capacity to
claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation
of freedom from governmental intrusion." Id. at 368.
32. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3, at 119.
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whether the search occurred at a place where he was lawfully pres-
ent.
33
Thus, while physical trespass is not dispositive on the issue of standing, the
utilization of property concepts will aid in the determination of whether a
particular defendant has standing.
B. Jones, Rakas, and Their Progeny
Rakas v. Illinois3a is considered the leading modem Supreme Court case
for standing under the Fourth Amendment.35 In Rakas, police officers pulled
over an automobile which matched the description of a vehicle used in a
robbery.36 They searched the car and found evidence of the robbery,
including a sawed-off shotgun underneath the front passenger seat and rifle
shells in a locked glove compartment.37 The defendant, a passenger, moved
to exclude the evidence on grounds that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.38 Relying on the Court's 1960 decision in Jones v.
United States, 39 the defendant contended he had standing to contest the
search because he was "'legitimately on [the] premises"' when the police
examined the car.40
In Jones, the defendant, a guest at another's apartment, was present
when police searched the apartment and found contraband.4 ' The defendant
testified that the apartment belonged to a friend who had given him a key
and permission to use the apartment. 42 Under its interpretation of Rule 41(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,43 the Court announced that
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
35. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 224.
36. 439 U.S. at 130.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled sub nor. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980).
40. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 (alteration in original).
41. 362 U.S. at 259.
42. Id.
43. Rule 41 states:
(e) Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court
for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on
the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property. The
court shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be returned to the movant,
although reasonable conditions may be imposed to protect access and the use of
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"anyone legitimately on premises" at the time of the search qualified "as a
'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" '44 and had standing to
move to suppress the evidence. Lower courts utilized this "legitimately on
premises" rationale as a basis for determining whether a defendant had
standing under the Fourth Amendment.46
The Court dismissed that line of logic in Rakas,47 and instead couched
its language for standing in terms of the doctrine espoused in Katz: Does the
individual have a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place?, 48
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a 5-4 majority, conservatively construed the
following rationale found in Alderman v. United States:49 "'Fourth Amend-
ment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights,
may not be vicariously asserted."' 50
Despite retreating from the "legitimately on premises" rationale
grounded in Jones, the Court upheld the lower court's holding through the
the property in subsequent proceedings. If a motion for return of property is
made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or infor-
mation is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) (emphasis added).
44. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)).
45. Id. at 267.
46. See State v. Porter, 324 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Tasco,
323 A.2d 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974); State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
These cases all hold that guests who were legitimately on premises have standing to challenge
the admission of evidence to be used against them.
47. This will prove to be important because an Internet user who is at a website with the
system operator's permission (legitimately on premises) may not automatically attain standing
to challenge evidence searched and seized in cyberspace. See discussion infra Part IV.
48. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
49. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, the Court crystallized the contention that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal:
There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to pro-
tect the rights of another.... What petitioners appear to assert is an independent
constitutional right of their own to exclude relevant and probative evidence be-
cause it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth Amendment. But we
think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between pre-
venting the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally
seized from him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot
claim this predicate for exclusion.
Id. at 174. This argument is vital to understanding the predicament of the online user and her
relationship with the system operator. A user may not be able to assert a Fourth Amendment
violation if only the system operator's rights are violated. See discussion infra parts IV.A.-F.
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use of the Katz framework51 and some crafty post hoc analysis. Thus, the
Court did not directly overrule the "legitimately on premises" rationale in all
cases. Rather, this factor should be considered in conjunction with a
determination as to whether the particular defendant's situation parallels the
circumstances in Jones. The Court reasoned that Rakas, though legitimately
on the premises (in the car), did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
similar to Jones. Unlike Rakas, Jones had a key to the apartment, clothes in
the closet, and had previously slept on the premises. 2 Those facts indicate
complete dominion and control and the power to exclude others from the
apartment.53 "[D]ominion and control" and the power to exclude others are
integral components of the objective prong to the Katz test.54 The key Jones
possessed, in addition to the clothes he stored in the apartment, were
sufficient indicia of control to warrant an expectation of privacy that
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 55 The Court also eluci-
dated that because the right to exclude others invariably flows from the
ownership or lawful possession of real or personal property, one who has
such a possessory interest will probably have a legitimate expectation of
privacy stemming from that right to exclude.
5 6
Unlike Katz and Jones, Rakas did not have any indicia of control:57
Katz occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all
others, and paid the toll.58 "Except with respect to his friend, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others
from it."59 Here, Rakas simply could not prove he had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy as a mere passenger in an automobile contesting the search of
51. Id. at 141. Why did the Court retreat from the "legitimately on premises" rationale
found in Jones?
[The holding in Jones can best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the premises he was using and therefore could
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to a governmental
invasion of those premises, even though his "interest" in those premises might
not have been a recognized property interest at common law.
Id at 143.
52. Id at 141.
53. Id at 143-44 n.12.
54. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149.
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
56. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
57. Essentially, Rakas could not legitimately exclude others from the automobile because
he did not have a possessory interest in it. See discussion supra notes 54-56 and accompa-
nying text.
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contraband found under the seat and in a glove compartment. 6° Therefore,
Rakas did not have standing to assert the illegality of the search in an
attempt to suppress the evidence seized.6'
Interwoven within standing analysis under the Fourth Amendment is the
issue of whether a search has occurred. Because the Fourth Amendment
only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, it could not come
into play with out a search. To determine whether government activity rises
to the level of a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, one
must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area examined.62
Essentially, this is the same test used to determine whether a defendant has
standing to challenge the admission of evidence. The basic similarity
between the tests for standing and determining whether a search occurred led
Justice Rehnquist to opine in Rakas: "The inquiry under either approach is
the same. But we think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent
of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than
on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of stand-
ing."6
3
Despite Justice Rehnquist's position, two years later, in Rawlings v.
Kentucky,64 Justice Blackmun contended:
[T]hat these two inquiries [standing and whether a substantive
Fourth Amendment 'search' occurred] 'merge into one' in the
sense that both are to be addressed under the principles of Fourth
Amendment analysis developed in Katz v. United States and its
progeny. But I do not read... Rakas[] as holding that it is im-
proper for lower courts to treat these inquiries as distinct compo-
nents of a Fourth Amendment claim.
65
60. Id. Arguably if Rakas has a key to the car, he would have had standing.
61. Id.
62. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (footnote omitted).
64. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
65. Id. at 112 (Blackmun J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Rawlings, the defendant
was the unsuspecting guest at the house of one Marcuess who had the misfortune of being
present when the police searched the Marcuess home without a warrant. Apparently, seconds
before the police arrived, the defendant stuffed some 1,800 tablets of LSD and other drugs
into another guest's (Vannessa Cox) purse. Although the defendant had a possessory interest
in the contraband seized, the Court concluded that he did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in Cox's purse. Id. at 105-06. Defendant could not exclude others from Cox's purse
and had no dominion and control over it. Id. Thus, the defendant did not have standing. Id.
One can foresee the applicability of Rawlings on the Internet. The fact that one might have a
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Justice Blackmun pointed out that it is possible for a defendant to have
standing but lose on the merits.6 Conversely, one could win on the merits
yet have no legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of standing.67 In
the final analysis, however, if the defendant loses either the standing issue or
on the merits, the evidence will be admissible. To successfully win a motion
to suppress evidence, one must have standing and there must be a "search"
under substantive Fourth Amendment analysis.68
C. Hotels, Motels, Tenants, and the Transfer of Property
Does an individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
leasehold, hotel, or motel room when he or she is not there at the time of the
government search?69 At first blush, some might contend that because the
hotel or motel manager has a possessory interest in the establishment, as well
as the potential to access its rooms, one cannot have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Such an argument necessarily encompasses a rationale that
the landlord or manager can validly consent to a government agent's request
to search the tenant's or guest's premises. This sort of argument has been
consistently rejected by courts facing the issue.
Courts have determined that those tenants,70 hotel guests,7' and motel
guests72 with a present possessory interest in the premises searched all have
possessory interest in one's electronic mail does not necessarily mean one will have standing.
If one lacks dominion and control or the power to exclude others from their electronic mail,
the possessory interest in it becomes irrelevant.
66. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105-06.
67. Id.
68. It is useful to examine cases stemming from both of these issues to assess their appli-
cability to the Internet. See also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (rejecting the
automatic standing doctrine for possession offenses and developing the chronological analysis
under the standing doctrine). Salvucci sheds light on Rakas. Interview with Professor Mark
Dobson, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center (Feb. 18, 1997).
69. Standing in these types of situations is important because some will contend that the
relationship between a user and her system operator is the functional equivalent of the hotel
guest and manager relationship. If these types of relationships are indeed analogs of each
other, then the case for standing in cyberspace dramatically improves because hotel and motel
guests typically have standing to assert the illegality of a search. See infra Part IV (providing
additional discussion on this argument).
70. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); United States v. Ford, 34
F.3d 992 (1 th Cir. 1994). These cases stand for the proposition that one with a leasehold
interest (as opposed to ownership) has standing to challenge a government search. Under a
Katz-Mancusi analysis, a defendant would have a legitimate expectation of privacy for
purposes of standing. See LAFAvE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a), at 122.
71. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); State v. Jackson, 210 N.W.2d
537 (Iowa 1973). Both cases hold that the consent of a hotel clerk obtained by police to
search defendant's room was invalid. Under a Katz-Mancusi analysis, the defendant would
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standing to challenge evidence obtained by the government. 73 Thus, manag-
ers and landlords may not always effectively consent to the search of their
tenants rooms. For example, tenants and paying guests could effectively
consent with their landlords or managers to allow the police to search their
rooms. Such consent would obliterate the legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary for standing.
D. Self-Protective Steps and Modem Technology
What constitutes a self-protective step that would rise to the level of a
reasonable expectation of privacy? Technology has advanced to a point
where activities once considered private are, for purposes of standing
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment, "broadcast to the world.' 74
In Smith v. Maryland,75 the Court ruled that the defendant had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed from his
home.76 Police used a device called a pen register to monitor the electrical
impulses coming from the defendant's phone in order to compile a list of the
numbers he called.77  The Court applied Katz and determined that the
defendant probably could not have an actual expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers he dialed because he knowingly divulged that information to
the telephone company. 78 Second, assuming arguendo one did have an
actual expectation of privacy in the phone number she dialed, such an
expectation could not be reasonable.79 Following the line of logic in Hoffa
and it's progeny, one who voluntarily conveys information to a third party
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 80 Katz was distinguished
on the ground that pen registers do not disclose the contents of one's
conversations, only the numbers dialed.8' Where one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of her conversation, she does not with
have a legitimate expectation of privacy for purposes of standing. See LAFAVE, supra note 15,
§ 11.3(a), at 122.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 177-78 n.6 (9th Cir. 1971)
(relying on Jones in order to deduce that a motel guest has standing). Utilizing the Katz-
Mancusi analysis, a defendant in a motel room would have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in such premises for purposes of standing. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a), at 122.
73. See generally LAFAvE, supra note 15, § 11.3(a).
74. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
75. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
76. Id. at 742.
77. Id. at736n.1.
78. Id. at 742.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
81. Id. at 741.
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the numbers she dialed.82 The phone company must track the phone num-
bers dialed for purposes of billing.83 A phone company does not have a
similar need for the contents of the user's communications." Therefore, a
defendant like Smith will not have standing to assert the illegality of a search
for phone numbers dialed.
The use of beepers to track a suspect's movements is not considered a
search under constitutional analysis if the information it communicates is
available to the general public, or if such information could be gathered from
an area where one is legally entitled to watch. If information is secured
through the use of a beeper from an area not within the public's view, then
such activity is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.
86
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,87 the Court held that no search
occurred when the government engaged in aerial photography to secure
pictures of an industrial complex. 88 Although Dow Chemical Company
constructed walls around their complex preventing ground-level view,89 such
self-protective steps were not legally sufficient.90 Because the plane's
surveillance occurred from public navigable airspace and was not physically
intrusive, the self-protective steps taken by Dow were rendered meaningless
because they did not cloak what could be seen from above.91 The Court
noted in dictum that the use of "highly sophisticated surveillance not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology," 92 might
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The dissent pointed out the fallacious logic in the majority opinion:
How could the $22,000, precision aerial mapping camera the government
used be considered readily available to the public? 93 Who would purchase
such a device? From Dow Chemical, it would seem that if sense-enhancing
technology is available (like a precision aerial mapping camera), then the use
of it can not be considered a search. However, the use of sense-creation
devices (like satellite technology) probably would constitute a search under
82. Id.
83. Id at 744.
84. Id-
85. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
86. Id.
87. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id at 229.
90. Id. at 239.
91. Id. at 238-39.
92. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238.
93. Id at 251 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the Fourth Amendment. What one knowingly exposes to the public must be
done at one's peril. If BIG BROTHER can potentially watch from a public
view, he can legally watch.
One other case of note, California v. Greenwood,94 holds that one
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her
garbage left at the side of the curb.95 The Court cited to both Katz and
Smith, reasoning that garbage is knowingly exposed to the public and
voluntarily turned over to a third party (the garbage collector).96 The crux of
Greenwood in reality went further than Katz and Smith. Greenwood only
knowingly exposed opaque garbage bags to the public, not the contents
inside the bag. The majority worked around this obstacle by reasoning that
"[ilt is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public." 97  Thus, one cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he discards at curbside.
The Court "emphasized instead that the Fourth Amendment analysis must
turn on such factors as 'our societal understanding that certain areas deserve
the most scrupulous protection from government invasion."'
98
The Court also reasoned that a California law declaring the search of
trash illegal, and providing for use of the exclusionary rule as a means of
remedying such illegality, does not allow an individual's expectation of
privacy to rise to the level of a "reasonable" one under the Fourth Amend-
ment.99 State law does not define whether one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 1°° Similarly, in a case where police broke the law and trespassed
on the defendant's property to search for marijuana, despite "no trespassing"
signs, the Court held that one could not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy because the area invaded was an open field.1 1
94. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. at 40.
97. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). The garbage ultimately goes to the dump
where people, along with thousands of vultures, can view and peck at the contents of
everyone's rubbish. Say au revoir to any reasonable expectation of privacy!
98. Id. at 43. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). The Court
now seems to be injecting society's common knowledge and understanding into the calculus
of what constitutes a legitimate expectation of privacy.
99. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43.
100. Id.
101. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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E. Flaws in the Federal Wiretapping Statutes
In 1986, Congress revamped federal wiretapping statutes to include the
prohibition on the interception of electronic communications.10 2 Commonly
known as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA'), °3 this
statute purports to govern the procedures for obtaining information online.
As with many statutes, the ECPA is riddled with exceptions.
1 4
Section 2510(12) defines an "electronic communication" as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system."105 Although the ECPA prohibits
the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions, 1°6 it permits any person "to intercept or access an electronic communi-
cation made through an electronic communication system that is configured
so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general
public." 107 This language encompasses the rationale in Katz and authorizes
the interception of those electronic communications knowingly exposed to
the public.
The ECPA also carves out an exception permitting one to disclose the
contents of electronic communications "which were inadvertently obtained
by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a
102. LANCE RosE, NETLAW: YOUR RIGrs IN um ONuNE WORLD 167 (1995) [hereinafter
NErLAW].
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
104. It should also be noted that there are no cases which apply the ECPA to a situation
involving the interception of communications in cyberspace.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). Not included in the definition of an electronic communica-
tion is a wire or oral communication. See id. § 2510(12)(A).
"[W]ire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furished
or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of... communications ....
Id. § 2510(1). "'[O]ral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication." Id. § 2510(2). These definitions will prove to be important because the
ECPA only authorizes the suppression of evidence when oral and wire communications are
intercepted.
106. Md2 § 2511 (1994).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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crime, if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency. ' 1°s Thus, if
the service provider "inadvertently" stumbles across some evidence tending
to incriminate her user, she may divulge the contents of the user's communi-
cations to the police. The crux of the ECPA, as it pertains to the prohibition
on divulging the contents of an electronic communication, is found in
section 2511 (3)(a) which states that
a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to
the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any com-
munication (other than one to such person or entity, or an agent
thereof) while in transmission on that service to any person or en-
tity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communi-
cation or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient. 109
The words "while in transmission" are crucial to understanding the ECPA.
Because the ECPA only protects against the divulging of communications
"while in transmission," it is logical to deduce that stored messages are
beyond the reach of the statute.
[T]he ECPA does not give online system users an automatic right
of privacy from system operators for stored messages. Since a
system can easily be configured to store all messages that pass
through it, the ability to review stored messages effectively gives
the operator the ability to review all messages passing through the
system.110
Of course, a provider of an electronic communication service may
divulge the contents of electronic communications if he or she has been
provided with "a court order directing such assistance signed by the author-
izing judge."'' A properly executed warrant authorizes the service provider
to assist law enforcement officials in intercepting electronic communica-
tions.
Assuming arguendo the electronic communication is "in transmission"
within the meaning of section 2511(3)(a), it remains unclear whether one
will be able to remedy the interception of such communications through a
108. Id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv).
109. Id. § 2511(3)(a) (emphasis added).
110. NETLAW, supra note 102, at 168. The ECPA would prohibit the interception and
disclosure of electronic messages sent in live or real-time transmission. Id.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A).
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motion to suppress evidence. Section 2515112 only prohibits the use of
evidence of intercepted wire or oral communications.11 3 This section does
not mention an "electronic communication" as a type of communication
which would require the prohibition of its use as evidence' 1 4 The canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterious leads one to conclude that because the
drafters of the ECPA specifically mentioned the words "wire" and "oral
communications" in section 2515, the words "electronic communications"
must have been intentionally omitted since such words would have been
included if that was what the legislature had intended.1 5 The ECPA seem-
ingly affords the greatest amount of privacy protection for aural transmis-
sions n1 6 (a type of transmission not encompassed in the definition of
"electronic communications"). The only remedy mentioned for an unau-
thorized interception or disclosure of an electronic communication is a civil
cause of action under section 2520.117
It would seem as though the ECPA, like many laws, has loopholes
which would curtail a user's privacy for purposes of standing under the
Fourth Amendment. The issue of whether a particular defendant has
standing to initiate a motion to suppress evidence will most likely have to be
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994).
113. Section 2515, entitled "Prohibition of use as evidence intercepted wire or oral com-
munications," states:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, departnent, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative com-
mittee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. See id.
115. The following canon should play a significant role in the interpretation of § 2515:
'Technical and legal words with special meanings are construed according to the technical,
legal, or special meaning appropriate to the context of the statute." JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS IN A NuTsHELL 311 (1986). This canon futher buttresses the argument that
the drafters intended "electronic communications" to be omitted from the scope of § 2515.
Accordingly, the meanings of the words electronic, oral, and wire communications, which are
"technical and legal words," should be treated the same throughout the ECPA. The words are
"technical" in the sense that they deal with highly particularized modes of communication.
They are "legal" because they must be construed within the meaning of a law, the ECPA.
Simply put, the ECPA does not explicitly, or even implicitly, authorize the suppression of an
electronic communication.
116. NETLAW, supra note 102, at 168.
117. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994).
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resolved by resorting to the seminal Fourth Amendment cases discussed
above.n 8
HI. CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace is a globally networked, computer-sustained, com-
puter-accessed, and computer-generated, multi-dimensional, artifi-
cial, or "virtual" reality. In this world, on which every computer
screen is a window, actual, geographic distance is irrelevant. Ob-
jects seen or heard are neither physical nor, necessarily, presenta-
tions of physical objects, but are rather-in form, character, and
action-made up of data, pure information. This information is de-
rived in part from the operation of the natural, physical world, but
is derived primarily from the immense traffic of symbolic informa-
tion, images, sounds, and people, that constitute human enterprise
in science, art, business, and culture.119
Because there are so many different methods of accessing cyberspace,
various legal theories will apply to different factual scenarios. This note will
focus only on the potential legal pitfalls in the "public system" which
provides access to the general public as a whole. Such a system typically
includes a storage area in cyberspace where one can access his or her own
data and prevent others from retrieving it (through the use of a password).
Additionally, there are areas where all have access to the same information.
A system operator (also referred to as a "sysop") is one who heads the
particular online system. System operators who run these systems have the
ability to access one's "private" files but may or may not choose to do so. 120
Within the web of "public" cyberspace, there might also be some systems
existing which provide users limited access. In order to gain access to such a
system, a user might have to pay a fee or obtain approval from the system
operator who runs it.
A. Online Crime and Evidence of Crime Online
New societal conventions seem to go hand in hand with new forms of
crime. Even those who have never gone online know about the problems
118. See also Megan Connor Bertron, Note, Home Is Where Your Modem Is: An Appro-
priate Application of Search and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 163
(1996).
119. M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGrrAL WORLD 29 (1995).
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with hackers in cyberspace.12 1 The word "hacker" was not in existence until
computers linked up with telecommunications.
Aside from hacking, various forms of computer crime now exist.
Criminals upload viruses in an attempt to destroy computer systems, steal
copyrighted material, and engage in the exchange of child pornography
amongst other things.'2 Private files exist which contain evidence of crime
occurring outside cyberspace (the dreaded physical world). 23 If police
"search" cyberspace, the question of standing to assert the illegality of
government conduct becomes pertinent.
B. Meet Stoney and Talley'24
In order to better understand how standing under the Fourth Amend-
ment works in conjunction with cyberspace, we will follow the exploits of
two fictional characters named Stoney and Talley. Stoney and Talley are
your stereotypical cyber-nerds who have a knack of getting into trouble
while surfing the net.
IV. Six HYPOThETCALS
A. The "Public" Chat Room
The Dean of Admissions at the newly-established Cyber Law Center
would ultimately regret rejecting Stoney and Talley to the class of 2000.
Upon receiving their e-mail rejections from the Cyber Law Center, Stoney
and Talley decided to discuss their options at the "Worms R' Us" site on the
web where all the expert hackers did their business.
Both entered the site from their computers at home and joined Public
Chat Room No. 3-a forum for disgruntled law school rejects. No password
or fee was required to join Public Chat Room No. 3. "All are Welcome"
blinked across the screen as they logged in. The top of the screen indicated
29 users who were currently in the room. Stoney and Talley bragged to all
who would listen about their detailed plot to upload a destructive worm into
the Cyber Law Center.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Id. at 187-208.
123. Id.
124. Professor Johnny C. Burns of Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center created these names for a hypothetical problem he distributed to his Criminal
Procedure class in the Summer of 1995.
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What Stoney and Talley couldn't know was that Officer Iago McFad-
den, a veteran of the Cleveland Police force, was masquerading online as
Earthworm Jim, a supposed world-famous hacker. Warrantless online
eavesdropping had become second nature to McFadden after the Cleveland
brass moved him behind a desk and off the streets of Ohio. McFadden-
downloaded the incriminating conversations to his computer and later
arrested Stoney and Talley for attempted computer tampering. At a pre-trial
conference, Stoney and Talley moved to suppress the evidence on grounds
that McFadden's search violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Would Stoney and Talley have standing to assert the illegality of
Officer McFadden's search? Clearly they would not. Under Katz, neither
could have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the contents of
their communications because Public Chat Room No. 3 was open to the
public. They both had to know that anyone online could see what they were
saying. Assuming arguendo they did have an actual expectation of privacy,
they could not have standing under the objective prong of the Katz analysis.
Stoney and Talley knowingly exposed their conversation to the public. They
took no self-protective steps to ensure privacy, and had no indicia of control
to exclude others from the room. Furthermore, Hoffa tells us that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides information will not reveal it to the govern-
ment.125 Thus, it would appear that any expectation of privacy they might
have had would not be one which society would recognize as reasonable.
The ECPA is in accordance with such analysis as it provides for the lawful
interception of those electronic communications which are readily available
to the public. 26 Inherent within the concept of a public chat room is the
principle that everyone can see what everyone else is saying. It is therefore
impossible to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in public chat rooms.
B. The "Private" Chat Room
Same scenario as before, except this time: Stoney and Talley decide to
discuss their plot to destroy the Cyber Law Center in "The Worm Hole" a
"private')127 chat room and sub-cite of "Worms R' Us." Other users are
excluded from this area and may only view communications posted in the
public chat room. Only the "Worms R' Us" system operator can view
messages being transferred in private chat rooms like "The Worm Hole."
125. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
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Sysop Slug, the system operator for "Worms R' Us," configured her
system to store all messages passed online in both the public and private
chat rooms. It is common knowledge that system operators can view
messages stored in the computer and are capable of viewing live chat room
discussions as well.
Hot on the trail of Stoney and Talley and tired of his desk job, Eagle-
Eye McFadden takes to the streets and proceeds to (without a warrant)
shakedown Sysop Slug for any information she might have on the two
notorious hackers he'd been following. Reluctantly, Sysop Slug turns over
the information. Stoney and Talley are arrested and they move to suppress
the evidence McFadden gathered.
A few wrinkles develop in the previous hypothetical. First, when
Stoney and Talley entered into "The Worm Hole," their case for an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy becomes more plausible if they really
thought it was a "private" chat room. If both offer solid proof that they
thought their communications would not be read by anyone, including Sysop
Slug or eavesdropping hackers and users, it would be tough to overcome
their assertion of a subjective expectation of privacy. Standing in this
instance will (as it almost invariably does) turn on whether Stoney and
Talley had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Stoney and Talley will
contend that stepping into the "private" room constituted a self-protective
step sufficient to rise to the level of a reasonable expectation of privacy. By
doing so, they had dominion and control of their online conversation and had
the power to exclude others from viewing it.
A cursory inspection of the former argument might seem persuasive. In
fact, the Katz Court might have found a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, however, it is generally under-
stood by society that system operators have access to monitor all areas
within their control and are truly considered the biggest threat to online
privacy.1 28 System operators fear potential raids by government agents
chasing cyber-criminals. 129 This fear prompts many system operators to
"reduce or eliminate user privacy on the system."'30
Assuming arguendo this sort of societal understanding is empirically
true, one cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a "private" chat
room under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver. If the possibility of snoops
rummaging through our garbage does not create a legitimate expectation of
privacy based on our common knowledge, it requires a simple extension of
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the Greenwood holding to argue that a sysop's control of users' data renders
an expectation of privacy illegitimate even in a "private" chat room when
society recognizes the existence of this type of sysop control.
Under the logic of the ECPA, because Sysop Slug configured her
system to automatically store messages, the interception and disclosure of
the contents of the electronic communications would fall beyond the periph-
eral protection of the ECPA since the ECPA only covers the interception of
communications "while in transmission." One must also consider the bite of
section 2515. According to that section, electronic communications cannot
be suppressed. 13' Thus, Sysop Slug's disclosure to Eagle Eye would be
authorized under the ECPA.
Greenwood would also seem to allow the admission of evidence
surreptitiously retrieved from deleted files or messages once found in a
"privte" chat room. Hackers would become the cyber-analog for the scaven-
gers and snoops. The deletion of a message or a file would serve as the
functional equivalent to taking out the garbage. If the government visited a
site and undeleted a file, the "owner" of that file could not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in it under the analysis of Greenwood.
Under the combined analysis of Katz and Hoffa, Stoney and Talley's
conversation would probably be treated as if they voluntarily disclosed
information to a third party because of the societal understanding concerning
sysop control. The system operator could not be considered the functional
equivalent of the telephone operator depicted in Katz. Whereas society
understands that Ma Bell will not listen in on our phone conversations, the
same cannot be said about system operators. Because of the growing fear
amongst system operators concerning government raids, they have elimi-
nated or severely curtailed user privacy. 132 Ergo, the telephone and system
operators are not the clear analogs one might think they are. This leads us to
an unsavory sort of conclusion: police could illegally search and seize the
system operator's stored data and use it against the system operator's
users-not the system operator herself. Such reasoning would be in tune
with the idea that "'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.
' 1 33
Stoney and Talley are not the "victims" of the illegal search, Sysop Slug
(under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence) is the only real victim.
Even laws which curb the system operator's ability to monitor a user's
communications would not, under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, bear
131. See discussion supra Part II.E.
132. Id.
133. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-134.
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on whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy for purposes of
standing jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment.134 Although the ECPA
provides for civil remedies under section 2520 for certain system operator
conduct which violates a user's privacy, Greenwood's rationale would seem
to lend credence to the argument that the ECPA could not provide an
individual with the legitimate expectation of privacy needed for standing. In
cyberspace this argument becomes even stronger upon analogizing from
Greenwood. The Court in Greenwood found that a state statute provided for
the use of the exclusionary rule when police illegally searched garbage. 135 In
the case of cyberspace and system operators, we are only dealing with a
statute which provides for civil remedies when the proscribed conduct
arises. 13 6 Further, the use of the exclusionary rule does not seem to apply to
electronic communications under the section 2515 and the basic canon of
expressio unius.13 7 If the statute in Greenwood would not provide a basis for
a legitimate expectation of privacy, a statute which dealt specifically with
the exclusion of evidence, then it is a small step in logic to argue that the
civil remedies set forth in section 2520 will not be sufficient insofar as one's
reasonable expectation of privacy is concerned. This argument is buttressed
by the fact that the exclusion of "electronic communications" is not provided
for in section 2515.
C. Electronic Mail
Stoney and Talley, now in separate jail cells awaiting trial, suffer
extreme withdrawal symptoms as they are without their portable laptops and
each other. Luckily for them, the kind-hearted and dim-witted Nurse
Hatchet takes pity on the two inmates and buys them both portable laptops
equipped with cellular modems.
Behind steel bars and beneath prison issued blankets, electronic
illuminesence brings smiles to the faces of Stoney and Talley. Being careful
not to enter into any sort of chat room, they dial into their "private" e-mail
accounts on Casablanca Online ("COL"), the largest public online service
in the United States.
134. Although the ECPA provides civil remedies for certain system operator conduct
which violates a user's privacy, under the logic of Greenwood and Oliver, the ECPA could not
provide an individual with a legitimate expectation of privacy. See supra notes 94-101 and
accompanying text.
135. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43-44.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
137. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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After entering in their passwords, each send detailed accounts of their
plan to break out of prison (which eclipse mere preparation and rise to the
level of perpetration under the law of criminal attempts) and take over
cyberspace. Other than the sysop, no one can access their e-mail accounts.
Stoney promised to advertise for COL in exchange for its promise not to
disclose any e-mail to anyone unless a properly executed search warrant
forced it to do so. Stoney and COL signed a legally binding contract
evidencing their promises. Talley was too lazy to make a similar contract
with COL.
With a gun and a smile, Officer McFadden asked the COL system
operator to turn over any messages stored in Stoney and Talley's e-mail
accounts. McFadden arrests Stoney and Talley and again they move to
suppress evidence at a pre-trial hearing.
As ridiculous as the above hypothetical is, the issue of standing remains
a difficult one. Do individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their e-mail accounts? While Officer McFadden certainly violated several
laws in the pursuit of the e-mail, Stoney and Talley must have standing to
assert the illegality of McFadden's actions. Though the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct, 138 standing remains a prerequisite for a
motion to suppress evidence.
139
Do Stoney and Talley have standing to suppress their e-mail messages?
Under Katz and its progeny, both need subjective and objective expectations
of privacy. On a subjective level, it would probably be difficult to show that
neither had an actual expectation of privacy. This is especially true for
Stoney who contracted with COL for the express purpose of ensuring his
privacy. Is their expectation of privacy one which society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable? Both Stoney and Talley evidenced indicia of
control and the power to exclude with the use of their password. The
password could be thought of as the functional equivalent of the key in Jones
which the Court found to be very significant. However, unlike Jones, Stoney
and Talley "voluntarily disclosed" the contents of their e-mail to the sysop
by virtue of the societal understanding concerning the sysop/user relation-
ship. Any possessory interest one might have in their e-mail is contingent on
what the sysop decides to do with it. Thus, the power to exclude, tradition-
ally linked to property rights, is tenuous at best in the context of e-mail
communications. A legitimate expectation of privacy in this instance will
138. DRESSLER, supra note 5, at 239.
139. See generally id. at 219.
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not flow from the possessory interest Stoney and Talley have in their
communications.
The contract Stoney had with COL is rendered meaningless under the
logic of Hoffa, Greenwood, and Oliver. The Fourth Amendment simply
does not provide protection for a wrongdoers misplaced belief in the trust-
worthiness of a third party. 14° A contract, like a law or statute, will not
create a legitimate expectation of privacy. 141 Stoney may try to sue COL for
breach of contract (though COL would have a solid duress defense), but that
would be his only mechanism for relief. The fact that Officer McFadden
grossly violated COL's rights is of no concern. "'Fourth Amendment rights
are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be
vicariously asserted. ' ,
142
On the other hand, Stoney might try to argue that his contract with COL
provided him with a legitimate expectation of privacy similar to that which a
tenant would have with his or her landlord. 143 Like a tenant or hotel guest, a
user who has a present possessory interest in the e-mail would have standing
to assert the illegality of a government search. Like the landlord-tenant
relationship, a system operator may not effectively consent to the search of
his user's e-mail communications. In fact, Stoney's contract with COL
explicitly states that COL may not divulge the contents of e-mail unless the
sysop is provided with a properly executed search warrant. Stoney may
contend that such a contract is the functional equivalent of the implicit
agreements between a landlord and her tenant, or a hotel and its guest, to not
let others in their homes or rooms. Therefore, such a contract would provide
Stoney with standing.
On the surface, this argument seems to be pretty convincing. However,
implicit within such an argument is the proposition that the sysop/user
relationship is analogous to the landlord-tenant relationship. In a landlord-
tenant relationship (or hotel-guest relationship) the government searches
homes or rooms. In cyberspace, the government searches for electronic data
stored in the sysop's computer. The difference in the place searched might
prove to be important. First, the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been
interpreted to afford the greatest protection to the home and similar dwell-
140. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
141. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); see
also supra note 94-101 and accompanying text.
142. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)).
143. Stoney might also argue that his situation is like that of the relationship between a
hotel/motel guest and manager. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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ings such as a hotel room.' 44 Can the storage area where electronic informa-
tion is kept logically be equated to a home? The type of activity which
occurs at an e-mail address is distinct from the intimate activity which
occurs at one's home (or hotel room). Second, a system operator may
monitor all activities associated with the e-mail address after they are stored
in her computer. 45 Conversely, a landlord or hotel manager cannot monitor
the activities of her tenant or guest without some sort of contract allowing
such monitoring. Clearly, the sysop's ability to monitor a user's e-mail
severely curtails any legitimate expectation of privacy. This second level of
differentiation would probably lead a court to conclude that a defendant in
such a situation would not have standing despite any contract. There is little
reason to think that electronic mail will be treated any differently from
"private" chat rooms.
D. The System Operator
In addition to communicating via e-mail that day, Stoney and Talley
decided to open up their own web-site and e-mail service. In order to access
their sites, a person needed a password and rejection letter from the Cyber
Law Center. As system operators, Stoney and Talley had complete dominion
and control over the accessibility of their site.
Officer McFadden surreptitiously hacks into Stoney and Talley's web
site and discovers pictures evidencing child pornography and bestiality in
violation of state law. Stoney and Talley move to suppress the evidence as a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.
Here, Stoney and Talley would have standing to assert the illegality of
the search. They have a possessory interest in the website and the computer
which they share with no one else. The password protection evidences self-
protective steps which would rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy in
this example because no one else aside from Stoney and Talley can circum-
vent the password to glean information from their web-site. 46 Because
Stoney and Talley can choose who enters their site, they seem to have the
144. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (explaining the historical backdrop
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
145. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
146. One might question the truth of this statement considering that McFadden hacked
into Stoney and Talley's website. The difference here lies in the fact that the garbage was not
taken to the curbside. Greenwood is taken out of the equation, assuming files are not deleted
into Cyberspace. Here, it is unlikely that e-mail will be deleted into Cyberspace. Any
deletion should remain within the physical confines of the computer. See supra notes 94-101,
accompanying text, and discussion in Part IV.B.
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power to exclude which is important in attaining a legitimate expectation of
privacy. Stoney and Talley, as sysops, are direct victims of the illegal
search. Thus, system operators seemingly would have standing to assert the
illegality of police action when they take the self-protective steps required
under the Fourth Amendment.
E. Pen Register and Beeper Analogies
Hypothetically, if the police used a device to track where one travels in
cyberspace, there is no reason to think that the use of such technology would
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. When one travels along
the digital highway, such movements are knowingly exposed to the public
and merit no Fourth Amendment protection. The digital web where a user
journeys would be considered the functional equivalent of the public streets.
A cyber-beeper 47 or pen register would seem to comport with the Court's
analysis in Smith and Knotts. As long as a user travels along a public area in
cyberspace, where one can legally view their movements, cyber-tracking
devices would not constitute a search.
F. Data Encryption
While searching through the records of Stoney and Talley's conversa-
tions in the public chat room at Worms R' Us, Officer McFadden discovers
several lines of garbled text sent between Stoney and Talley. Stoney and
Talley encrypted the most detailed portions of their plan to destroy the
Cyber Law Center. Presently, there is no method to decrypt a message
unless one has the key to decode it. Stoney and Talley each memorized the
keys and have never written them down.
Encryption of data is the only surefire way to ensure privacy. 148 Only
those who have the key can decrypt an encoded message. Encrypted data
acts like an impenetrable bomb shelter. Nothing can break into it. It would
seem that the power to exclude others with this technology is absolute. That
being the case, it would seem one will always have standing to challenge the
illegality of a search or seizure of encrypted data. By definition, it is taken
out of the public view.
For every rule there is an exception. The United States government
created encryption software called the "Clipper." 149 Those who use Clipper
147. A cyber-beeper is a hypothetical label that this author is attaching to a device used to
track movement in cyberspace.
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encryption must be aware that the government holds the keys for decryption
in escrow with government agencies. 50 This factor would diminish one's
legitimate expectation of privacy. Further, if technology becomes available
to the public which would allow one to decrypt at will, then encryption will
become obsolete as a means for ensuring a legitimate expectation of privacy
under the rationale of Dow Chemical.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above analysis, it would seem that encryption of data is
the only way a user can attain a legitimate expectation of privacy for
purposes of standing under the Fourth Amendment. The system operator
can gain a legitimate expectation of privacy in cyberspace, but she must take
adequate self-protective steps equivalent to those outlined in Katz and its
progeny. Thus, the criminal defense attorney should advise her clients not to
store any information in cyberspace unless they would be willing to shout
out the same information in a crowded public theater.
"He looked up again at the portrait of Big Brother. The colossus that




151. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 244 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961). In Erich Fromm's after-
word to 1984, he crystallized the impetus this author had for altering the tense in one of the
last passages George Orwell wrote in 1984.
George Orwell's 1984 is the expression of a mood, and it is a warning. The
mood it expresses is that of near despair about the future of man, and the warning
is that unless the course of history changes, men all over the world will lose their
most human qualities, will become soulless automatons, and will not even be
aware of it.
Erich Fromm, Afterword to GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (NAL Penguin Inc. 1961) (emphasis
added).
Unless the current state of the law changes (§ 2515 of the ECPA should be considered a
prime candidate for change), and the courts and Congress act with a keen eye toward learning
about the Internet, it is this author's opinion that that we will forever remain stuck in a sand
trap throughout the "course of history."
* The author would like to thank Professors Johnny C. Burris and Mark Dobson of the
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center for their insight, support, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Immunity, by definition, is a permanent exemption from proceeding
with a legal duty. 2 A maxim of law holds that words of exemption are not to
be construed to import any liability.3 However, privilege has been defined as
a particular benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person or class, beyond the
common advantages of ordinary citizens.4 Additionally, a privilege is known
as
[a]n exemption from some burden or attendance, with which cer-
tain persons are indulged, from a supposition of law that the sta-
tions they fill, or the offices they are engaged in, are such as require
all their time and care, and that, therefore, without this indulgence,
it would be impracticable to execute such offices to that advantage
which the public good requires. 5
This broad definition of privilege is the basis of President Clinton's
argument against Paula Jones. These differences between "immunity" and
"privilege" will be apparent as the United States Supreme Court decisions
and reasons for each are examined herein.
This article distinguishes the concepts of executive immunity from
executive privilege, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, in an
attempt to provide guidance for those interested in understanding the
arguments advanced in Jones v. Clinton.6 Part II of this article begins by
examining the early arguments for executive immunity. Part II also conducts
an in-depth review of the history of Supreme Court decisions and policy
justifications affecting the executive immunity doctrine.
After reviewing the currently applicable Nixon immunity cases, this
article examines the history of Supreme Court decisions involving executive
privileges. Although few Supreme Court decisions have concerned execu-
tive privilege, the procedure of claiming an executive privilege parallels
those arguments advanced in support of President Clinton's claim of a
2. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1197.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979).
6. 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) [hereinafter Jones Il] (holding that President Clinton is
not temporarily immune from civil process, from discovery through trial, during his tenure as
President of the United States).
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"temporary immunity." Part IV of this article presents the facts and argu-
ments advanced in Jones, from the trial court to the Supreme Court. In
addition, the holdings and rationales advanced in both the trial and appellate
courts are surveyed.
After concluding that President Clinton does not have a constitutionally
sound claim for presidential "immunity," Part IV of this article argues that
the relief sought by President Clinton is more akin to the term presidential
privilege. Finally, Part V examines the issues of whether the trial court has
the discretion to stay the trial of the President, and whether the President or
the plaintiff should bear any burden of proof.
II. THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE IMMUNrTIs
Immunities are codified in both state and federal constitutions, statutes,
and the common law.7 First, a state or federal statute may provide a person
immunity from prosecution, immunity from particular testimony, or immu-
nity in exchange for incriminating testimony.8 The most notable form of
common law immunity is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "which
protects local, state, and federal governments from suit." 9 The historical
roots of common law immunity can be traced back to the English maxim,
'the King can do no wrong." °  Second, the United States Constitution
enumerates certain governmental immunities. Specifically, Article I, section
6 of the United States Constitution, which contains the Arrest Clause and
Speech or Debate Clause, states that:
The Senators and Representatives shall ... in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Ar-
rest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in
any other Place."
7. See William F. Allen, Note: President Clinton's Claim of Temporary Immunity: Con-
stitutionalism in the Air, 11 J.L. & PoL. 555, 558-60 (1995).
8. Id. at 558-60.
9. Id. at 558.
10. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1033
(5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted); see e.g. R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47
CAL. L. R .303, 311 (1959).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1997]
195
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
Although immunity has been granted to the legislative 2 and judicial 13
branches of government, this paper is confined to the examination of
immunities extended to the executive branch.
The roots of executive immunity can be found in the English common
law and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 14 "While the latter doctrine -
that the 'King can do no wrong' - did not protect all government officers
from personal liability, the common law soon recognized the necessity of
permitting officials to perform their official functions free from the threat of
suits for personal liability. ' '15 "In general, there is no executive immunity -
common law or otherwise - from criminal prosecution."' 16
Some commentators argue "that the Constitution's provision of im-
peachment as a means of removing 'civil Officers' bars any indictment or
prosecution of impeachable officials until after their removal."' 7 Regardless,
in Marbury v. Madison,18 Chief Justice John Marshall authored the most
often cited rule that "[t]he very effence [sic] of civil liberty certainly confifts
[sic] in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
12. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972) (holding both congres-
sional aides and members of Congress immune under the Speech or Debate Clause for actions
which lead to illegal resolutions); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966)
(holding that judicial inquiry into the substance and motivation of a congressman's speech
was in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379
(1951) (holding that the civil rights statute did not create civil liability for acts by committee
and individual members of Congress during their legitimate legislative activities).
13. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978) (holding that informal pro-
ceeding does not deprive a judge of absolute immunity from damages liability); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (holding state court judges absolutely immune from civil suits
based on constitutional grounds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 357 (1871) (holding that judges are absolutely immune for acts commit-
ted within their judicial jurisdiction).
14. Laurier W. Beaupre, Note, Birth of a Third Immunity: President Bill Clinton Secures
Temporary Immunity From Trial, 36 B.C. L. REv. 725, 729 (1995); Jennifer L. Long, Note,
How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential
Immunity, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 283, 292 (1995); Michael T. Matraia, Note, Running For Cover
Behind Presidential Immunity: The Oval Office as Safe Haven from Civil Suits, 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 195, 199 (1995); Theodore P. Stein, Nixon v. Fitzgerald: Presidential Immunity as
a Constitutional Imperative, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 762 (1983); Gray, supra note 10, at
305.
15. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 (1974) (citations omitted).
16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-14, at 268 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Id.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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afford that protection.,' 9  Consequently, "[t]he Supreme Court has long
recognized a federal common law immunity protecting executive officials, in
the absence of congressionally-created exceptions, from civil liability to
private plaintiffs arising out of acts performed 'in the discharge of duties
imposed upon [such officials] by law."' 20  Initially, two public policy
arguments were established for extending immunity to executive officials.
This immunity,
apparently rested, in its genesis, on two mutually dependent ratio-
nales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of
subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obli-
gations of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to exe-
cute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
the public good.2'
A. The Supreme Court's Early Immunity Cases
Although the United States Constitution enumerates executive powers
and duties vested in the President, it falls to specifically impart any special
privileges or immunities upon the executive. 22  Although "presidential
immunity is mentioned neither in the Constitution nor in any statute, it did
prove a topic for debate among early statesmen."23 "John Adams and Oliver
Ellsworth argued that 'the President, personally, was not the subject to any
process whatsoever,' reasoning that to do otherwise would allow the courts
to 'stop the whole machine of Government."' 24 Nonetheless, "Charles
Pinckney argued that the framers deliberately chose not to grant the Presi-
dent immunity because they 'well knew how oppressively the power of
undefined privileges has been exercised in Great Britain, and were deter-
mined no such authority should ever be exercised here."'5 "The absence of
19. Id. at 163.
20. TRME, supra note 16, at 269 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
21. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 (citations omitted).
22. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II (memorializing the President's powers and duties).
23. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 731.
24. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 n.31 (1982) (citing W. MACLAY,
ThE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 167 (1890 ed.))).
25. Id. at 732 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 777 (1982) (White, J., dis-
senting) (citing 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 72 (1800))).
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Constitutional authority left the creation of an American immunity doctrine
where it had been in England: in the courts. 26
In 1866, in Mississippi v. Johnson,27 the United States Supreme Court
faced the issue of whether an injunction could restrain the President from
carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional.2' The
State of Mississippi filed a bill to enjoin Andrew Johnson and his officers
from executing two acts of Congress, commonly called the Reconstruction
Acts.29 In President Andrew Johnson's defense, Attorney General Stanbery
argued that, due to the office which the President holds, the President is
immune from service of process or the jurisdiction of any court. 30 Stanbery
continued:
There is only one court or quasi court that he can be called upon to
answer to for any dereliction of duty, for doing anything that is
contrary to law or failing to do anything which is according to law,
and that is not this tribunal but one that sits in another chamber of
this Capitol. There he can be called and tried and punished, but not
here while he is President; and after he has been dealt with in that
chamber and stripped of the robes of office, and he no longer
stands as the representative of the government, then for any wrong
he has done to any individual, for any murder or any crime of any
sort which he has committed as President, then and not till then can
he be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts. Then it is the indi-
vidual they deal with, not the representative of the people.
31
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase distinguished the
performance of a ministerial duty from the exercise of discretion.32 The
Court concluded that "the duty of the President in the exercise of the power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed ... is in no just sense ministerial.
It is purely executive and political. 33 The Court held that, "this court has no
jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. ' 34  Although the Court never addressed the issue of whether the
26. Id. at 732-33 (citations omitted).
27. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
28. Id at 498.
29. Id. at 475.
30. Id. at 484.
31. Id. at 484-85.
32. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 498-99.
33. Id at 499.
34. Id. at 501.
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President is immune from service of process or jurisdiction, "some com-
mentators broadly interpreted Johnson to mean that the President is immune
from legal process when performing what he deems to be his constitutional
duties. 35
In United States v. Lee,36 the issue concerned whether an action could
be maintained against the defendants, who were military officers and
executive officials of the United States, for the possession of approximately
1000 acres, known as Arlington estate.37 George W. P. C. Lee, the original
plaintiff, devised this land to his daughter, the wife of General Robert E.
Lee, for life, and after her death to the plaintiff. The United States pur-
chased the land in controversy at a tax sale and retained possession of the
property for more than ten years. Frederick Kaufman and Richard P. Strong,
defendants, were tax commissioners in charge of the certificate of sale to
Arlington estate, and both defendants were under orders from the secretary
of war. The orders included that part of the property was to be used for a
military station, and the rest, for a national cemetery to bury deceased
soldiers and sailors, today known as the Arlington Cemetery.38 The case was
first decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Virginia, and the jury found the tax certificate and sale did not divest the
plaintiff of his title to the property.39 Attorney General Devens argued on
appeal that the courts had no jurisdiction over the subject in controversy, by
reason of official immunity, and that "all the proceedings be stayed and
dismissed.. .. "40
Writing for the United States Supreme Court, Justice Samuel F. Miller
stated:
The defense stands here solely upon the absolute immunity from
judicial inquiry of every one who asserts authority from the execu-
tive branch of the government ....
[However,] [n]o man in this country is so high that he is above
the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with
35. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONmSTIUTIONAL LAW § 7.1, at 235 (5th ed.
1995).
36. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
37. Id at 199.
38. Id. at 198.
39. l at 199.
40. Id. at 198.
1997]
199
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
41
The Court went on to affirm the decision of the circuit court, further
stating that a court's "power and influence rest[s] solely upon the public
sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal
for the assertion and protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
by the laws of the land .... 42
The arguments advanced in these early immunity cases laid the founda-
tion for a judicially-created executive immunity doctrine. "Understanding
the importance of the immunity doctrine as applied to the President requires
an analysis of currently existing immunity law and its historical founda-
tions."43
B. Supreme Court Development of Executive Immunity
The scope of the immunities extended to the executive branch were
"traditionally quite broad and protected the defendant even in cases that
undoubtedly involved tortious behavior."44 Federal courts granted immunity
to the executive branch based on the judicial immunity developed in Bradley
v. Fisher.45 "Just as the judicial system could not function if judges feared
lawsuits.. . the executive branch could not function if officials could not act
in the public interest without fearing liability."
46
1. Absolute Immunity
Originally, the federal courts took a broad, liberal view of immunity
when executive officers were sued under state law claims, "holding that in
such cases the federal officers held an absolute immunity for acts within the
scope of their discretion." 47 This tolerant approach to the executive immu-
nity doctrine extended protection, "even for malicious actions if those
actions were deemed to be within the 'outer perimeter' of the federal duty.
48
41. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Long, supra note 14, at 292.
44. KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, § 131, at 1032. he idea was that... social values of
great importance required that the defendant escape liability. The immunity thus might be
thought to differ from a privilege .. " Id.
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
46. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 734.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss3/1
Williams
Thus, absolute immunity permanently bars a plaintiff's civil damages claim
regardless of the official's underlying motive.49 Originally, "[h]igh-ranking
executive branch officials donned the judge's absolute immunity cloak in
1896.1"50
In Spalding v. Vilas,51 the issue was whether the head of an executive
department, here the Postmaster General, was liable for damages on account
of official communications made within his authority, pursuant to an act of
Congress, due to the personal or malicious motive which prompted his
action. 2 An attorney representing local postmasters in a salary dispute
alleged that the Postmaster General maliciously sent letters to the attorney's
clients with the intent to circumvent and prevent the attorney from recover-
ing his fees. 3
Writing for the Court, Justice John M. Harlan proclaimed:
We are of opinion that the same general considerations of public
policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of supe-
rior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from
acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial
functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made
by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge
of duties imposed upon them by law. The interests of the people
require that due protection be accorded to them in respect of their
official acts.54
As with judicial immunity, the Court continued to distinguish between
actions taken by an executive department head which are "manifestly or
palpably beyond his authority" and actions taken within the executive's
discretion or authority under *the law.55 The Court went on to hold that an
executive department head was not liable for a civil suit predicated on
actions taken within the official's authority.56 The Court reasoned that, in
49. Matraia, supra note 14, at 204.
50. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 734.
51. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
52. Id. at 484. See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871) (holding
that judges of courts of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune from civil suits for judicial
actions within the court's jurisdiction, and, therefore, any exercise of that jurisdiction cannot
be affected by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done).
53. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 487-88.





: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
keeping within the limits of one's authority, an executive department head
"should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his
official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil
suit for damages," because to do so would "cripple the proper and effective
administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch ....
The preceding policy argument was the underlying proposition and main
justification for the Supreme Court's extension of immunity to executive
branch officials.
In Barr v. Matteo,58 the issue was whether the absolute immunity
granted to executive department heads should be extended to lower ranking
executive officials.59 Two employees from the Office of Rent Stabilization
sued the Acting Director, William Barr, for defamation based on the issu-
ance of a press release in which its publication and terms originated by
reason of the Acting Director's malice.6° Linda A. Matteo and John J.
Madigan, the two employees, devised a plan to spend $2,600,000 of agency
funds earmarked for terminal-leave payments, whereby agency employees
would be discharged, paid their terminal-leave, rehired immediately as
temporary employees, and later restored to permanent status.61 The text of
the press release included comments that William Barr would demand the
resignations of employees who took cash leave settlements because he
violently opposed it. He charged that his first official act as director would
be to ferret out and suspend these employees.
62
Writing for a plurality, Justice John M. Harlan reasoned that Barr's
action was within the "outer perimeter of... [his] line of duty," and was "an
appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must
possess if the public service is to function effectively. 63 Thus, the Court
extended absolute immunity beyond executive department heads to execu-
tive officers generally. 64 While applying this functional approach to immu-
nity, Justice Harlan added a third policy argument for extending immunity to
57. Id.
58. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
59. Id. at 569.
60. Id. at 565.
61. Id. at 565-56. Various senators referred to the plan as "'a highly questionable proce-
dure,' a 'raid on the Federal Treasury,' 'a conspiracy to defraud the Government of funds,'
and as 'definitely involv[ing] criminal action."' Id. at 567 n.4 (citation omitted).
62. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 567 n.5.
63. Id. at 575.
64. Id. at 574; see also TRIBE, supra note 16, at 269 n.5 (explaining that immunity rules
extend beyond "'executive officers of cabinet rank,"' protecting executive officers generally).
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executive officials when he stated that damage suits "would consume time
and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental ser-
vice .... ,,65 This policy argument is the main trust of President Clinton's
justification for extending presidential immunity to protect an incumbent
President from most civil legal process, from discovery through trial.
2. Qualified Immunity
Beginning in the 1970s, many immunity cases involved allegations of
state and federal officers violating federal laws." The Civil Rights Act was
the main source for claims alleging violations of constitutional rights.67
When an officer violated a federal constitutional right, the Supreme Court
provided protection for the officer but qualified the immunity granted. 68
Originally, qualified immunity had a subjective element. Today, the plaintiff
is required to establish a violation of "statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. 69
In Pierson v. Ray,70 three policemen of the City of Jackson arrested and
charged ministers, who were members of a group of fifteen white and Negro
Episcopal clergymen, with violating Mississippi law for "attempt[ing] to use
segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal.' The ministers were
eventually convicted of the offense by Judge Spencer.72 Following their
convictions, the ministers instituted a lawsuit alleging that the police officers
and the judge had violated the Civil Rights Act and the common law of
Mississippi for false arrest and imprisonment. 3 At issue was whether the
police officers and judges were immune from liability for damages actions
under the Civil Rights Act.74
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren reasoned that Congress
never indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which effects all people who under
color of law deprive another of his civil rights, would "abolish wholesale all
65. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571; see also Stein, supra note 14, at 764 (adding a third policy
justification for extending the immunity doctrine to federal executive officials generally).
66. KEFTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1060-61.
67. Id. at 1061.
68. Id.
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
70. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
71. IMt at 549.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 550.
74. Id. at 548.
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common-law immunities.",75 Writing on judicial immunity, Warren further
reasoned,
[T]his Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove .... that the immunity of
legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished.
The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally
well established, and we presume that Congress would have spe-
cifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.76
Consequently, the Court held Judge Spencer absolutely immune from
damages liability for his role in these convictions.77 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that "[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute
and unqualified immunity....,,s
The police officers argued that they should not be liable for acting in
good faith and with probable cause while making an arrest under a statute
that they believed to be valid.79 The Court reasoned that "[p]art of the
background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is
the defense of good faith and probable cause., 80 For the first time in the
Supreme Court, police officers were afforded a qualified immunity in actions
alleging constitutional violations.
[T]he defense of good faith and probable cause.., available to the
officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprison-
ment, is also available to them in the action under [42 U.S.C.] §
1983.... We agree that a police officer is not charged with pre-
dicting the future course of constitutional law.
81
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,82 the issue concerned whether a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment by a federal agent acting under color of law gives rise to a damages
cause of action. 3 Allegedly, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
carried out an arrest of Webster Bivens and a search of his apartment,
75. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554.
76. Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 553.
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id.
80. Ray, 386 U.S. at 556-57.
81. I. at 557.
82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
83. Id. at 389.
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without a warrant and using unreasonable force.84 The Court reiterated that
the "Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal
power .... ,,85 Although the United States Supreme Court never ruled on the
immunity issue, the Court repeated the declaration made in Marbury v.
Madison, that "'[tihe very effence [sic] of civil liberty certainly confifts [sic]
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury."' 8 6 The Court held that an alleged violation of the
Fourth Amendment by federal officials gives rise to a cause of action for
damages.87
The case was remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, where the appellate court fashioned a two-step test to
determine whether official actions were within the established immunity
doctrine.88 First, it must be determined whether the officials were acting
"within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty." 89 If so, were they
"performing the type of 'discretionary' function that entitles them to immu-
nity from suit[?]" 90 The court of appeals determined that the agents were
acting within the scope of their duty, but rejected the claim of immunity
because the agents were not engaged in the performance of a discretionary
act.91
Writing for the court, circuit Judge Medina went further and established
a partly subjective, partly objective defense to claims against officers
charged with violating one's constitutional rights.92 Subjectively, the
officials must allege and prove that they acted in good faith.93 Objectively,
officials must have a reasonable belief in the validity of their actions. 94 "By
asserting violations of constitutional rights as the basis for their suits,
litigants stripped the absolute immunity defense from executive offi-




85. Id. at 392.
86. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
87. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
88. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972).
89. Id. at 1343.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. ILd. at 1348.
93. Bivens, 456 F.2d at 1348.
94. Id.
95. Beaupre, supra note 14, at 736.
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In Scheuer v. Rhodes,96 the personal representatives of the estates of
three students who died on the campus of Kent State University brought
various damage actions under the Civil Rights Act against the Governor of
Ohio, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, various other
National Guard officers, and the University president.97 These officials were
charged with allegedly acting under color of state law by intentionally
causing the deployment of the National Guard with orders to perform illegal
acts.98
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated:
Ex parte Young teaches that when a state officer acts under a state
law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes
into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."99
After an analysis and rejection of the common law absolute immunity
afforded officials, Chief Justice Burger went on to say:
[Q]ualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on
which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reason-
able grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in
the course of official conduct.'0
Chief Justice Burger supplied a three-step analysis for courts to apply
when addressing issues of qualified immunity for state officials.'0 ' First, a
96. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
97. Id. at 234.
98. Id. at 235.
99. Id. at 237 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). "Ex parte
Young... involved a question of the federal courts' injunctive power, not, as here, a claim for
monetary damages." Id. at 237-38.
100. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
101. Id. at 250.
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court must determine whether the official was acting within the scope of his
duties. 10 2 Second, the court must decide whether the official acted within the
"range of discretion permitted [to] the holders of such office.. ." under the
law.103 Finally, the fact-finder must determine whether the official acted in
the good faith belief that his actions were within the law.1°4
In the instant case, the Court ordered that the case be reversed and
remanded so the lower court could make a finding of good faith.105 But,
"after Scheuer, lower federal courts applied varying standards, unsure of
whether a government official must satisfy an objective test, a subjective
test, or both."' 6  Scheuer represents the first time the Supreme Court
departed from the all-or-nothing approach under absolute immunity, seeking
a more balanced approach, by weighing the competing policy interests
affecting executive immunity, with the recognition of qualified immunity.
According to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.:
Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in
§ 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded quali-
fied immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in pro-
portion to the nature of their official functions and the range of de-
cisions that conceivably might be taken in 'good faith.' This
'functional' approach also defined a second tier, however, at which
the especially sensitive duties of certain officials-notably judges
and prosecutors-required the continued recognition of absoluteimmunity.1°7
In Butz v. Economou,10 8 the plaintiffs filed suit against federal officials
within the Department of Agriculture claiming that the investigation and
administrative proceeding, to revoke or suspend plaintiffs' registration, was
in retaliation for criticism of the Department and in violation of federal
constitutional rights. 09 The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the
102. ld.
103. Id.
104. Id. See also Matraia, supra note 14, at 210 (reciting the holding that qualified im-
munity applies if the official acted in good faith and believed that the actions taken were
within the law).
105. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 250.
106. Matraia, supra note 14, at 210.
107. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,746 (1982).
108. 438 U.S. 478 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. I& at 480.
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grounds of official immunity arguing that all federal officials are absolutely
immune from any liability for damages, even if in the course of enforcing the
law, they violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights." ° Writing for the
Court, Justice Byron R. White reexamined the history of immunity. Justice
White stated that "[t]he immunity of federal executive officials began as a
means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties
from criminal or civil actions based on state law."'' The Court distin-
guished Barr"2 and Spalding' 3 on the ground that neither suit involved the
liability of officials who had exceeded their constitutional limits, as was the
case here." 4 Justice White stated the opinion of the Court:
We agree... that, in the absence of congressional direction to the
contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher
degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional
infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state offi-
cials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983 .... To
create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely
the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is
to stand the constitutional design on its head .... If, as the Gov-
ernment argues, all officials exercising discretion were exempt
from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide
no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter
federal officials from committing constitutional wrongs." 5
The Court clarified another element for courts to analyze when the
litigation involves an alleged constitutional violation. First, courts should
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a damages remedy for the
particular constitutional violation." 6 Then, courts should "address how best
to reconcile the plaintiffs right to compensation with the need to protect the
decision-making processes of an executive department."' 1 7 Although, the
Supreme Court held that federal executive officials are only entitled to a
qualified immunity for constitutional violations, absolute immunity will be
recognized for those "officials whose special functions require a full exemp-
110. Id. at 483.
111. Id. at 489.
112. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
113. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
114. Economou, 438 U.S. at 495.
115. Id. at 500, 504-05.
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tion from liability."' 18 In so holding, the Court first ruled that persons
performing adjudicatory functions within federal agencies are entitled to
absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial acts.119 Second, agency officials
who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor were determined
to be entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their decisions
to initiate or continue proceedings.120 Finally, an agency attorney who
arranges for presentation of evidence in the course of proceedings was
entitled to absolute immunity from suit based on the introduction of such
evidence. 21 The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.122
The preceding case law illustrates the extent to which the Supreme
Court rationalized the scope and need for executive immunity. As a result,
the United States Supreme Court has drawn the line of executive immunity
between those acts which fall within a particular official's discretion and
functional responsibilities. In the Nixon immunity cases,1 3 however, the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of immunity for the President of the
United States. Presidential immunity continues to apply to civil actions for
damages, but the Court consciously avoided any application of the functional
approach for the Presidency. Although presidential immunity is limited for
those acts taken within the zone of a President's 6onstitutional duties, the
zone of constitutional responsibilities are interpreted rather broadly. Besides
granting an absolute immunity for President Nixon, the Supreme Court
stated its willingness to extend absolute immunity for certain functions
exercised by executive branch officials.
118. Id at 508.
119. Economou, 438 U.S. at 514. See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)
(holding state court judges absolutely immune from civil suits based on constitutional grounds
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1872)
(holding judges absolutely immune from civil suit "for malice or corruption in their action
whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general scope of their jurisdiction .... ).
120. Economou, 438 U.S. at 516. See also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,427 (1976)
(extending absolute immunity to state prosecutors and holding a state prosecutor immune from
suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims). The Pachtman Court reasoned that "lilt is the
functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both
grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities
being termed 'quasi-judicial' as well." Id. at 423 n.20.
121. Economou, 438 U.S. at 517. The Economou Court saw no difference between a
prosecutor's function in presenting evidence in a judicial proceeding from that of the agency
attorney presenting evidence in an administrative proceeding. Id. at 516.
122. Id. at 517.
123. The phrase "Nixon immunity cases" refers to Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982) and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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3. The Nixon Immunity Cases
On June 24, 1982, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,124 an intensely divided
Supreme Court granted the President absolute immunity from all civil
damage claims alleging acts within the "outer perimeter" of the President's
official duties and responsibilities. 125 That same day, the Supreme Court
handed down Harlow v. Fitzgerald,126 in which the Court declined to extend
absolute immunity to presidential aides.127 These Nixon immunity cases
introduce the current law applicable to disputes involving both the absolute
and qualified immunities available to the President and all other executive
officials in general.
The Harlow case actually began in January of 1970, when A. Earnest
Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Air Force Department, lost his job
during a "departmental reorganization and reduction in force ....,,28 Back
in November of 1968, Fitzgerald "attained national prominence" while
testifying before a Congressional Subcommittee that there were approxi-
mately $2,000,000,000 in cost overruns on a new transport airplane. 129
"Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congres-
sional testimony, the [Congressional] Subcommittee... convened public
hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal."' 30 After a flurry of media questions
concerning Fitzgerald's termination, President Nixon attempted to reassign
Fitzgerald to the Bureau of the Budget.' 3' In reality, "Fitzgerald's proposed
reassignment encountered resistance within the administration" because of
Fitzgerald's poor loyalty.1 32 As a result, his position was abolished.
133
Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission ("Commission")
which, after a highly publicized closed hearing, concluded that Fitzgerald's
dismissal was grounded on "'reasons purely personal,"' thus the reasons for
"'134his termination were an "impermissible basis for a reduction in force ....
124. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
125. Id. at 757.
126. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
127. Id. at 817-18.
128. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 733.
129. Id. at 734.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 735.
132. Id. at 735-36.
133. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 736-37.
134. Id. at 738 (citation omitted).
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The Commission awarded Fitzgerald back pay and recommended that he be
ordered a new position within the Defense Department.
135
Consequently, "Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States
District Court ... rais[ing] essentially the same claims presented to" the
Commission.5 6 The complaint was dismissed for all defendants based upon
the statutes of limitations, except for White House aide Alexander Butter-
field. 137 More than eight years after Fitzgerald's initial discharge, Fitzgerald
amended the complaint to include former President Nixon and another White
House aide Bryce Harlow.138 The district court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment and ruled that President Nixon was not
entitled to absolute immunity. 139 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the appellate court summarily dismissed the appeal."40
Writing for a plurality, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that since
"[c]onsiderations of 'public policy and convenience' justified "judicial
recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts," with cases
involving the President, the inquiries into history essentially involve
"policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the
President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government
under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers."' 41 Justice Powell
focused on two policy issues that raised "unique risks to the effective
functioning of government."' 42 First, "[b]ecause of the singular importance
of the President's duties... there exists the greatest public interest in
providing an official 'the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially
with' the duties of his office.' 43 Second,
[i]n view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions
on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable
target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vul-
nerability frequently could distract a President from his public du-
135. Id. at 738-39 n.17.
136. Id. at 739.
137. Id.
138. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 740.
139. Id. at 740-41.
140. Id. at 741.
141. Id. at 745, 748.
142. Id. at 751.
143. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751-52 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
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ties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but
also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve.
144
"In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office and
functions," the Court held that the President is entitled to absolute immunity
against damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official
responsibilities.
45
Even though the President was afforded absolute immunity from civil
damages suits, the Court reasoned that the "[n]ation [is not] without suffi-
cient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive."'
146
The Court specifically identified impeachment as a constitutional remedy for
misconduct by a President, including "formal and informal checks," such as,
"constant scrutiny by the press," "[v]igilant oversight by Congress," the
President's "desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an
element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for
his historical stature."'147 The Court concluded that "[t]he existence of
alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will
not place the President 'above the law.' For the President, as for judges and
prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy
for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends."'4 s
However, the plurality opinion was intensely criticized by the dissent-
ers. Writing the dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued:
Attaching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather
than to particular activities that the President might perform, places
the President above the law. It is a reversion to the old notion that
the King can do no wrong. Until now, this concept had survived in
this country only in the form of sovereign immunity .... Now,
however, the Court clothes the Office of the President with sover-
eign immunity, placing it beyond the law.
149
Justice White accurately summarized the history of the American common
law doctrine of executive immunity during his rebuttal:
144. Id. at 753.
145. Id. at 756.
146. Id. at 757.
147. Id.
148. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 758.
149. Id at 766-67 (White, J. dissenting).
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The Court's response, until today, to this [immunity] problem has
been to apply the argument to individual functions, not offices, and
to evaluate the effect of liability on governmental decisionmaking
within that function .... The functional approach to the separation-
of-powers doctrine and the Court's more recent immunity decisions
converge on the following principle: The scope of immunity is
determined by function, not office. The wholesale claim that the
President is entitled to absolute immunity in all of his actions
stands on no firmer ground than did the claim that all Presidential
communications are entitled to an absolute privilege, which was
rejected in favor of a functional analysis, by a unanimous Court in
United States v. Nixon.'
50
Harlow v. Fitzgerald'5 ' addressed the scope of immunity available to
senior aides and advisors of the President of the United States involving
lawsuits for damages predicated upon their official acts.1 52 White House
aides Alexander Butterfield and Bryce Harlow were alleged to have joined
former President Richard M. Nixon 53 in a conspiracy to violate constitu-
tional and statutory rights of the respondent A. Earnest Fitzgerald.
15 4
Consequently, Butterfield and Harlow appealed the denial of their immunity
defense independent of former President Nixon.
55
Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. determined that,
"[o]ur decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds. For
officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete
protection from suit, we have recognized the defense of 'absolute immunity.'
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that
qualified immunity represents the norm."'156 Butterfield and Harlow argued
that they were "entitled to a blanket protection of absolute immunity as an
incident of their offices as Presidential aides.' 57 Since the President must
delegate a large measure of authority, they argued that "recognition of
derivative absolute immunity is made essential by all the considerations that
support absolute immunity for the President himself."'15 8 The Court coun-
150. Id. at 784-85 (citation omitted).
151. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
152. Id. at 802.
153. Id. The alleged conspiracy is the same as involved in Fitzgerald. Id.
154. Id. at 802.
155. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806.
156. Id. at 807 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 808.
158. Id. at 810.
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tered by stating that "we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity in
Butz .... In general our cases have followed a 'functional' approach to
immunity law.' 59
Butterfield and Harlow also asserted their entitlement to immunity
based on the "special functions" of White House aides.1 60 To this argument
the Court responded:
For aides entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive
areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity
might well be justified to protect the unhesitating performance of
functions vital to the national interest. But a 'special functions' ra-
tionale does not warrant a blanket recognition of absolute immunity
for all Presidential aides in the performance of all their duties ....
In order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential
aide first must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced
a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability. He
then must demonstrate that he was discharging the protected func-
tion when performing the act for which liability is asserted.16
The Court agreed that if Butterfield and Harlow failed to establish
absolute immunity, public policy "mandates an application of the qualified
immunity standard that would permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial."'162 "Yet.. . the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits
without trial-a factor presupposed in the balance of competing interests
struck by our prior cases-requires an adjustment of the 'good faith'
standard established by our decisions."
' 63
The Court reasoned that "Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided
on motions for summary judgment. And an official's subjective good faith
has been considered to be a question of fact.., regarded as inherently
requiring resolution by a jury."' 64 Justice Powell explained:
Immunity generally is available only to officials performing dis-
cretionary functions .... [and] the judgments surrounding discre-
tionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decision-
159. Id.
160. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811.
161. Id. at 812-13.
162. Id. at 813.
163. Id. at 814-15.
164. Id. at 816.
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maker's experiences, values, and emotions. These variables ex-
plain in part why questions of subjective intent so rarely can be de-
cided by summary judgment .... Judicial inquiry into subjective
motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the
deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional
colleagues. Inquires of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of ef-
fective government. 165
Accordingly, the Court held that "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 166 The Court reasoned that, "[r]eliance on the objective reason-
ableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly
established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." 167
The Court fashioned a two-step analysis for issues of qualified immu-
nity on summary judgment. 68 First, the judge should determine what is the
currently applicable law.169 Second, the judge should determine "whether
that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.' 70 The
Court justified this analysis by stating the following:
If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed.' 7 '
Il. THE HISTORY OF ExEcuTIvE PRIVILEGES
Scholarly literature has associated and combined the term "immunity"
with "privilege," hence an essential prerequisite to any intelligent discussion
165. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17.
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of privilege involves distinguishing privilege from the related doctrines of
governmental immunity.17 2  Primarily, executive privilege is defined as an
executive official's or a President's claim of constitutional authority to
withhold information from the legislative and judicial branches, whereas
immunity, if granted, permanently prohibits a plaintiffs cause of action. 7
3
"The very words 'executive privilege' were conjoined only yesterday, in
1958."'' 7 Just as executive immunity began with arguments that the Presi-
dent was not subject to service of process or jurisdiction, these arguments
were also advanced by Presidents to avoid subpoenas in executive privilege
cases.
175
In addition to a communications privilege, some commentators suggest
that the President has a witness privilege. 176  It is suggested that due to
presidential responsibilities, a President should be excused from actual
appearance, and instead, may give his or her testimony by deposition. 77
However, several Presidents and former Presidents have testified in court
'78and before Congress.
172. 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5663 (1992).
173. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 (1974).
174. Id. at 1.
175. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 235 n.1.
Subpoenas of the President. Prior to the subpoena of a President upheld in
United States v. Nixon, the courts only twice before issued a subpoena to a sit-
ting President. The first was the subpoena issued to President Jefferson in
United States v. Burr; Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on circuit during the treason
trial of Aaron Burr, was the trial judge. Burr intended to obtain a letter sent to
Jefferson as well as various documents. The extent to which Jefferson complied
is unclear. Jefferson withheld parts of the letter, and Marshall apparently ac-
cepted this withholding. The letter was not introduced in evidence.
On January 3, 1818, President Monroe became the second President to be
served with a subpoena while in office.
Id. (citations omitted).
176. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5673, at 58.
177. Id.
178. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 35, at 238-39 n.28.
Ford. In United States v. Fromme, President Ford was compelled to testify
by videotaped deposition at trial of Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, who had at-
tempted to assassinate Ford. In addition, while President, President Ford volun-
tarily appeared before a House subcommittee to answer questions that had been
raised concerning his pardon of former President Nixon; and on September 15,
1988 Ford voluntarily appeared before a Senate Committee and testified about
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The President has the right to receive confidential communications from
his aides and advisors pursuant to Article II of the United States Constitu-
tion. 179 "[A]lthough the Constitution does not explicitly reference a privi-
lege of confidentiality, to the extent the President's interest in confidentiality
relates to the effective discharge of Executive powers, it is constitutionally
based." 180 -Although the need to protect confidential communications is
derived from the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, executive
privilege is not absolute, but rather a qualified privilege.'
81
Although some commentators thought that executive privilege was first
recognized by the courts in the trial of Aaron Burr,18 2 most writers assert that
the privilege demanded by President Thomas Jefferson during that case was
what is today called "executive privilege."'183 The case most frequently cited
as being the first American decision allowing for the privilege of state
secrets is Totten v. United States.184 "However, a careful reading of Totten
tends to support those who argue that the basis of the decision was the law of
contracts, not the privilege for secrets of state."'
85
"In 1953, in the midst of the worst of the McCarthy hysteria, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Reynolds, its first and still the
leading case on the state secrets privilege."'8 6  In United States v. Rey-
Carter. During his presidency, President Carter gave videotaped testimony
that was presented at the criminal trial of two Georgia state officials charged with
gambling conspiracy; two years later, President Carter provided videotaped tes-
timony for a grand jury probing charges that Robert Vesco, a fugitive financier,
had enlisted the White House to quash extradition proceedings against him. Also
while President, President Carter was interviewed under oath by the Counsel on
Professional Responsibility pursuant to a Department of Justice order to investi-
gate "for criminal, civil and administration purposes" any offenses resulting from
his brother Billy Carter's relations with the Libyan Government.
Reagan. In United States v. Poindexter, the district court ordered video-
taped deposition of former President Reagan, at the insistence of criminal defen-
dant Poindexter, the former President testified on videotape, which was intro-
duced in the trial, which was part of the series of trials prosecuted by the statuto-
rily created Independent Counsel and growing out of the Iran-Contra affair.
Id. (citations omitted).
179. Andrea L. Wolff, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Executive Privilege:
Resolving the Separation of Powers Issue, 5 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 1023, 1040 (1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692D) (C.C.Va. 1807).
183. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5663, at 505-06.
184. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
185. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 172, § 5663, at 506.
186. Id. at 507-08.
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nolds,187 the Supreme Court granted certiorari "[b]ecause an important
question of the Government's privilege to resist discovery is in-
,188volved .... " A military aircraft took flight to test secret electronic
equipment. 89 While in flight, fire consumed the bomber's engines and
killed six crew members and three civilians in the resulting crash.19° The
widows of the three deceased civilians brought a consolidated suit against
the United States. 191 During discovery, the widows sought production of the
Air Force's official accident investigation report. The Government moved to
quash the request for production on the ground that these matters were
privileged against disclosure.192 After the Government produced the docu-
ments to the judge for a determination of whether they contained privileged
information, the district court declined the claim of privilege and ordered the
documents be produced.193 In the end, final judgment was awarded to the
widows and an appeal followed. 194 The appellate court affirmed, stating
both that there was a sufficient showing of good cause for the production of
the documents and as to the ultimate disposition of the case.1
95
The government's attorney argued to the United States Supreme Court
that executive department heads have the power to withhold any documents
in their custody from judicial view if they deem it to be in the public inter-
est.196 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson reasoned that,
"[w]hen the Secretary of the Air Force lodged his formal 'Claim of Privi-
lege,' he attempted therein to invoke the privilege against revealing military
secrets .... , Ruling on the merits, the Court stated:
[T]he trial judge was in no position to decide that the report was
privileged until there had been a formal claim of privilege. Thus it
was entirely proper to rule initially that petitioner had shown prob-
able cause for discovery of the documents. Thereafter, when the
formal claim of privilege was filed.., there was certainly a suffi-
187. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).




192. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6.
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cient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the docu-
ment.
198
Since there was nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment had
any causal connection with the accident, the Court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court.' 99 Thus, the
Court granted a qualified executive privilege to executive department heads
in civil suits.
In United States v. Nixon,2°° an indictment was issued alleging viola-
tions of federal statutes by certain White House staff and political supporters
of the President. Before trial, the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for a
subpoena duces tecum directing President Nixon to produce certain tapes
and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and meetings
between the President and others.2 1 The President filed a motion to quash
the subpoena, claiming executive privilege.?2 Initially, President's counsel
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena, because the
matter was an intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior
officer of the executive branch and hence not subject to judicial review.0 3
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger first
addressed the issue of justiciability. The Court reasoned:
The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an ob-
vious controversy in the ordinary sense... [i]n the constitutional
sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict;
rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally resolve.
Here at issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evi-
dence.., sought by one official of the Executive Branch within the
scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive
on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the
communications of the President. Whatever the correct answer on
the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally justi-
ciable ..... Moreover, since the matter is one arising in the regular
198. l at 10-11.
199. Id. at 11-12.
200. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 692.
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course of a federal criminal prosecution, it is within the traditional
scope of Art. IH power. 
2W
Thus, the Court ruled that the Special Prosecutor has standing to
enforce a subpoena duces tecum for the production, before trial, of certain
tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conversations and
meetings between the President and others.
After determining that the requirements of rule 17(c) were satisfied, 205
the Court turned to the claim of executive privilege. 2°M The President's first
argument was that the separation of powers doctrine precluded judicial
review of the President's claim of privilege.207 Additionally, the President
argued that if he does not prevail on the claim of absolute privilege, the
Court should, as a matter of constitutional law, hold that the privilege
prevails over the subpoena duces tecum °2 08 The Court first reiterated a
proposition in Marbury v. Madison, that "it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.,' 20 9 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that it had the authority in this case to state what the law
was regarding the President's claim of privilege.210 Turning to the second
argument, Chief Justice Burger reasoned:
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute
privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal
statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest
in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions
would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government'
and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. 111.211
204. Id. at 696-97 (citation omitted).
205. See United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In order to require
production prior to trial, the moving party must show: 1) that the documents are evidentiary
and relevant; 2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
exercise of due diligence; 3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such
production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may
tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and 4) that the application is made in good faith and is
not intended as a general 'fishing expedition.' Id. at 338.
206. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
210. Id. at 705.
211. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
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The Court held that a general claim for the privilege of confidentiality
of presidential communications must be weighed against the effects which
this particular exercise of privilege would bear against the effective func-
tioning of the judicial process.21 2 However, the Court proceeded to justify
the invocation of a qualified, presumptive privilege.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alter-
natives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except pri-
vately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is funda-
mental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution ....
But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of
our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere more
profoundly manifest than in our view that "the twofold aim [of
criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suf-
fer. . . ." To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the func-
tion of courts that compulsory process be available for the produc-
tion of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the de-
fense .... Nowhere in the Constitution... is there any explicit ref-
erence to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest
relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is con-
stitutionally based.213
After weighing the competing interests at stake, the Court concluded
that President Nixon's generalized interest in confidentiality of communica-
tions does not prevail over fundamental demands of due process of law in
the fair administration of criminal justice:214
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,21 5 President Nixon, after
his resignation, entered into an agreement with the Administrator of General
Services that provided for the storage of an estimated 42 million pages of
documents and 880 tape recordings. Under the agreement, neither President
Nixon nor the General Services Administration ("GSA") could gain access
to the materials without the other's consent.216 Just after a public an-
nouncement of this agreement, a bill was introduced in Congress designed to
212. Id. at 707-08.
213. Id. at 708-11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
214. Id. at7ll-13.
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invalidate it.217 Approximately three months later, this bill was enacted as
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act ("Act") and was
signed into law by President Gerald Ford.218 The Act directs the Adminis-
trator of GSA to take custody of President Nixon's materials and have them
screened by Government archivists.219 The purpose was to return to Presi-
dent Nixon those materials, personal and private in nature, and to preserve
those having historical value.220 This Act would make important materials
available for use in judicial proceedings subject to "any rights, defenses or
privileges which the Federal Government or any person may invoke., 221
The day after the Act was signed into law, President Nixon filed an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the
Act by challenging the Act's constitutionality on the grounds that it violates:
1) the principle of separation of powers; 2) the Presidential privilege; 3)
President Nixon's privacy interests; 4) his First Amendment associational
rights; and 5) the Bill of Attainder Clause.222 Because this section is only
concerned with presidential privileges, this discussion is limited to those
issues related to the presidential privilege doctrine.
Writing for the Court, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. stated that
President Nixon may only assert a privilege as to those materials which fall
within the scope of the privilege as recognized in United States v. Nixon.223
The Court stated that Nixon held that the privilege is limited to communica-
tions "'in performance of [a President's] responsibilities, of his office,"' and
made "'in the process of shaping policies and making decisions.' ' '224 The
Court denied President Nixon's claim of privilege, reasoning that section
104 of the Act directed the Administrator to take into account "'the need to
protect any party's opportunity to assert any.., constitutionally based right
or privilege"' and the need to return purely private materials to the Presi-
dent.225 The Court concluded that, "[i]n view of these specific directions,




220. General Services, 433 U.S. at 425.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 425-26.
223. Id. at 449.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. General Services, 433 U.S. at 450 (citation omitted).
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established by regulation will not be adequate to preserve executive confi-
dentiality." 226 Ultimately, the Court reasoned:
[that] given the safeguards built into the Act to prevent disclosure
of such materials and the minimal nature of the intrusion into the
confidentiality of the Presidency, we believe that the claims of
Presidential privilege clearly must yield to the important congres-
sional purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access
to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes. 227
Although Supreme Court opinions involving executive privilege cases
are sparse, the procedure involved in claiming and establishing the privilege
parallels those arguments advanced in Jones v. Clintonm in support of a
"temporary immunity." This presumptive privilege would entail halting all
civil legal process against a sitting President for the duration of his or her
tenure. A President may still be sued, but a presumption could be attached
where the plaintiff or President will have the burden to show why they
would be injured if the proceeding were continued or stayed.
IV. JONES V. CLINTON
A. Facts
On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed suit against President
William Jefferson Clinton and Arkansas State Trooper Danny Ferguson,
who was assigned to President Clinton's security detail during his tenure as
Arkansas' Governor.229  On May 8, 1991, the underlying incident was
alleged to have occurred in a Little Rock, Arkansas, hotel suite where
President Clinton, then Governor of Arkansas, delivered a speech at a
conference that day.230 According to the complaint, Trooper Danny Fergu-
son, President Clinton's bodyguard, delivered a piece of paper to Paula
Jones with a four digit number written down and said, "[t]he Governor
226. Id.
227. Id. at 454.
228. See 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996) The dissent argues that the plaintiff should have
the burden of proving why this litigation will not interfere with the President's duties, whereas
the concurrence argues that the President should bear the burden of establishing why this
litigation would interfere with real and established responsibilities. Id. (Ross J., dissenting).
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would like to meet with you" in this suite number. 23' Jones, a rank-and-file
Arkansas state employee being paid approximately $6.35 per hour, thought it
was an honor to be asked to meet with the Governor.232 It was during this
encounter which Paula Jones alleges that President Clinton violated her
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process by sexually harass-
ing and assaulting her.233 She further alleges that Trooper Ferguson and Mr.
Clinton conspired to violate her constitutional rights.234 The Jones complaint
also asserts two supplemental state law claims, one against President Clinton
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the other against both
Trooper Ferguson and President Clinton for defamation.235 On June 10,
1994, Mr. Ferguson answered the complaint, admitting that he traveled in an
elevator with Paula Jones and pointed out a particular room of the hotel, but
that he had no knowledge of what took place in that room.
236
B. Prior History of Jones v. Clinton
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas,
Western Division, President Clinton asserted a claim of immunity from civil
suit and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to its
refiling when he is no longer President.237 In the alternative, he requested a
stay of the proceedings for as long as he remains President.238 On December
28, 1994, United States District Court Judge Susan Webber Wright denied
the sitting President of the United States absolute immunity during presiden-
tial service from civil suit for his unofficial acts. 239 Nevertheless, Judge
Wright did reason that the separation of powers doctrine entitled President
Clinton a "temporary or limited immunity from trial," thereby granting
President Clinton a stay of trial during his tenure as President.24° Judge
Wright also justified the stay on the basis of her authority under Rule 40 of
231. Complaint at 3, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994) [hereinafter
Jones I].
232. Id.
233. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1357.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Answer of Danny Ferguson at 3-4, Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark.
1994).
237. Jones 1, 869 F. Supp. at 692.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 698.
240. Id. at 699.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure241 and "the equity powers of the
Court."242 The court concluded that the claims against Trooper Ferguson
were so factually and legally intertwined with the claims of President
Clinton that the stay from trial also applied to Mr. Ferguson. However, the
court allowed discovery to go forward on Mrs. Jones' claims against both
defendants.243
President Clinton appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the court should
have dismissed the suit without prejudice to the refiling of Mrs. Jones' suit
when he is no longer President.244 President Clinton also challenged the
decision to permit discovery to proceed during the stay of trial. 245 Contem-
poraneously, Paula Jones cross-appealed, arguing that the stay entered by the
district court was in error, and the case should be allowed to proceed through
trial.2A
Writing for a divided panel, circuit Judge Bowman began with the
proposition that the President, like all other government officials, is subject
247to the same laws that apply to all other members of American society.
The appellate court rationally grounded its holding by stating that "[b]y
definition, unofficial acts are not within the perimeter of the President's
official responsibility at all, even the outer perimeter., 248  Therefore,
President Clinton's claim of immunity was not within the holding of Nixon
v. Fitzgerald.249 The appellate court continued, "[w]e thus are unable to read
Fitzgerald as support for the proposition that the separation of powers
doctrine provides immunity for the individual who serves as President from
lawsuits seeking to hold him accountable for his unofficial actions."0
Turning to the issue of temporary immunity, the appellate court cited
Marbury v. Madison2s1 for the proposition that "'[t]he very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec-
241. See FED. R. Civ. P. 40 (allowing district courts to place actions upon its trial calen-
dar).
242. Jones 1, 869 F. Supp. at 699.
243. Id.
244. Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1356.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1358.
248. Id. at 1359.
249. Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1359.
250. Id.
251. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury,"' and the court stated that
"Mrs. Jones is constitutionally entitled to access to the courts and to the
equal protection of the laws."252 Judge Bowman reasoned:
Mrs. Jones's [sic] claims, except for her defamation claim, concern
actions by Mr. Clinton that, beyond cavil, are unrelated to his du-
ties as President. This lawsuit thus does not implicate presidential
decision-making. If this suit goes forward, the President still will
be able to carry out his duties without any concern that he might be
sued for damages by a constituent aggrieved by some official
presidential act. Though amenable to suit for his private acts, the
President retains the absolute immunity found in Fitzgerald for of-
ficial acts, and presidential decision-making will not be im-
paired 53
Thus, the court of appeals held that the Constitution does not provide a
sitting President with any immunity from civil actions based on unofficial,
pre-presidential actions.25 4 The case was remanded to the district court to lift
the stays and to allow Mrs. Jones' suit to proceed against President Clinton
and Trooper Ferguson.
2 55
In a special concurrence, circuit Judge Beam wrote separately to
express his conviction on three points "insufficiently discussed" by the
256dissent and Judge Bowman. First, Judge Beam discussed how the stay of
proceedings would affect Paula Jones' claim by justifiably realizing,
Ms. Jones faces real dangers of loss of evidence through the un-
foreseeable calamities inevitable with the passage of time .... If a
blanket stay is granted and discovery is precluded as suggested by
Mr. Clinton and his amicus, Ms. Jones will have no way ... to per-
petuate the testimony of any party or witness should they die or be-
come incompetent during the period the matter is held in abey-
ance .... Thus, her "chose in action" would be obliterated, or at
least substantially damaged if she is denied reasonable and timely
access to the workings of the federal tribunal. 7
252. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).
253. Id. (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 1363.
255. Id.
256. Id. (Beam J., concurring specially).
257. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1363-64.
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Judge Beam continued his analysis by addressing the dissent's conten-
tion that the burden of proof establishing "'irreparable injury"' along with a
showing "'that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly
impair the President's ability to attend to the duties of his office"' should lie
with Ms. Jones2 8 Judge Beam reasoned that "a litigant could [n]ever
successfully shoulder the burden assigned by the dissent, especially if all
discovery is prohibited."' 59 Rather, the burden should be upon "the party
seeking to delay the usual course of discovery and trial" as in any other civil
litigation.26°
Next, Judge Beam discussed the impact this litigation could have on the
President. After citing to numerous instances where an incumbent President
has been subject to judicial actions, Judge Beam reasoned that since these
previous Presidents had managed to schedule "these encounters without
creating a cataclysmic episode in which the constitutional duties of the office
have been compromised," accordingly, President Clinton could similarly
manage his duties of office while following discovery requests based on an
uncomplicated civil litigation.261 Moreover, the trial judge's careful supervi-
sion of the litigation can make certain that discovery requests are "carried
out with a minimum of impact on the President's schedule."
262
Judge Beam then turned his concern to Trooper Danny Ferguson. Judge
Beam discussed how he could find "no separation of powers or other
constitutional basis for a stay" for the claims against Trooper Ferguson.263
Judge Beam concluded that:
Judge Bowman's opinion reasonably charts a fair course through
the competing constitutional waters and does so without serious
injury to the rights of any party. As I have attempted to stress,
nothing prohibits the trial judge from halting or delaying or re-
scheduling any proposed action by any party at any time should she
find that the duties of the presidency are even slightly imperiled. 264
Despite these rational and legally based opinions, circuit Judge Ross
dissented from the majority opinion. Judge Ross would have held that,
258. Id. at 1364 (citation omitted).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1366.
262. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1366.
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"unless exigent circumstances can be shown, private actions for damages
against a sitting President of the United States, even though based on
unofficial acts, must be stayed until the completion of the President's
term. 265 After reiterating the holding and public policy arguments advanced
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,2 66 Judge Ross argued, "[w]hile the majority would
encourage other courts to exercise 'judicial case management sensitive to the
burdens of the presidency,' ... only a stay of civil litigation during a
President's term in office will ensure the performance of Executive duties
unencumbered by the judiciary and thereby avoid separation of powers
conflicts., 267 Judge Ross reasoned:
Where there is no urgency to pursue a suit for civil damages,
the proper course is to avoid opportunities for breaching separation
of powers altogether by holding the litigation in abeyance until a
President leaves office. The cause of action should be stayed unless
the plaintiff can show that he or she will suffer irreparable injury
without immediate relief and that the immediate adjudication of the
suit will not significantly impair the President's ability to attend to
the duties of his office.
It is important to keep in mind that the issue here is not
whether the President may be required to answer claims based on
unofficial conduct, but when. This conclusion merely delays,
rather than defeats, the vindication of the plaintiff's private legal
interests, and thus is far less burdensome for a plaintiff than the ab-
solute immunity recognized in Fitzgerald. A stay for the duration
of the President's service in office would not prevent Jones from
ultimately obtaining an adjudication of her claims. Rather, staying
the litigation will protect the important public and constitutional
interests in the President's unimpaired performance of his duties,
while preserving a plaintiff's ability to obtain resolution of his or
her claims on the merits.26
Additionally, Judge Ross reasoned that a stay of the proceedings against
Trooper Ferguson is "essential if the President is to be fully protected. 269
Judge Ross insisted:
265. Id. at 1367 (Ross J., dissenting).
266. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
267. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Bowman J., majority opinion).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1370.
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[that he] would hold that to rebut the presumption that private suits
against a sitting President should not go forward during the Presi-
dent's service in office, the plaintiff should have to demonstrate
convincingly both that delay will seriously prejudice the plaintiff's
interests and that immediate adjudication of the suit will not sig-
nificantly impair the President's ability to attend to the duties of his
office. Absent such a showing, the litigation should be deferred.270
In Judge Ross's opinion, "the stay should include pretrial discovery, as
well as the trial proceedings, because discovery is likely to pose even more
intrusive and burdensome demands on the President's time and attention
than the eventual trial itself."271
C. Current Status of Jones v. Clinton
On May 15, 1996, President Clinton petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.272 The first of two questions pre-
sented was whether the incumbent President is entitled to immunity, for the
duration of his Presidency, from a civil suit for damages for his unofficial
actions. The second question is whether the district court properly exercised
its discretion by granting a stay of trial until the President leaves office.
President Clinton's counsel, Robert S. Bennett, stated four reasons for
granting the petition. Counsel claimed that the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals is inconsistent with previous Supreme Court decisions and
jeopardizes the separation of powers doctrine.273 Counsel contended that
"[c]ourts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional respon-
sibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint."274
Counsel presumed that the court of appeals "concluded that because the
Fitzgerald holding was limited to civil damages claims challenging official
acts, the President should receive no form of protection from any other civil
suits," which is completely "inconsistent with the reasoning of Fitzger-
ald."275 Counsel persisted:
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1369-70.
272. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Clinton v. Jones, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) (No. 95-1050) [hereinafter Petition].
273. Id. at 9.
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[t]he Court in Fitzgerald determined that the President was entitled
to absolute immunity not only because the threat of liability for of-
ficial acts might inhibit him in the exercise of his authority, but also
because, in the Court's words, 'the singular importance of the
President's duties' means that 'diversion of his energies by concern
with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective func-
tioning of government.'
276
Thus, the President's counsel places unwieldy emphasis upon this second
policy argument, and concluded that the Court of Appeals "ignored this
second basis for the holding of Fitzgerald.,
277
Next, Mr. Bennett argued that the Court of Appeals erred by viewing
the relief sought by the President as extraordinary.278 As support for this
proposition, counsel maintained that, "[t]here are numerous instances where
civil plaintiffs are required to accept the temporary postponement of litiga-
tion so that important institutional or public interests can be protected." 279
Three examples are advanced in support of this proposition. First, the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940280 grants military personnel
the right to toll or stay civil claims while they are on active duty. Therefore,
"President Clinton here thus seeks relief similar to that to which he may be
entitled as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces., 28  Next,
[t]he so-called automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code
similarly provides that litigation against a debtor is to be stayed as
soon as a party files a bankruptcy petition. Thus, if [Paula Jones]
had sued a party who entered bankruptcy, [she] would automati-
cally find herself in the same position she will be in if the President
prevails before this Court--except that the bankruptcy stay is in-
definite, while the stay in this case has a definite term, circum-
scribed by the constitutional limit on a President's tenure in of-
fice. 21
2
276. Id. (citing Nixon 457 U.S. at 751-52).
277. Petition at 10, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id.
280. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
281. Petition at 14-15, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
282. Id. at 15.
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Lastly, courts may "put off civil litigation until the conclusion of a related
criminal prosecution against the same defendant." 283 As a result, counsel
argued that "these examples thoroughly dispel any suggestion that the
President, in asking that this litigation be deferred, is somehow placing
himself 'above the law,' or that holding this litigation in abeyance would
impermissibly violate a plaintiff's entitlement to access to the courts." 24
Next, it is argued that the court of appeals erred in asserting jurisdiction
over, and reversing, the district court's discretionary decision to stay the trial
until after the President leaves office. s Mr. Bennett reasoned:
The question of whether the President is entitled, as a matter of
law, to defer this litigation is analytically distinct from the question
of whether a district court may exercise its discretion to stay all or
part of the litigation ... the latter is a discretionary determination
to be made on the basis of the particular facts of the case. More-
over,... a court's exercise of discretion to stay proceedings is a
determination that can be overturned only for abuse of that discre-
tion. The panel majority's expansion of the court of appeals' juris-
diction over [Paula Jones'] interlocutory appeal was in error. 86
Counsel concluded that the appellate court never conducted "the kind of
careful weighing of the particular facts and circumstances that might warrant
a conclusion that the trial court here abused its discretion. 2s
Finally, the President's attorney made an argument that the Supreme
Court should grant review now in order to protect the interests of the
Presidency.2 s Counsel reasoned, "Now, a court for the first time in history
has held that a sitting President is required to defend a private civil damages
action." 289 Ending his arguments, counsel reasoned:
There is no question that the issues raised by this case will have
profound consequences for both the Presidency and the Judiciary.
The last word on issues of this importance should not be a decision
by a splintered panel of a court of appeals--a decision that is incon-
283. Id.
284. Id. at 16.
285. Id.
286. Petition at 17-19, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
287. Id. at 19.
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sistent with the precedents of this Court and with the constitutional
tradition of separation of powers.
290
Therefore, counsel pleaded for the Supreme Court to grant the President's
petition for writ of certiorari.
On May 17 of 1996, Attorney Gilbert K. Davis, Paula Corbin Jones'
counsel, responded in opposition to President Clinton's petition for writ of
certiorari.2 9' Mr. Davis reinforced three reasons why the Supreme Court
should deny the petition. His first declaration bolsters the argument that this
case in no way possesses any consequential threat to the functioning of the
executive branch. Mr. Davis reiterates that this case is "a very simple
dispute about what happened in a very short encounter between two people,"
and quite possibly the least burdensome case a President may ever face.2 92
Gilbert Davis argues that President Clinton has "sought to advance his
argument that this litigation might 'interfere with [his] constitutionally
assigned duties ... without detailing any specific responsibilities or ex-
plaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit.' 2 93 As
counsel made clear:
In the 220-year history of the Republic, there apparently have been
"only three prior instances in which sitting Presidents have been
involved in litigation concerning their acts outside official presi-
dential duties." The historical record reveals no claims of any
presidential hardship in these cases, let alone any claims of presi-
dential immunities.
2 94
Concluding that President Clinton failed to raise any concrete issue as to any
institutional interference with the Presidency, Mr. Davis reasoned that the
President shows neither the extent to which this litigation would violate the
separation of powers nor how the executive branch would be prevented from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.295
Mr. Gilbert's second argument attacks the President's contention that
this litigation comes within the immunity doctrine espoused in Nixon v.
290. Id. at 21.
291. Brief for Respondent at 24, Clinton v. Jones, 72 F. 3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996) (No. 95-1050).
292. Id. at 10.
293. Id.
294. Id. at I 1 (citation omitted).
295. Id. at 14.
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Fitzgerald.2 9 6 Counsel argued that the President is not entitled, as a matter
of law, to defer this litigation, because the acts complained of are not within
the outer perimeter of his official duties.2 7 Mr. Davis stated that "Mr.
Clinton consistently styled his claim as one of immunity. He has now
dropped that word, but the relief he seeks is effectively the same."
298
Following counsel's logic, he stated:
[N]otwithstanding [the President's] advocacy of discretionary
stays, he still contends that under Nixon v. Fitzgerald he is
"entitled, as a matter of law, to defer this litigation" for the remain-
der of his presidency. That is essentially the argument for presi-
dential immunity... [but] [i]n more than a century of immunity
decisions, from Bradley v. Fisher, to Fitzgerald, this Court has not
once suggested that a public official could avoid litigation of a case
involving only unofficial acts. To the contrary, as Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence in Fitzgerald repeatedly stressed, the Court's
cases have always presumed that protection of public officials from
suit covers only official actions and "does not extend beyond such
actions"-that "a President, like Members of Congress, judges,
prosecutors, or congressional aides... [is] not immune for acts
outside official duties." It was precisely that limitation that al-
lowed Chief Justice Burger to declare that Fitzgerald did not place
[the] President "above the law."2 99
Counsel concluded that nothing within the Fitzgerald opinion grants or
even suggests that a President, when acting personally, has any immunity,
neither qualified nor absolute. Counsel reasoned that to extend immunity
here "would contravene the Nation's egalitarian civic creed and the Consti-
tution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.,,300 As the appeals court
reasoned, Article II of the United States Constitution certainly did not create
a monarchy.
301
Counsel argued that the appeals court, in a proper exercise of jurisdic-
tion, correctly reversed the district court's grant of temporary immunity from
trial and its stay of proceedings. 30 2 Counsel reasoned that the appeals court
296. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
297. Brief for Respondent at 14, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 18.
301. Id.
302. Brief for Respondent at 20, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
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correctly determined that what the district court ordered, a postponement of
trial, was "the functional equivalent of a grant of temporary immunity."
303
Even though the trial court had the power to stay proceedings, "the District
Court's decision was a manifest abuse of discretion. '' ° Mr. Gilbert stressed
that when the district court granted trial immunity to President Clinton, the
court made no finding that the President even attempted to make a showing
of an actual and "clear case of hardship," as required to stay a proceeding.
30 5
The appellate court's ruling was proper, despite the district court's recitation
of Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurea°6 and the court's equity
powers, because the district court's order was based upon its erroneous
holding that Mr. Clinton was entitled to "immunity from trial as Fitzgerald
seems to require.
3°7
Despite Mr. Gilbert's arguments espousing the correct scope of the
cases mentioned herein, on June 24 of 1996, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted President Clinton's petition for writ of certiorari.30 8
V. PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGE
If the Supreme Court extends any protection to President Clinton
according to the circumstances underlying Jones, then, initially, there must
be a determination made to precisely label the form of relief sought by the
President. President Clinton hopes to persuade the Supreme Court to
recognize some form of immunity, applicable only to the office of the
President. However, all rational analyses seem to weight heavily in Paula
Jones' favor when distinguishing the circumstances involved in Jones to the
holding and policy arguments advanced in Nixon.30 9 According to Nixon,
presidential immunity attaches to broad official actions within the scope of a
President's responsibility. 310 The more narrow functional approach to the
immunity doctrine extends to grant officials immunity only for acts within
the functions provided to that particular official's discretion and responsi-
bilities. Regardless, President Clinton petitions the Supreme Court to
provide the office of the President monumental protection from practically
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 21.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 40.
307. Brief for Respondent at 21, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
308. 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
309. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
310. Id. at 756.
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all phases of a civil litigation, from discovery through trial, until the Presi-
dent leaves office.
Contrary to the holdings of every executive immunity case, President
Clinton's claim arises from actions prior to his Presidency and completely
outside of any functional or discretionary executive action taken by then
Governor Clinton. If any other citizen, executive official, judge, or legislator
were to argue immunity from trial, then summary judgment would have
surely put an end to such a claim, because President Clinton's actions were
outside of any broad zone of an official's duties or responsibilities. Never-
theless, the Chief Executive of the United States is not just one person in one
office representing one department, but rather one person representing an
entire branch of government. For this reason alone, the office of the Presi-
dent is definitely unique and merits some form of protection from disruptive
lawsuits.
However, any claim of immunity by President Clinton is erroneous.
Both qualified and absolute immunity, if granted, permanently bars a
plaintiff's civil damages action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,3 11 the Second Circuit's test to determine
whether an official's actions were within the established immunity doctrine,
required that it must first be determined whether the official was acting
"'within the outer perimeter of his line of duty.' 3 12 The holding in Nixon
established this identical limit upon claims of presidential immunity.
313
Clearly, President Clinton's claim of a temporary immunity for pre-
presidential, unofficial actions immediately fails under any established
immunity doctrine, definition, or test.
In reality, what President Clinton seeks to avoid is the rigorous judicial
process only during his tenure as President. President Clinton claims that he
and all future Presidents should be entitled to some form of protection for
the purpose of being unencumbered while in the execution of Article II
responsibilities. This claim has policy merit due to the possibility that the
overwhelming exposure of the President makes him "an easily identifiable
target for suits for civil damages[,]" and consequently, could frequently
"distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the
President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed
to serve. 314
311. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
312. Id. at 1343 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).
313. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 756.
314. Id. at 753.
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President Clinton's ultimate relief is more akin to the term "presidential
privilege" rather than "temporary immunity." Logically, Mr. Clinton's relief
should be termed a privilege, because supporters argue that this temporary
immunity should be presumptive with a burden of proof for either the
plaintiff or President to establish. 315  This presumptiveness parallels the
procedure established for claims based on executive privilege.316 Moreover,
the President's ultimate relief is definitely not any form of an immunity,
because, by definition, it is temporary and of a fixed duration.317 On the
other hand, every single grant of immunity has permanently barred the
underlying claim. Therefore, how can the President's requested relief be
termed "temporary immunity?" The term "temporary immunity" is an
oxymoron and absolutely unsuited for any intelligent constitutional analysis.
Additionally, President Clinton's relief is exclusively presidential, because
all policy arguments supporting President Clinton's claim focus upon the
Article II responsibilities and unique office of the Presidency. Therefore,
any temporary relief granted to the office of the Presidency should be
entitled presidential privilege, because Clinton's position parallels executive
privilege cases while his basic argument focuses on the uniqueness of the
oval office.
Rationalizing the arguments advanced, both pro and con, for President
Clinton's claim of a presidential privilege, one must recall that these
arguments were advanced in both executive immunity and executive privi-
lege cases. According to Judge Ross' dissent in Jones, "unless exigent
circumstances can be shown, private actions for damages against a sitting
President of the United States, even though based on unofficial acts, must be
stayed until the completion of the President's term."318 Thus, Judge Ross
would allow the President a presumptive privilege, which can only be
countered with a showing of exigent circumstances. Judge Ross' test
parallels that espoused in the Reynolds and Nixon cases. In Reynolds, the
Court championed the procedure involved in assessing an executive privi-
315. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (1996) (presenting conflicting opinions as both
the concurrence and the dissent argue whether the plaintiff or the president should bear the
burden of proof).
316. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953) (concluding that the person
alleging the privilege must make a formal claim of privilege, and then, the opposing party
must rebut any presumption of privilege).
317. See Petition at 15, Clinton (No. 95-1050) (arguing that a stay in this case has a
definite term based on the constitutional limit on a president's tenure in office).
318. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1367 (Ross J., dissenting).
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lege issue. First, there must be a formal claim of privilege.319 Thus, it is
entirely proper to initially rule that a plaintiff has shown probable cause for
the discovery of privileged information. 320  Thereafter, when the formal
claim of privilege is asserted, it must be determined if there is a sufficient
showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the privileged informa-
tion. 21 President Clinton is not asserting an absolute immunity from civil
process, but a qualified privilege against compelled participation in the
process while in office. As a result, a President can be served process and be
subjected to judicial process. However, once a President asserts a formal
presidential privilege claim, then it must be determined if there is a suffi-
cient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the privileged
information.
In United States v. Nixon,322 the Court weighed the competing interests
at stake and concluded that a President's generalized interest in confidenti-
ality of communications'does not prevail over fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.323 Hence, Judge
Ross' test parallels the procedures and balancing of interests used by the
Supreme Court to evaluate a claim of executive privilege because a President
bears the burden of establishing the privilege while the court balances the
competing interests. President Clinton does not assert that he is always
immune from this type of suit, rather that the office itself holds the privilege.
Thus, presidential privilege is a President's claim of constitutional authority
to withhold information, not from the legislative and judicial branches, but
from a civil plaintiff while the President remains in office, provided that the
President's interest for the privilege relates to the effective discharge of
executive powers.
VI. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court in Jones v. Clinton granted the President "temporary or
limited immunity from trial" on the basis of the court's discretion and equity
powers. 324 Yet, the appellate court debated whether the plaintiff or the
President should bear the "burden of showing specific hardship or inequity if
319. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 10-11.
322. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
323. Id. at711-13.
324. Jones I, 869 F. Supp. at 699.
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he or she is required to go forward. 325 If the Supreme Court grants Presi-
dent Clinton a presidential privilege to stay any proceedings of this matter
during the President's tenure in office, then the Supreme Court must address
whether the trial court has the power and discretion to grant a stay of trial,
and whether the plaintiff or President must shoulder any burden of proof.
A. The Trial Court
President Clinton's counsel cites Landis v. North American Co., 32 6 in
support of the trial court's discretion to stay the trial. Writing for the Court
in Landis, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo reasoned:
[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for liti-
gants .... True, the suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case
of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work
damage to some one else.
327
The Landis Court went on to state:
Especially in cases of extraordinary public moment, the individual
may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and
not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or con-
venience will thereby be promoted .... Even so, the burden of
making out the justice and wisdom of a departure from the beaten
track lay heavily on the petitioners, suppliants for relief, and dis-
cretion was abused if the stay was not kept within the bounds of
moderation. 32
8
Nonetheless, this case concerned the power of a court to stay proceed-
ings in one suit until the decision of an identical suit in another court is
rendered. 329 Therefore, the Landis decision is distinguishable here, because
Paula Jones has filed only one suit in federal court.
President Clinton argued, in his petition for writ of certiorari, that the
trial court's discretionary "decision to postpone trial - unlike review of its
325. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1364.
326. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
327. Id. at 254-55.
328. Id. at 256.
329. Id. at 249.
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decision to reject the President's position that the entire case should be
deferred as a matter of law - must address these particular facts of this
case."'33  Additionally, "[t]he panel majority justified its reversal of the
district court with a single sentence in a footnote... [and] it is unclear what
the panel meant by labeling the district court's order the 'functional equiva-
lent' of 'temporary immunity. ''3 31 Thus, "in its sweeping and conclusory
ruling, [the appellate court] did not begin to conduct the kind of careful
weighing of the particular facts and circumstances that might warrant a
conclusion that the trial court here abused its discretion."
332
Countering this argument, Paula Jones' counsel contested the Presi-
dent's claim by asserting that "Mr. Clinton misconstrues" the Landis case.
333
After reciting the holding in Landis, counsel argued that "a stay of litigation
may be granted '[o]nly in rare circumstances.' '334 Counsel contended that
the appellate court was faithful to the holding in Landis when they properly
reversed the trial court's postponement of trial.335 Counsel reasoned:
In granting trial "immunity" to Mr. Clinton, the District Court
made no finding that Mr. Clinton had made a showing of an actual
and "clear case of hardship," a showing not even attempted. As
Judge Beam explained, moreover, the danger of harm to Ms. Jones
was manifest: she "faces real dangers of loss of evidence through
the unforeseeable calamities inevitable with the passage of time."
336
And the passage of time contemplated by the District Court's or-
der-possibly into the next century-was surely immoderate. In-
deed, in Landis itself, the Court found "the limits of a fair discre-
tion" to have been "exceeded" by a stay that had suspended "the
proceedings in the District Court... more than a year."337 And
since the "stay," despite the District Court's citation of FED. R.
Crv. P. 40 and the court's equity powers, was dependent upon its
erroneous holding that Mr. Clinton was entitled to an "immunity
330. Petition at 18, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
331. Id. at 19 (quoting Jones 11, 72 F.3d at 1361).
332. Id.
333. Brief for Respondent at 20, Clinton (No. 95-1050).
334. Id. at 21 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
335. Id.
336. Id. (citing Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1364).
337. Id. (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 256).
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from trial as Fitzgerald seems to require," it was properly reversed
for that error as well.338
Accordingly, Paula Jones argued that the decision rendered in the appellate
court was correct, and her case should proceed against Mr. Clinton and
Trooper Ferguson.
Due to the fact that a trial court has the power to control its docket, the
Supreme Court will have to determine whether the district court properly
exercised its discretion to stay the trial until President Clinton leaves office.
On this same issue, the appellate court stated:
The discretion of the courts in suits such as this one comes into
play, not in deciding on a case-by-case basis whether a civil com-
plaint alleging private wrongs is sufficiently compelling so as to be
permitted to proceed with an incumbent President as defendant, but
in controlling the scheduling of the case as necessary to avoid inter-
ference with specific, particularized, clearly articulated presidential
duties. If the trial preliminaries or the trial itself become barriers to
the effective performance of his official duties, Mr. Clinton's rem-
edy is to pursue motions for rescheduling, additional time, or con-
tinuances.
339
Thus, the court's justification is to allow the trial court to use its
discretionary functions to protect the President when there is a clear and
actual conflict between Presidential duties and the judicial process, not a
wholesale grant of immunity from trial while sitting as President.
B. Burden of Proof
Writing his dissent for the appellate court, Judge Ross reasoned that
"[t]he burdens and demands of civil litigation can be expected to impinge on
the President's discharge of his constitutional office by forcing him to divert
his energy and attention from the rigorous demands of his office to the task
of protecting himself against personal liability." 34° Thus, circuit Judge Ross
asserted that "[t]he cause of action should be stayed unless the plaintiff can
show that he or she will suffer irreparable injury without immediate relief
and that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly impair
338. Brief for Respondent at 21, Clinton (No. 95-1050) (citing Jones I, 869 F. Supp. at
699).
339. Jones II, 72 F.3d at 1362-63.
340. Id. at 1367 (Ross, J., dissenting).
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the President's ability to attend to the duties of his office." 341 However,
Judge Ross cites no authority nor any public policy arguments to support his
proposition for shifting the burden onto the plaintiff.
Subsequently, circuit Judge Beam, writing a special concurrence for the
court, specifically stated that:
The dissent cites no established authority or case precedent for this
burden-shifting strategy, even by analogy to some reasonably com-
parable situation. I have discovered none. In this regard, there is
no way, in my view, that a litigant could ever successfully shoulder
the burden assigned by the dissent, especially if all discovery is
prohibited. [T]he burden... should be shouldered, as in any other
civil litigation, by the party seeking to delay the usual course of
discovery and trial. Otherwise, we will have established require-
ments of insurmountable proportions for any litigant who may have
a viable and urgent civil claim against a sitting President or per-
haps, against other important governmental figures with constitu-
tionally established duties.
This approach to staying litigation is a well-established legal
concept.
342
Judge Beam reiterated that the traditional approach espoused in Landis
established that the person applying for the stay has the burden of showing
any specific hardship or inequity before the court will grant any stay of the
proceedings.343 If the Supreme Court follows the traditional approach, then
President Clinton will have the burden of establishing a stay from proceed-
ings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court granted President Clinton's petition for
certiorari, the Justices must determine whether President Clinton is entitled
to a presidential privilege against civil process during his tenure for alleg-
edly unofficial, pre-presidential actions. Paula Jones' allegations have lost
the attention of Americans, but the issues now involved are quite real and
will impact the Presidency for the immediate and foreseeable future. In this
341. Id. at 1369.
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regard, one should not take lightly the allegations advanced; rather, one
should focus upon the issues raised by Paula Jones and President Clinton.
If the Supreme Court grants President Clinton a presidential privilege
against compelled civil process, then the King cannot be wrong while
occupying the oval office. Consequently, the doctrine of presidential
immunity may encounter a ripple-effect, whereby the historic functional
approach may be altered in favor of public policy concerns for an unimpeded
Presidency. As a result, the last quasi-judicial process available will be the
process of impeachment. But due to the conflicting views in the appellate
court's decision on who should bear the burden of proof, the Supreme Court
may have to address this issue. If Landis is controlling, then President
Clinton will bear any burden of proving that this litigation will harm his
ability to function as President.
If the Supreme Court follows stare decisis and applies the holding in
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, then the appellate court's decision may stand. Since
President Clinton's alleged actions are pre-presidential, any application of
the holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald will result in a denial of the President's
claim for relief. Thus, Paula Jones will be able to claim the protection of the
laws against a sitting President, whenever injury results. In the end, every
person interested should hope that justice will prevail, and Paula Jones will
soon get her day in court.
The Supreme Court may extend to the Presidency a new presidential
privilege, effectively carving out a constitutional exception applicable only
to the presidential office. Contemporary pressures upon the Presidency may
favor a policy of allowing the President unimpeded civil protection to
perform his or her Article II duties. However, the Court is more likely to
take Chief Justice Burger's view in United States v. Nixon, that this new
presidential privilege will gravely impair the role of the courts under Article
344III and upset the constitutional balance of powers.
Glenn T. Williams
344. 418 U.S. at 707.
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Law. Note, Brenda L. Henderson, vol. 17, p. 549 (Fall 1992).
Alimony Modification: Awards Based on Ability to Pay Without Showing Increased Need.
Helene R. Cohen, vol. 16, p. 543 (Fall 1991).
Congress Demands Stricter Child-Support Enforcement: Florida Requires Major reforms to
Comply. Maureen Gallen, vol. 10, p. 1371 (Winter 1986).
Congress Demands Stricter Child-Support Enforcement: Florida Requires Major Reforms to
Comply. M. Gallen, vol. 10, p. 1371 (Spring 1986).
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Domestic Violence: Recent Amendments to the Florida Statutes. Honorable Jay B. Rosman,
vol. 20, p. 117 (Fall 1995).
Estate of C.W.: A Pragmatic Approach to the Involuntary Sterilization of the Mentally
Disabled. Comment, Robert R. Adler, vol. 20, p. 1323 (Spring 1996).
Family Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law. Cynthia Greene, vol. 18, p. 2 8 1 (Fall 1993).
Lessons Learned: A Reflection Upon Bowers v. Hardwick. Abby R. Rubenfeld, vol. 11, p. 59
(Fall 1986).
Mediation Experience of Family Law Attorneys. Susan W. Harrell, vol. 20, p. 479 (Fall
1995).
No Tears for Corey Greer: A Review of Foster Care in Florida. Is It Time to Ask the Court for
Relief? Marcia Beach, vol. 12, p. 881 (Spring 1988).
Parental Consortium in Florida: Our Children Have No Place to Turn. Keith Metcalf, vol. 13,
p. 295 (Fall 1988).
Parental Liability for the Torts of Their Minor Children: Limits, Logic and Legality. Note,
Robert C. Levine, vol. 9, p. 205 (Fall 1984).
Personal Jurisdiction in a Dissolution of Marriage Action: Garrett v. Garrett. Comment,
Gregory P. McMahon, vol. 21, p. 491 (Fall 1996).
Post-Dissolution Cohabitation of Alimony Recipients: A Legal Fact of Life. Evan J.
Langbein, vol. 12, p. 787 (Spring 1988).
Post-Majority Support in Florida: An Idea Whose Time Has Come. Barbara B. Wagner, vol.
5, p. 271 (Winter 1981).
Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Florida's Need for an Equitable
Distribution Statute. Melinda S. Gentile, vol. 8, p. 71 (Fall 1983).
The Florida Statute Prohibiting Adoption by Homosexuals in View of Seebol v. Farie:
Expressly Unconstitutional. Comment, Camille L. Worsnop, vol. 16, p. 983 (Winter
1992).
The Use of Contempt of Court to Enforce Florida Divorce Decrees. Jeffrey F. Thomas, vol.
6, p. 313 (Winter 1982).
Time to Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call to Repudiate Mississippi's Gift to the
American Family. Joel Berman, vol. 4, p. 25 (Spring 1980).
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
Broadcasters' First Amendment Rights Through the Courts with "The Seven Dirty Words":
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. Fran A. Arnold and Cara E. Cameron, vol. 3, p. 261
(Spring 1979).
Confronting Indecent Cable Television Programming: Balancing the Interests of Children and
the Exercise of Free Speech in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consor-
tium, Inc. v. FCC. Comment, Christopher D. Ritchie, vol. 21, p. 741 (Winter 1997).
Fair Trial-Free Press: The Camera in the Courtroom Dilemma Continues. Mariana S. Smith
and Marcia R. Powell, vol. 3, p. 11 (Spring 1979).
Hate Crimes, Hate Speech and Free Speech-Florida's Bias-Intended Crime Statute Note,
Eric D. Rosenberg, vol. 17, p. 597 (Fall 1992).
Latera v. Isle at Mission Bay Homeowners Ass'n: The Homeowner's First Amendment Right
to Receive Information. Comment, Zelica M. Grieve, vol. 20, p. 531 (Fall 1995).
Making the Press Talk After Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Morejon: How Much of a Threat
to the First Amendment? Paul H. Gates, Jr., vol. 17, p. 497 (Fall 1992).
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Schutz v. Schutz: More Than a Mere "Incidental" Burden of First Amendment Rights.
Comment, David L. Ferguson, vol. 16, p. 937 (Winter 1992).
When If Ever, Should Trials Be Held Behind Closed Doors? Honorable Joseph A. Boyd, Jr.
and Paul A. Lehrman, vol. 5, p. 1 (Fall 1980).
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A Quodlibet, A Mumpsimus and the Rule of Infield Flies: The Unfinished Business of Term
Limits in Florida. P.C. Doherty, vol. 18, p. 921 (Winter 1994).
Battle of the Budget: The Legislature and the Governor Fight for Control. Jon Mills, vol. 18,
p. 1101 (Winter 1994).
City of North Miami v. Kurtz: Is It Curtains for Privacy in Florida? Comment Deborah Lynn
Stewart, vol. 20, p. 1393 (Spring 1996).
Constitutional Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law. David C. Hawkins, vol. 16, p. 167 (Fall
1991).
Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law. David C. Hawkins, vol. 15, p. 1049 (Spring
1991).
Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the Reality Falls the Shadow. John
Sanchez, vol. 18, p. 775 (Winter 1994).
ELM Street Revisited: The Florida Supreme Court's Rulemaking Authority and the Circuit
Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Local Government Comprehensive Plan-
ning Act Real or Imagined? John E. Fennelly, vol. 18, p. 1289 (Winter 1994).
Erie and Florida Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Constitutional Need for Statewide Stare
Decisis. Brian E Mattis & B. Taylor Mattis, vol. 18, p. 1333 (Winter 1994).
Florida Constitutional Law: Decade Survey. David C. Hawkins, vol. 14, p. 693 (Spring
1990).
Florida's Constitution: A View From the Middle. Harry Lee Anstead, vol. 18, p. 1277
(Winter 1994).
Florida's Constitutional Mandate Restrictions. Nancy Perkins Spyke, vol. 18, p. 1403 (Winter
1994).
Florida's Official English Amendment. Donna M. Greenspan, vol. 18, p. 891 (Winter 1994).
Good Intentions-Questionable Results: Florida Tries the Primacy Model. Daniel Gordon, vol.
18, p. 759 (Winter 1994).
In re Dubreuil: Is An Individual's Right to Refuse a Blood Transfusion Contingent on
Parental Status? Comment, Jennifer L. Bamonte & Cathy Bierman, vol. 17, p. 517 (Fall
1992).
Is There a Lucky Seven in Florida's Future. Eugene N. Bardakjy, vol. 18, p. 1065 (Winter
1994).
Protecting Against the State Constitutional Law Junkyard: Proposals to Limit Popular
Constitutional Revision in Florida. Daniel R. Gordon, vol. 20, p. 4 13 (Fall 1995).
Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Labor Arbitrator's View of the Florida Constitution.
Roger I. Abrams, vol. 18, p. 733 (Winter 1994).
Shoot the Patient or Find the Cure: The Florida Constitutional Requirement that Increases in
Public Employee Pensions be Funded on a Sound Actuarial Basis. Richard A. Sicking,
vol. 18, p. 1465 (Winter 1994).
So You Want to Amend the Florida Constitution? A Guide to Initiative Petitions. Jim Smith,
vol. 18, p. 1509 (Winter 1994).
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Some Proposed Changes to the Florida Constitution. Thomas C. Marks & Alfred A. Colby,
vol. 18, p. 1519 (Winter 1994).
The 1978 Constitution Revision Commission: Florida's Blueprint for Change. Steven J.
Uhlfelder & Robert A. McNeely, vol. 18, p. 1489 (Winter 1994).
The Florida Board of Bar Examiners: The Constitutional Safeguard Between Attorney
Aspirants and the Public. Thomas A Pobjecky, vol. 18, p. 1313 (Winter 1994).
The Florida Cabinet: Is it Time for Remodeling? Stephen T. Maher, vol. 18, p. 1123 (Winter
1994).
The Florida Constitution's Open Government Amendments: Article I, Section 24 and Article
III, Section 4(e) - Let the Sunshine In. Patricia A. Gleason and Joslyn Wilson, vol. 18,
p. 973 (Winter 1994).
The Governor's Troops Under the Florida Constitution. Anthoy J. Scaletta, vol. 18, p. 1133
(Winter 1994).
The History of Florida's State Flag. Robert M. Jarvis, vol. 18, p. 1037 (Winter 1994).
The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court. Justice Gerald Kogan & Robert
Craig Waters, vol. 18, p. 1151 (Winter 1994).
The Process and Politics of Legislative Reapportionment and Redistricting Under the Florida
Constitution. George L. Waas, vol. 18, p. 1001 (Winter 1994).
There's No Place Like Home(stead) in Florida-Should it Stay that Way? Donna Litman
Seiden, vol. 18, p. 801 (Winter 1994).
WARNING: Municipal Home Rule is in Danger of Being Expressly Preempted. Ilene S.
Lieberman and Harry Morrison, Jr., vol. 18, p. 1437 (Winter 1994).
FORFEITURE
Bennis v. Michigan: Does the Innocent Owner Have a Defense to Civil Forfeiture. Comment,
Brooke D. Davis, vol. 21, p. 685 (Winter 1997).
Contraband Forfeiture: Survey of Florida Law. Richard Purdy, vol. 18, p. 213 (Fall 1993).
Forfeiture of a Vehicle: Search for a Nexus Griffis v. State. Victoria S. Sigler, vol. 4, p. 271
(Spring 1980).
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
Taking Out the Old and Bringing in the New: The Effect of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act on Florida Fraudulent Conveyance Law. Pamela M. Lund, vol. 12, p. 915 (Spring
1988).
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
see also ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A City Guide to Developing, Using, and Regulating Regional Telecommunications Networks
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Andrea L. Johnson, vol. 21, p. 515
(Winter 1997).
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Government Regulation of In Vitro Fertilization, Recombinant DNA and Cloning Biotech-
nologies: Where Powers End and Rights Begin. Anita C. Porte, vol. 3, p. 65 (Spring
1979).
Local Government: 1993 Survey of Florida Law. John J. Copelan and Barbara Monahan, vol.
18, p. 561 (Fall 1993).
Local Government: 1991 Survey of Florida Law. Joel A. Mintz, vol. 16, p. 375 (Fall 1991).
Local Government: 1989 Survey of Florida Law. Joel A. Mintz, vol. 14, p. 919 (Spring
1990).
Pesticide Regulation. Why Not Preventive Legislation? John P. Wilkes, vol. 2, p. 93 (Spring
1978).
Protecting Municipalities Against Unnecessary State Infringement: The Unrealized Wake of
the Municipal Homes Rule Powers Act, and Temple Terrace. Cheryl R. Eisen, vol. 3, p.
119 (Spring 1979).
GROWTH MANAGEMENT
see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CONDEMNATION LAW
Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: Preserving the 'Critical
Link' Between Habitat Modification and the 'Taking' of an Endangered Species.
Kenenth J. Plante and Andrew J. Baumann, vol. 20, p. 747 (Winter 1996).
Coastal Ecosystem Protection in Florida. Note, Joy R. Brockman, vol. 20, p. 859 (Winter
1996).
Concurrency and Its Relation to Growth Management. Note, Craig A. Robertson, vol. 20, p.
891 (Winter 1996).
Ecosystem Management in Florida - A Case Study Mike Batts, vol. 20, p. 743 (Winter 1996).
Florida's Growth Management Act: How Far We Have Come, and How Far We Have Yet to
Go. Richard Grosso, vol. 20, p. 589 (Winter 1996).
Florida's Private Property Rights Act - What Will It Mean for Florida's Future? Nancy E.
Stroud and Thomas G. Wright, vol. 20, p. 683 (Winter 1996).
Introduction, (Growth Management Symposium). Joel A. Mintz, vol. 20, p. 585 (Winter
1996).
Judicial Review of Local Government Decisions: 'Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil'.
Charles L. Siemon and Julie P. Kendig,, vol. 20, p. 707 (Winter 1996).
The Growth Management Pendulum: The Ecological Clock is Ticking for Florida and Other
States. Note,Vanessa Steinberg-Prieto, vol. 20, p. 987 (Winter 1996).
The Vermont Barrier: How Economic Protectionism Kept Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Out of St.
Albans, Vermont. Note, Michael A. Schneider, vol. 20, p. 919 (Winter 1996).
Waiting for the Go: Concurrency, Takings, and the Property Rights Act. Brenna Durden,
David Layman, and Sid Ansbacher, vol. 20, p. 661 (Winter 1996).
HANDICAPPED AND DISABLED
Retreat of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Southeastern Community College v. Davis. Clyde
M. Collins, Jr., vol. 4, p. 309 (Spring 1980).
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Academic Law Review Writing. John M. Lindsey, vol. 17, p. 917 (Winter 1993).
Assault and Flattery: A Texas Legend. James D. Peden, vol. 17, p. 955 (Winter 1993).
Attorney's Guide to Safe FAX: Dear Dr. Schwarz. Dr. Schwarz, vol. 17, p. 811 (Winter
1993).
Becoming a Partner. Ralph Warner & Toni Ihara, vol. 17, p. 951 (Winter 1993).
Case: God Juanita Grier v. Reagan, vol. 17, p. 795 (Winter 1993).
Case: Kazmaier V. Central Intelligence Agency, vol. 17, p. 793 (Winter 1993).
Concise Guide to Surviving the First Year of Law School. Oren S. Tasini, vol. 17, p. 849
(Winter 1993).
Corpus Juris Humorous. John B. McClay and Wendy L. Matthews, vol. 17, p. 911 (Winter
1993).
Courtesy on High. Justice Stanley Mosk, vol. 17, p. 937 (Winter 1993).
Dear Paul: Language Tips Questions and Answers. Paul Morris, vol. 17, p. 729 (Winter
1993).
Deconstruction Letters. Kenny Hegland and James Gordon, vol. 17, p. 994 (Winter 1993).
Faculty Meetings: 'A Quorum Plus Cramshaw.' Ron Lansing, vol. 17, p. 817 (Winter 1993).
Getting Into the Right Law School ('My Roomate the Moonie Scored in the 98th Percentile
on the LSAT and Got Into Harvard. Why Didn't I?'). D. Robert White, vol. 17, p. 979
(Winter 1993).
Good Humor' on the Bench: Just Desserts in a Judicial Diet. Rodger L. Hochman, vol. 17, p.
965 (Winter 1993).
Great / Fractured Moments in Courtroom History. Charles M. Sevilla, vol. 17, p. 669 (Winter
1993).
How to Win Friends and Impress Clients with Latin. Paul Morris, vol. 17, p. 991 (Winter
1993).
If the Law is a Jealous Mistress, What Ever Happened to Pay Toilets? A Digest of the Legally
Profound. Scott M. Solkoff, vol. 17, p. 715 (Winter 1993).
It's the Truth. Anonymous Author From The Department of Justice, vol. 17, p. 723 (Winter
1993).
Law and the Chicken: An Eggs-agerated Curriculum Proposal. Roger I. Abrams, vol. 17, p.
771 (Winter 1993).
Life, Lawyers, and Book Royalties. Jess M. Brallier, vol. 17, p. 767 (Winter 1993).
Mad Dogs and Englishmen: Pierson v. Post [A Ditty Dedicated to Freshmen Law Students,
Confused on the Merits]. Kenneth Lasson, vol. 17, p. 857 (Winter 1993).
Marxism and Critical Legal Theory: Why Groucho? Craig Brownlie, vol. 17, p. 921 (Winter
1993).
Memo of Masochism (Reflections in Legal Writing). J. Tim Willette, vol. 17, p. 869 (Winter
1993).
Notes and Comments: A Law Review Article. Patric M. Verrone, vol. 17, p. 733 (Winter
1993).
Open Season on Lawyers. Neal Boortz, vol. 17, p. 985 (Winter 1993).
Pain & Suffering. Dave Barry, vol. 17, p. 999 (Winter 1993).
Postmoderism and Dworkin: The View From Half-Court. Adam Winkler and Joshua Davis,
vol. 17, p. 799 (Winter 1993).
Recruiting Letters. D. Robert White, vol. 17, p. 709 (Winter 1993).
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Socrates' Class: A One-Act Play. Marc Rohr, vol. 17, p. 839 (Winter 1993).
Syllabus. Dan McGum, vol. 17, p. 893 (Winter 1993).
The All-Supreme-Court-Opinion Baseball Team. Patric M. Verrone, vol. 17, p. 933 (Winter
1993).
The Annotated Cordas. Michael L. Richmond, vol. 17, p. 899 (Winter 1993).
The Bases are Loaded and It's Time to Get a Restraining Order: The Confounding Conflation
of America's Two National Pastimes. Paul A. LeBel, vol. 17, p. 813 (Winter 1993),
The Best of PALS. Arnold B. Kanter, vol. 17, p. 975 (Winter 1993).
The Care and Feeding of TV Court Critics. Gerald F. Uelmen, vol. 17, p. 825 (Winter 1993).
The Drudge. Ron Ostroff, vol. 17, p. 855 (Winter 1993).
The Nebbish Letter. Glen Freyer, vol. 17, p. 685 (Winter 1993).
The Top Ten Ways the Justice System Would be Different if Bears Sat on Juries. Writers of
the David Letterman Show, vol. 17, p. 997 (Winter 1993).
The Unwritten Article. Erik M. Jensen, vol. 17, p. 785 (Winter 1993).
Top Ten Titles That Didn't Make the Cover. The Executive Board, vol. 17, p. 761 (Winter
1993).
Traffic Infraction, He Wrote. Dave Barry, vol. 17, p. 665 (Winter 1993).
Ugly as SIN. Arnold B. Kanter, vol. 17, p. 763 (Winter 1993).
Voir Dire: Just When You Think You've Heard It All. Judge Charles Stone, vol. 17, p. 867
(Winter 1993).
When on Mars. Arthur Garwin, vol. 17, p. 941 (Winter 1993).
Why Haven't the Critics Deconstructed Footnotes? Arthur D. Austin, vol. 17, p. 725 (Winter
1993).
HURRICANE ANDREW
Emergency Decisionmaking During the State of Florida's Response to Hurricane Andrew.
Stephen T. Maher, vol. 17, p. 1009 (Spring 1993).
Price Gouging: Application of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the
Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. Gary E. Lehman, vol. 17, p. 1029 (Spring 1993).
Recovering from Hurricane Andrew: Your Legal Rights. Legal Services of Greater Miami,
Inc., vol. 17, p. 1167 (Spring 1993).
Restrictions Against the Use of Hurricane Shutters: Are They Enforceable After Hurricane
Andrew? Note, Matthew J. Jowanna, vol. 17, p. 1191 (Spring 1993).
That Sinking Feeling-A Boat Owner's Liability in the Aftermath of a Hurricane. James E.
Mercante, vol. 17, p. 1053 (Spring 1993).
The Lessons of Hurricane Andrew: A Prescript. Roger I. Abrams, vol. 17, p. 1001 (Spring
1993).
IMMIGRATION
A Primer on Adjustment of Status in the United States. Judge Juan M. Bracete, vol. 13, p.
165 (Fall 1988).
Equal Protection for Aliens-The Sliding Scale of Judicial Review: Foley v. Connelie. Douglas
A. Blankman, vol. 3, p. 249 (Spring 1979).
Hard Decision: Asylum Protection as Applied to Aliens Opposing Population Control
Policies. Susan Y. Slaton, vol. 16, p. 955 (Winter 1992).
1039
263
: Nova Law Review 21, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha: A Legislative "House of Cards" Tumbles.
Fred L. Rush, Jr., vol. 8, p. 451 (Winter 1984).
Immigration Reform: Congress Expedites Illegal Alien Removal and Eliminates Judicial
Review from the Exclusion Process. Note, Paul S. Jones, vol. 21, p. 915 (Spring 1997).
The Five Year Residence Requirement for Naturalization: Its Operation and Employment-
Related Exceptions and Amelioration. Judge Juan M. Bracete, vol. 11, p. 1065 (Spring
1987).
The PRUCOL Provision in Public Benefits Law: An Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits.
Sharon F. Carton, vol. 14, p. 1033 (Spring 1990).
IMPACT FEES
Impact Fees: National Perspective to Florida Practice. Paul Gougelman, vol. 4, p. 137 (Spring
1980).
St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Association and Florida School Impact Fees:
An Exercise in Semantics. Joseph L. Parisi, vol. 16, p. 569 (Fall 1991).
INSURANCE
Apres le Deluge: National Flood Insurance. Marilyn B. Cane and Paul A. Caldarelli, vol. 17,
p. 1077 (Spring 1993).
Business Interrruption Insurance-A Business Perspective. David A. Borghesi, vol. 17, p. 1147
(Spring 1993).
Collateral Source Rule: Florida Statute [Section] 627.7372. Lori M. Lapin, vol. 5, p. 261
(Winter 1981).
Florida No-Fault Insurance: Ten Years of Judicial Interpretation. Patricia V. Russo, vol. 6, p.
241 (Winter 1982).
Florida Statutes Section 627.727: Is the Statutory Right to Reject Uninsured Motorist
Coverage Really a "Right" at All? Karen E. Roselli, vol. 8, p. 145 (Fall 1983).
Grant v. State Farm Fire Casualty Company-Finding Coverage for Motorcycles Under
Florida Insurance Law: Has the Good Neighbor Moved? Denise Tamir, vol. 18, p. 683
(Fall 1993).
Legislative Overview: Florida Automobile Reparations Act, 1972-1978: A Review of the
Modifications in the Tort Threshold. Terence T. O'Malley, vol. 3, p. 179 (Spring 1979).
Should an Intentional Discrimination Be Insured? David A. Silverstone, vol. 13, p. 671 (Fall
1989).
The Availability of Excess Damages in First-Party Bad Faith Cases: A Distinction Without a
Difference. Marc S. Buschman, vol. 15, p. 297 (Winter 1991).
The Insurer's Liability for Judgments in Excess of Policy Limits and the Movement Toward
Strict Liability: An Assessment. Donald A. Orlovsky, vol. 1, p. 31 (Spring 1977).
Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand Up? Florida Statutes Section 627.7262 as
Amended. Ilene D. Napp, vol. 7, p. 587 (Winter 1983).
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Copyright, Fair Use and Photocopying: A Stone Conundrum. Brian Anderson, vol. 3, p. 187
(Spring 1979).
Is Home Videotaping Fair Use of Copyright Programs? Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corporation of America. Howard S. Toland, vol. 6, p. 663 (Summer 1982).
The Current State of Computer Software Protection: A Survey and Bibliography of Copyright,
Trade Secret and Patent Alternatives. Batya R. Inofuentes, vol. 8, p. 107 (Fall 1983).
The Protection of Useful Articles and the Elusive Concept of Conceptual Separability:
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co. G. Coleman, vol. 13, p.
1417 (Spring 1989).
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the Prevention,
Control and Suppression of International and Transnational Criminality. M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, vol. 15, p. 353 (Spring 1991).
An International Criminal Court-An Emerging Idea. John B. Anderson, vol. 15, p. 433
(Spring 1991).
Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in the United States. Jeffrey N. Mausner,
vol. 15, p. 747 (Spring 1991).
Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation in the Criminal Process. Roger S.
Clark, vol. 15, p. 4 75 (Spring 1991).
Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal. M. Cherif Bassiouni, vol. 15, p. 373 (Spring
1991).
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Its Use, Its Roots and Its Viability. Richard D. Gregorie, vol. 15,
p. 625 (Spring 1991).
International Cooperation in a World Marketplace: Preventing & Prosecuting Commodity
Futures Fraud & Abuses. Lisa L. Davis and Bruce Zagaris, vol. 15, p. 507 (Spring
1991).
International Criminal Law and the Macro-Micro Problem. Anthony D'Amato, vol. 15, p.
343 (Spring 1991).
Protecting the Rule of Law from Assault in the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism.
Bruce Zagaris, vol. 15, p. 703 (Spring 1991).
The Development, Objectives, and Planned Activities of the International Criminal Law
Center of Fordham University School of Law. Abraham Abramovsky and Jonny Frank,
vol. 15, p. 501 (Spring 1991).
The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A Comparative Analysis. Sharon A. Williams,
vol. 15, p. 581 (Spring 1991).
The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United
States. David P. Stewart, vol. 15, p. 449 (Spring 1991).
United States International Drug Control-Policy, Extradition, and the Rule of Lawin
Colombia. Mark A. Sherman, vol. 15, p. 661 (Spring 1991).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW
see also CONFLICT OF LAWS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
International Law: 1987 Survey of Florida Law. Robert M. Jarvis, vol. 12, p. 547 (Spring
1988).
International Law: 1988 Survey of Florida Law. Robert M. Jarvis, vol. 13, p. 1105 (Spring
1989).
The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba. Luis Sala, vol. 8, p. 43 (Fall 1983).
Towards a Bill of Rights for Russia: Progress and Roadblocks. Vasilly A. Vlasihin, vol. 17, p.
1201 (Spring 1993).
JUDICIARY
A Response to Professor Graglia. Marc Rohr, vol. 14, p. 69 (Fall 1989).
A Sword for a Scabbard: Reflections on the Making of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Stanley I.
Kutler, vol. 14, p. 97 (Fall 1989).
Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw. Rodger L.
Hochman, vol. 17, p. 1367 (Spring 1993).
An Appreciation of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. William A. Fletcher, vol. 15, p. 15 (Winter
1991).
An Argument Against Judicial Immunity for Employment Decisions. Robert S. Glazier, vol.
11, p. 1127 (Spring 1987).
An Assessment of G. Edward White's "Coterminous Power Theory". Stuart Horn, vol. 14, p.
195 (Fall 1989).
An Introduction to Courts in American Society: A Symposium on the Bicentennial of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. Johnny C. Burris, vol. 14, p. 43 (Fall 1989).
Bad Decisions: Bad Judging: A Glimpse at the Dark Side of the Judiciary. John Tiedemann,
vol. 1I, p. 139 (Fall 1986).
Breakstone v. MacKenzie: In a Case Where Fear of Bias Is Raised by Judicial Election
Campaign Contributions, There Are No Clear Winners. Peter Cooke, vol. 15, p. 323
(Winter 1991).
Dear Boss: A Law Clerk's Tribute to Justice Brennan. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, vol. 15, p. 23
(Winter 1991).
Eighteen Years in the Judicial Catbird Seat. James C. Adkins, Leonard R. Sammuels and Paul
H. Crockett, vol. 11, p. 1 (Fall 1985).
Federal Judges' Absolute Immunity from Criminal Prosecution Prior to Impeachment: - U.S.
v. Hastings. Victoria Santoro, vol. 7, p. 623 (Spring 1983).
He Who Seeks Equity Must Find the Court Which Does Equity-The Current Jurisdictional
Conflict. Note, Manuel R. Valcarcel, vol. 19, p. 415 (Fall 1994).
Judicial Impartiality and the Judiciary Act of 1789. John T. Noonan, Jr., vol. 14, p. 123 (Fall
1989).
Judicial Review and the Supreme Court: An Accelerating Curve. Roger Handberg, vol. 2, p. 1
(Spring 1978).
Justice Harry Blackmun. Bruce S. Rogow, vol. 14, p. 9 (Fall 1989).
Keynote Address. Justice Gerald Kogan, vol. 16, p. 1 (Fall 1991).
Looking Back on Eighteen Years as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. Justice Joseph
A. Boyd, Jr., vol. 11, p. 25 (Fall 1986).
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Panel Discussion [Judicial Impartiality and the Judiciary Act of 1789]. Michael Bums, John
Flackett, and Janet Munn, vol. 14, p. 143 (Fall 1989).
Panel Discussion [Making of the Judiciary Act of 1789]. Daniel Hurley, William Hoeveler,
and Melanie May, vol. 14, p. 111 (Fall 1989).
Panel Discussion [The Judiciary Act of 1789]. John T. Noonan, vol. 14, p. 123 (Fall 1989).
Panel Discussion [The Separation Doctrine]. Stephen Wisotsky, Scott Mager, and Jerry
Sessions II, vol. 14, p. 241 (Fall 1989).
Pathways for Future Justice. Ben F. Overton, vol. 1, p. 1 (Spring 1977).
Recovering Coterminous Power Theory. G. Edward White, vol. 14, p. 155 (Fall 1989).
Recusal of Judges for Reasons of Bias or Prejudice: A Survey of Florida Law-Proposal for
Reform. Louis D. D'Agostino, vol. 11, p. 201 (Fall 1986).
Reflections About the United States Supreme Court. Arthur J. Goldberg, vol. 5, p. 159 (Fall
1980).
Reply to G. Edward White's "Coterminous Power Theory". Stuart Horn, vol. 14, p. 195 (Fall
1989).
Response. The Growth of National Judicial Power. Lino A. Graglia, vol. 14, p. 53 (Fall
1989).
Roundtable Discussion [Symposium on the Bicentennial of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789]. Roger I. Abrams, John B. Anderson, Lino A. Graglia, Stanley I. Kutler, John T.
Noona, Jr., and G. Edward White, vol. 14, p. 4 3 (Fall 1989).
Shelter from the Storm. Anthony Chase, vol. 14, p. 269 (Fall 1989).
Some Brief Observations on G. Edward White's Rediscovery of the Coterminous Power
Theory. Johnny C. Burris, vol. 14, p. 215 (Fall 1989).
Stripping Away the Fictions: Interview with Mr. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, vol. 6, p. 553
(Summer 1982).
The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings. Alan I. Baron, vol. 19, p. 873 (Spring 1995).
The Eleventh Circuit's First Decade Contribution to the Law of the Nation, 1981-1991.
Thomas E. Baker, vol. 19, p. 323 (Fall 1994).
The Federal Courts in the 21st Century. Maurice Rosenberg, vol. 15, p. 105 (Winter 1991).
The First Amendment and Its Religion Clauses: Where Are We? Where Are We Going? Harry
A. Blackmun, vol. 14, p. 29 (Fall 1989).
The Growth of National Judicial Power Replies. Lino A. Graglia, vol. 14, p. 53 (Fall 1989).
The Judiciary Act of 1789: Some Personal Reflections. Elizabeth Holtzman, vol. 14, p. 253
(Fall 1989).
The Separation Doctrine-Prescription for Conflict or Cause for Creative Constitutionalism?
John B. Anderson, vol. 14, p. 227 (Fall 1989)
The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative Naysayer to Affirmative Commander.
Arthur S. Miller, vol. 6, p. 1 (Fall 1981).
The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights.
William J. Brennan, Jr., vol. 15, p. 1 (Winter 1991).
Through the Looking Glass with Lino Graglia. Paul R. Joseph, vol. 14, p. 75 (Fall 1989).
Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Daniel J. O'Hem, vol. 15, p. 11 (Winter 1991).
Who Will Guard the Guardians? Independent Counsel, State Secrets, and Judicial Review.
Matthew N. Kaplan, vol. 18, p. 1787 (Spring 1994).
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JUVENILE LAW
see also CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
FAMILY LAW
Juvenile Crime: The Implications and Effects on Juveniles in Florida. Richard C. Mahler, vol.
13, p. 1317 (Spring 1989).
Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation Back into Style. Jack Levine, vol. 8, p.
255 (Winter 1984).
Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 21, p. 189 (Fall 1996).
Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 20, p. 191 (Fall 1995).
Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 19, p. 139 (Fall 1994).
Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments in Florida Law. Michael J.
Dale, vol. 18, p. 541 (Fall 1993).
Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 17, p. 33 5 (Fall 1992).
Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 16, p. 33 3 (Fall 1991).
Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 15, p. 1169 (Spring 1991).
Juvenile Law: 1989 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 14, p. 859 (Spring 1990).
Juvenile Law: 1988 Survey of Florida Law. Michael J. Dale, vol. 13, p. 1159 (Spring 1989).
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juveniles into Adult Criminal Court: The Ends of Justice ... or the
End of Justice? State v. Cain. Tim Day, vol. 5, p. 4 87 (Fall 1980).
Speedy Trial Rights for Florida's Juveniles: A Survey of Recent Interpretations by Florida
Courts. Barbara D. Stull, vol. 6, p. 437 (Fall 1981).
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A Challenge to Workers' Rights. Anthony Chase, vol. 8, p. 671 (Spring 1984).
A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Evan J. Kemp, Jr.
and Christopher G. Bell, vol. 15, p. 31 (Winter 1991).
Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90s: Wards Cove vs. The Civil Rights Act of 1990.
Kenni F. Judd, vol. 15, p. 67 (Winter 1991).
Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and the Future of Law.
M. Ethan Katsh, vol. 8, p. 631 (Spring 1984).
Conflicts of Interest Arising under ERISA's Fiduciary Standards: Can the Trustee Ever Be
Prudent, As Long As He Faces Dual Loyalties? David I. Weiss, vol. 9, p. 413 (Spring
1985).
EEOC's New Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Civility in the Workplace. Robert W. Martin,
vol. 15, p. 405 (Spring 1981).
Employment and Labor Law: 1988 Survey of Florida Law. John Sanchez, vol. 13, p. 981
(Spring 1989).
Keeping Capital and Jobs at Home. Deborah G. Olson, vol. 8, p. 583 (Spring 1984).
Labor and Employment Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law-A Confluence of Streams. Clement
L. Hyland, vol. 19, p. 161 (Fall 1994).
Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments-At-Will Termination of Employment Has
Not Been Terminated. Joseph Z. Fleming, vol. 20, p. 437 (Fall 1995).
New Technology: A Catalyst for Crises in Collective Bargaining, Industrial Discipline and
Labor Law. Stan Weir, vol. 8, p. 597 (Spring 1984).
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Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle Sam. Anna M. Walsh Burke, vol. 21, p. 869 (Spring
1997).
Sexual Harassment After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-Is It Really Easier to Prove?
Comment, Mary C. Gomez, vol. 18, p. 1889 (Spring 1994).
Technology, Labor Interests and the Law: Some Fundamental Points and Problems. Warren J.
Samuels, A. Allan Schmid, and James D. Shaffer and Robert A. Solo and Stephen A.
Woodbury, vol. 8, p. 487 (Spring 1984).
The Case of the Burnside Foundry. Mary Gibson, vol. 8, p. 547 (Spring 1984).
The Cost of Scruples: A Call for Common Law Protection for the Professional Whistleblower.
Terry Ann Halbert, vol. 10, p. 1 (Fall 1985).
The Status of ERISA Plan Benefits in Bankruptcy After Patterson v. Shumate. Honorable
Sidney M. Weaver and Robin J. Baikovitz, vol. 17, p. 427 (Fall 1992).
Workers Compensation Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law. Ellen Fell Baig, vol. 18, p. 427
(Fall 1993).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Landlord Liability to Tenants for Crimes of a Third Party: The Status in Florida. Theresa M.
B. Van Vliet, vol. 6, p. 145 (Fall 1981).
LAW AND THE ARTS
A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989. Edward J. Danich, vol. 14, p. 407
(Spring 1990).
Art and Censorship. Richard Sierra, vol. 14, p. 323 (Spring 1990).
Art and First Amendment Protection in Light of Texas v. Johnson. Jeffrey N. Schwartz, vol.
14, p. 4 8 7 (Spring 1990).
Art and Income Taxes-The Changing Scene. Ralph E. Lerner, vol. 14, p. 533 (Spring 1990).
Art Forgery: Ten Art Market and Legal Considerations. Peter B. Skolnik, vol. 7, p. 315
(Winter 1983).
Art Funding: The Fight Over Sex, Money and Power. Nicols Fox, vol. 14, p. 369 (Spring
1990).
Art, Obscenity and the First Amendment. Judith Bresler, vol. 14, p. 357 (Spring 1990).
Avant-Garde, Kitsch and Law. Anthony Chase, vol. 14, p. 549 (Spring 1990).
Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90s: Wards Cove vs. The Civil Rights Act of 1990.
Kenni F. Judd, vol. 15, p. 67 (Winter 1991).
Drafting "Work For Hire" Agreements After Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.
Jean S. Perwin, vol. 14, p. 459 (Spring 1990).
EEOC's New Sexual Harassment Guidelines: Civility in the Workplace. Robert W. Martin,
vol. 15, p. 405 (Spring 1981).
Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution. Robert A. Gorman, vol.14, p. 421
(Spring 1990).
Florida's Art Consignment Statute: A Trap for the Unwary Artist? Cathryn M. Heise, vol. 14,
p. 473 (Spring 1990).
Moral Rights: The Long and Winding Road Toward Recognition. Jack A. Cline, vol. 14, p.
435 (Spring 1990).
One If By Land, Two If By Sea. Arthur I. Jacobs, vol. 14, p. 343 (Spring 1990).
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Reauthorizing the National Endowment for the Arts. Bruce Fein, vol. 14, p. 333 (Spring
1990).
Tax-Paid Obscenity. Jesse Helms, vol. 14, p. 317 (Spring 1990).
The Cost of Scruples: A Call for Common Law Protection for the Professional Whistleblower.
Terry A. Halbert, vol. 10, p. 1 (Fall 1985).
The General Practice of Art Law. Ira M. Lowe and Paul A. Mahon, vol. 14, p. 503 (Spring
1990).
The Lawyer as an Artist. Roger I. Abrams, vol. 14, p. 573 (Spring 1990).
The Role of Creativity in Social and Political Processes. Gustav Harrow, vol. 14, p. 545
(Spring 1990).
"Tilted Arc" Destroyed. Richard Serra, vol. 14, p. 385 (Spring 1990).
Where Are We Now? Some Thoughts on "Art Law". Susan D. Biederman, vol. 14, p. 313
(Spring 1990).
LAW AND LITERATURE
Coming of Age Some More: "Law and Literature" Beyond the Cradle. Richard Weisber, vol.
13, p. 107 (Fall 1988).
Winterset and the Recrudescence of Ressentiment. Steven M. Richman, vol. 18, p. 1863
(Spring 1994).
LFGAL EDUCATION
A Dream: On Discovering the Significance of Fear. Charles R. Lawrence, vol. 10, p. 627
(Winter 1986).
A Federal Litigation Program: For Students, Inmates and the Legal Profession. Randy
Freedman and Thomas J. Ross II, vol. 4, p. 377 (Spring 1980).
A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam. Janet I. Motley, vol. 10, p. 723 (Winter
1986).
A Law School with a Bent for Public Service. Daniel H. Pollitt, vol. 10, p. 779 (Winter
1986).
A Neglected Minority-Women in Law School. Faith Seidenberg, vol. 10, p. 843 (Winter
1986).
A New Direction in Legal Education: The CUNY Law School at Queens College. Charles R.
Halpern, vol. 10, p. 549 (Winter 1986).
A Second Chance: Learning What Law School Never Taught Me. Harry L. Anstead, vol. 10,
p. 289 (Winter 1986).
A Semi-Modest Proposal: Is a Little Business Sense Too Much to Ask? Marjorie M. Holmes,
vol. 10, p. 599 (Winter 1986).
Application of the 'Tipping Point" Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies. Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., vol. 10, p. 319 (Winter 1986).
Congestion and Beyond: Change and Continuity in Modem French Legal Education-A Design
for U.S. Law Schools. David Applebaum, vol. 10, p. 297 (Winter 1986).
CUNY Law School: Outside Perspectives and Reflections. Judith Kleinberg and Mark.
Barnes, vol. 12, p. 1 (Fall 1987)
Economics of Mind: A Collaborative Reflection. Dinesh Khosla and Patricia Williams, vol.
10, p. 619 (Winter 1986).
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Enlarging Legal Education: Berkeley's Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. Sheldon L.
Messinger and Philip Selznick, vol. 10, p. 691 (Winter 1986).
Finding Peace and Teaching it. Ann F. Glinger, vol. 10, p. 521 (Winter 1986).
How Women Betray Themselves. Vivian Wilson, vol. 10, p. 889 (Winter 1986).
Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Ideal University. Kellis E. Parker, vol. 10, p. 761 (Winter
1986).
Law School Clinical Education in Florida. Anne L. Spitzer, vol. 12, p. 797 (Spring 1988).
Law Schools: Where the Elite Meet to Teach. Howard A. Glickstein, vol. 10, p. 541 (Winter
1986).
Lawyering in the Classroom: An Address to First Year Students. Allison G. Anderson, vol.
10, p. 271 (Winter 1986).
Lawyers Above the Law. Gustave Harrow, vol. 10, p. 575 (Winter 1986).
Legal Education and the English Language. Stanley A. Weigel, vol. 10, p. 887 (Winter 1986).
Legal Education: The Last Academic Bastion of Sex Bias? Nancy S. Erickson, vol. 10, p. 457
(Winter 1986).
Legal Extemships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical Experiences for Law Students? Henry
Rose, vol. 12, p. 95 (Fall 1987).
Liberal Values in Legal Education. Duncan M. Kennedy, vol. 10, p. 603 (Winter 1986).
Of Law, the River and Legal Education. Gary Minda, vol. 10, p. 705 (Winter 1986).
Origins of Modem Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical
Instruction in Law. Anthony Chase, vol. 5, p. 323 (Spring 1981).
Preparation of Lawyers in England and the United States: A Comparative Glimpse. Roger C.
Crampton, vol. 10, p. 445 (Winter 1986).
Reminiscence. Patty Rauch, vol. 10, p. 793 (Winter 1986).
Reteaching Criminal Procedure: A Public Interest Model for the Defense of Criminal Cases.
Paul Savoy, vol. 10, p. 801 (Winter 1986).
Reworking the Latent Agenda of Legal Education. Cynthia F. Epstein, vol. 10, p. 449 (Winter
1986).
Robert Hutchings' Question Defining the Purpose of Legal Education-Then Doing Something
About It. Fredrick C. Tausend, vol. 10, p. 851 (Winter 1986).
Ruminations on Legal Education in the Next Decade. Don W. Llewellyn and Richard C.
Turkington, vol. 10, p. 647 (Winter 1986).
Staying Alive. Lucy S. McGough, vol. 10, p. 671 (Winter 1986).
Studies of Legal Education: A Review of Recent Reports. Robert S. Redmount and Thomas
L. Shaffer, vol. 1, p. 9 (Spring 1977).
Teaching and Writing: Curriculum Reform as an Exercise in Critical Education. Gerald
Torres, vol. 10, p. 867 (Winter 1986).
Teaching First-Year Students: The Inevitability of a Political Agenda. Leon Letwin, vol. 10,
p. 645 (Winter 1986).
The City University of New York Law School: An Insider's Report. Vanessa Merton, vol. 12,
p. 45. (Fall 1987).
The Habit of Success. Howard C. Anawalt, vol. 10, p. 255 (Winter 1986).
The Integration of Responsibility and Values: Legal Education in an Alternative Conscious-
ness of Lawyering and Law. Howard Lesnick, vol. 10, p. 633 (Winter 1986).
The Law School and the Profession: A Need for Bridges. Frank M. Coffin, vol. 11, p. 1053
(Spring 1987).
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The New Nova Curriculum: Training Lawyers for the Twenty-First Century. Roger I. Abrams
and Michael R. Masinter, vol. 12, p. 77 (Fall 1987).
The Pedagogy of Community: Trust and Responsibility at CUNY Law School. John M.
Farago, vol. 10, p. 465 (Winter 1986).
The Play's the Thing .... Jonathan B. Chase, vol. 10, p. 425 (Winter 1986).
The Politics of Meeting. Peter Gabel, vol. 10, p. 517 (Winter 1986).
The Reality of Law School. Al B. Tross, vol. 10, p. 879 (Winter 1986).
The Tunnel Vision of Legal Training. Joseph R. Grodin, vol. 10, p. 547 (Winter 1986).
The Use of Appellate Case Report Analysis in Modem Legal Education: How Much Is Too
Much? Steven I. Friedland, vol. 10, p. 495 (Winter 1986).
Too Important to Leave to the Lawyers: Undergraduate Legal Studies and Its Challenge to
Professional Legal Education. Donna E. Arzt, vol. 13, p. 125 (Fall 1988).
Training Lawyers for the Powerless: What Law Schools Should Do to Develop Public Interest
Lawyers. Jan C. Costello, vol. 10, p. 431 (Winter 1986).
What Should a Law Teacher Believe? Anthony Chase, vol. 10, p. 403 (Winter 1986).
Who Needs Information When You're Working Underground? Legal Education, Social
Context, and the Public Interest. Anthony Chase, vol.12, p. 55 (Fall 1987).
LEGAL ETHICS
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The Beginning of the End for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity.
Deborah S. Platz, vol. 18, p. 1919 (Spring 1994).
Client Perjury: The Law in Florida. Randolph Braccialarghe, vol. 12, p. 707 (Spring 1988).
Ethics: 1991 Survey of Florida Law. Jacquelyn P. Needelman, vol. 16, p. 281 (Fall 1991).
Legal Ethics: 1986 Survey of Florida Law. Howard R. Messing, vol. 11, p. 1435 (Summer
1987).
Professional Ethics: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments in Florida Law.
Adele I. Stone, vol. 18, p. 597 (Fall 1993).
Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida Law. Timothy Chinaris, vol. 21, p. 231
(Fall 1996).
Professional Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in Review, 1995. Timothy P. Chinaris,
vol. 20, p. 223 (Fall 1995).
Professional Responsibility: 1988 Survey of Florida Law. Patricia J. Allen, vol. 13, p. 1195
(Spring 1989).
Professional Responsibility: 1985 Survey of Florida Law. Howard R. Messing, vol. 10, p.
1107 (Spring 1986).
The Anencephalic Baby Theresa: A Prognosticator of Future Bioethics. Julie Koenig, vol. 17,
p. 445 (Fall 1992).
The Corporation's Attorney-Client Gamble: Privileged Communications or Discovery Prones
Disclosures. Mark R. McCollem, vol. 6, p. 617 (Summer 1982).
LEGAL PROFESSION
Bringing It All Back Home: Toward a Closer Rapport Between Lawyer and Layperson.
Michael L. Richmond, vol. 6, p. 97 (Fall 1981).
Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question.
Alan Morrison, vol. 4, p. 363 (Spring 1980).
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Private Homosexual Activity and Fitness to Practice Law: Florida Board of Bar Examiners, In
re N.R.S. Leslie J. Roberts, vol. 6, p. 519 (Spring 1982).
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia: A Manifesto for Sane Productivity and Productive
Sanity. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 13, p. 39 (Fall 1988).
A Law School for the Consumer. Marc Rohr, vol. 13, p. 102 (Fall 1988).
"A Task of No Common Magnitude": The Founding of the American Law Institute. William
P. LaPiana, vol. 11, p. 1085 (Spring 1987).
Advice to the Untenured. Gall L. Richmond, vol. 13, p. 79 (Fall 1988).
How Many Catz Can You Stand on the Head of a Pin, or Andrew Lloyd Webber, Where Are
You Now That We Need You? Charles A. Wright, vol. 13, p. 1 (Fall 1988).
Legal Scholarship, Legal Realism, and the Law Teacher's Intellectual Schizophrenia. Clark
Byse, vol. 13, p. 9 (Fall 1988).
The Cultural Milieu of Law. Michael L. Richmond, vol. 13, p. 89 (Fall 1988).
The Legal Scholar as Producer. Anthony Chase, vol. 13, p. 57 (Fall 1988).
This Is Not an Article, Or Scholarship: The Greek Salad. Roger I. Abrams, vol. 13, p. 33 (Fall
1988).
Why Law Professors Should Not Be Hessian-Trainers. Robert M. Jarvis, vol. 13, p. 69 (Fall
1988).
LEGISLATION
Florida Nonsmokers Need Legislative Action to "Clear the Air". Curtis R. Cowan, vol. 8, p.
389 (Winter 1984).
The War Powers Resolution of 1973: An Attempt to Regulate War Powers Proves Indequate.
Paul D. Novack, vol. 8, p. 4 27 (Winter 1984).
When Open-Meeting Laws Confront State Legislatures: How Privacy Survives in the Capitol.
John Peterson, vol. 10, p. 107 (Fall 1985).
LITIGATION
Asbestos Litigation: Balancing the Interests of Insurance Companies, Manufacturers, and the
Victims. Ryna E. Mehr, vol. 6, p. 573 (Summer 1982).
MEDIATION
see also ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Mediation: 1990 Survey of Florida Law. Geraldine L. Waxman and Sharon Press, vol. 15, p.
1211 (Spring 1991).
Mediation: 1989 Survey of Florida Law. Geraldine L. Waxman, vol. 14, p. 238 (Spring
1990).
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Medical Mediation-A Judicially Supervised Social Hours. Edward Winitz, vol. 3, p. 165
(Spring 1979).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Discoverability of Hospital Incident Reports and Taxing Expert Witness Fees in Medical
Malpractice Litigation in Florida: Plaintiff's Perspective. Michael Flynn, vol. 13, p. 189
(Fall 1988).
Hospital Liability in View of Insinga v. LaBella: No Relief in Sight. Leslie H. Friedland, vol.
14, p. 1115 (Spring 1990).
Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving Theories and ERISA's
Impact. Mark 0. Zamora, vol. 19, p. 1047 (Spring 1995).
Medical Malpractice: A Review of the Presuit Screening Provisions of the Florida Medical
Malpractice Act. Honorable Nelly N. Khouzam, vol. 20, p. 453 (Fall 1995).
Toward a Legally and Medically Acceptable Definition of Death. Cynthia L. Janov, vol. 5, p.
471 (Spring 1981).
MENTAL HEALTH
A Proposal for Changing Florida's Civil Commitment System. Winsor C. Schmidt, vol. 6, p.
385 (Spring 1982).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
see also INTERNATIONAL LAW
A Grenville Clark Hypothetical. Gerald T. Dunne, vol. 7, p. 165 (Summer 1982).
A Prelude to a Constitutional Debate. Ovid C. Lewis, vol. 7, p. I (Summer 1982).
Admirable Ends-Ineffective Means. Iredell Jenkins, vol. 7, p. 127 (Summer 1982).
In Brief Rejoinder. Arthur S. Miller, vol. 7, p. 171 (Summer 1982).
International Law as Law of the Land. Martin Feinreider, vol. 7, p. 103 (Summer 1982).
Lawyers Can Contribute to Nuclear Weapons Debate. L. Harold Levinson, vol. 7, p. 137
(Summer 1982).
Letter from the Government. William H. Taft, IV, vol. 7, p. 141 (Summer 1982).
Nuclear War: The End of Law. Milner Ball, vol. 7, p. 53 (Summer 1982).
Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law. Arthur S. Miller, vol. 7, p. 21 (Summer 1982).
Nuclear Weapons Policy: The Ultimate Tyranny. Elliott L. Meyrowitz, vol. 7, p. 93 (Summer
1982).
Nuclear Weapons: Unconstitutional or Just Unjust. Gary L. McDowell, vol. 7, p. 143
(Summer 1982).
Protective Posterity. Aviam Soifer, vol. 7, p. 39 (Summer 1982).
The Constitution and Nuclear Defense. Arval A. Morris, vol. 7, p. 149 (Summer 1982).
The Frail Constitution of Good Intentions. Stanley C. Brubaker, vol. 7, p. 65 (Summer 1982).








Nurse Practitioners: Here Today... Gone Tomorrow? Sheryl Havens, vol. 6, p. 365 (Winter
1982).
OBSCENITY
Essay: Too Live a Crew. Bruce Rogow, vol. 15, p. 241 (Winter 1991).
Obscenity, Music and the First Amendment: Was the Crew 2 Lively? Emily Campbell, vol.
15, p. 159 (Winter 1991).
Race, Rap and the Community Standards Test of Obscenity: The Community of Culture.
Steven I. Friedland, vol. 15, p. 119 (Winter 1991).
PARTNERSHIP
Limited Partnership Act 1986 Survey of Florida Law. Richard R. Thames, vol. 11, p. 1405
(Summer 1987).
PRIVILEGE
Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Recognizes the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
the Federal Courts and Expands the Privilege to Include Social Workers. Comment,
Jason L. Gunter, vol. 21, p. 719 (Winter 1997).
PRODUCTS LIAmLny
Products Liability Statute of Repose-A Florida Perspective. Linda D. Caldwell, vol. 11, p.
849 (Winter 1987).
The Products Liability Statute ofd Repose in Florida: A Trap for the Unwary. William M.
Tuttle, vol. 7, p. 563 (Spring 1983).
The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products.
Frank J. Cavico, Jr., vol. 12, p. 213 (Fall 1987).
PUBLIC SERVICE
Introduction to Nova Conference on Public Interest Practice in Florida. Bruce S. Rogow, vol.
4, p. 341 (Spring 1980).
Pathways for Future Justice. Ben Overton, vol. 1, p. 1 (Spring 1977).
The Old Lawyer Said: "I Look Out for My Paying Clients," The Young Lawyer Responded:
"But Good Lawyers Must Also Do Some Public Service." Chesterfield Smith, vol. 4, p.
349 (Spring 1980).
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REAL PROPERTY
see also LANDLORD AND TENANT
UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTION ACT
ZONING
Equitable Conversion: The Effect of a Hurricane on Real Estate Sales Contracts. Gary S.
Gaffney, vol. 17, p. 1133 (Spring 1993).
Florida's Land Trust Act: An Overview. Mitchell A. Sherman, vol. 6, p. 489 (Spring 1982).
Florida's Property Appraisers. David M. Hudson, vol. 7, p. 477 (Spring 1983).
Johnson v. Davis: New Liability for Fraudulent Nondisclosure in Real Property Transactions.
Renee D. Braeunig, vol. 11, p. 145 (Fall 1986).
Mandatory Titles: The Legality of Land Development Linkage. Fred P. Bosselman and Nancy
E. Stroud, vol. 9, p. 381 (Spring 1985).
Property Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Benton and Joseph M. Grohman, vol.
21, p. 279 (Fall 1996).
Property Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, Joseph M. Grohman, and
Manuel R. Valcarcel, IV, vol. 20, p. 257 (Fall 1995).
Property Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown and Joseph M. Grohman, vol.
19, p. 215 (Fall 1994).
Property: 1991 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 16, p. 399 (Fall 1991).
Property: 1989 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 14, p. 939 (Spring 1990).
Property: 1987 Survey of Florida Law. James J. Brown, vol. 12, p. 6 17 (Spring 1988).
Property: 1986 Survey of Florida Law. Joseph M. Grohman, vol. 11, p. 1467 (Summer 1987).
Real Estate Broker Liability in Florida: Is Mandatory Housing Inspection in Florida's Future?
Gary S. Gaffney, vol. 11, p. 825 (Winter 1987).
Real Estate Purchase Options. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 12, p. 147 (Winter 1987).
Real Property: 1993 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 18, p. 389 (Fall 1993).
Real Property: 1992 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 17, p. 387 (Fall 1992).
Real Property: 1990 Survey of Florida Law. Ronald B. Brown, vol. 16, p. 399 (Fall 1991).
Real Property: 1988 Survey of Florida Law. William P. Sklar, vol. 13, p. 1221 (Spring 1989).
Solar Access Rights in Florida: Is There a Right to Sunlight in the Sunshine State? Kenneth J.
Potis, vol. 10, p. 125 (Fall 1985).
The Preservation of Florida's Public Trust Doctrine. Karen Van Den Heuvel Fischer, vol. 11,
p. 227 (Fall 1986).
RELIGION
Religious Deprogramming: A Solution Through Judicially Approved Guardians. Ira J.
Schsacter, vol. 7, p. 383 (Winter 1983).
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
Forward-Symposium on Reproductive Rights. Nadine Taub, vol. 13, p. 319 (Spring 1989).
Introduction-Symposium on Reproductive Rights. Working Group of the Project on
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s, vol. 13, p. 321 (Spring 1989).
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Motherhood: Beyond Patriarchy. Barbara K. Rothman, vol. 13, p. 481 (Spring 1989).
Normative Regulation of Reproductive Technology in Israel. Amos Shapira, vol. 13, p. 609
(Spring 1989).
Perspective on Surrogacy: Risks, Rewards, and Personal Choices. Noel Keane, vol. 13, p. 487
(Spring 1989).
Predicting the Future of Privacy in Pregnancy; How Medical Technology Affects the Legal
Rights of Pregnant Women. George Anna, vol. 13, p. 329 (Spring 1989).
Reproduction and Medical Interventionism: An Historical Comment. Clyde Spillinger, vol.
13, p. 385 (Spring 1989).
Should Mom Be Constrained in the Best Interests of the Fetus? Patricia King, vol. 13, p. 393
(Spring 1989).
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act: A View from the Drafting Commit-
tee. Robert C. Robinson and Paul M. Kurtz, vol. 13, p. 491 (Spring 1989).
Weaving "Birth" Technology into the "Value and Policy Web" of Medicine, Ethics and Law:
Should Policies on "Conception" Be Consistent? Margaret A. Somerville, vol. 13, p.
515 (Spring 1989).
Whose Egg Is It Anyway? Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized, and
Incompetent Women. Susan Stefan, vol. 13, p. 4 05 (Spring 1989).
Will Roe v. Wade Survive the Rehnquist Court? Dawn Johnson and Marcy Wilder, vol. 13, p.
457 (Winter 1989).
Women, Abortion and Civil Disobedience. Lynn M. Paltrow, vol. 13, p. 4 7 1 (Spring 1989).
Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law. Maru
Ashe, vol. 13, p. 355 (Spring 1989).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Does the Constitution Guarantee Court-Appointed Counsel When the Plea Is "Don't Take My
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